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Abstract
As location becomes an increasingly important piece of context information regarding
a device, so too must the method of providing this information increase in reliability.
In many situations, false location information may impact the security or objectives of
the system to which it has been supplied. Research concerning localization and location
veriﬁcation addresses this issue. The majority of solutions, however, revolve around a
trusted infrastructure to provide a certiﬁed location.
This thesis presents an enhanced design for a location veriﬁcation system, moving
veriﬁcation away from infrastructure-based approaches. Instead, an ad hoc approach is
presented, employing regular local devices in the role usually reserved for trusted entities
- the role of the evidence provider.
We begin with an introduction to the area of localization, outlining the primary tech-
niques employed. We summarize previous approaches, highlighting the improvements and
outstanding issues of each. Following this, we outline a novel metric for use with dis-
tance bounding to increase the accuracy of evidence extracted from the distance bounding
process. We show through emulation that this metric is feasible within an IEEE 802.11
wireless network.
We detail the Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gathering Protocol (SLVPGP), a
protocol designed to protect the process of evidence gathering. We employ our novel metric
to conﬁrm the presence of a device in an area. We repeatedly extend the SLVPGP's basic
design to form three protocols, each with increasingly stronger security. These protocols
are formally veriﬁed to conﬁrm their speciﬁed security properties.
To complete the design of our veriﬁcation system, we present two approaches to judging
a claim based on the evidence supplied. We demonstrate the accuracy of these approach
through simulation. We also include a brief outline of the concept of reputation and discuss
an existing approach to its calculation based on the previous behaviour of devices within
the system.
vi
Acknowledgements
I wish to acknowledge everyone who has helped me with my research and this thesis. I
would like to thank the Irish Research Council for Science Engineering and Technology
and the Embark Initiative for supporting me through their Ph.D. Research Grant scheme.
I also thank my examiners, Dr. Srdjan apkun and Dr. David Sinclair for their useful
comments, suggestions and feedback on this thesis, and Dr. Gavin Lowe for all his help in
conquering the tricks necessary to tame Casper for my own uses.
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. David Gray, without
whom I would never have come this far. Over the years, David has been an inspiration
and a sounding board, as well as a source of advice and a fresh perspective on the issues.
Throughout my work, from its infancy as an idea about IP address localization right
through to its current form, no matter what the area, he has been a huge inﬂuence. His
support and encouragement have helped me to overcome many obstacles that seemed
impossible along the way and this work would not exist without all of his guidance.
There is one other member of my DCU life that has shaped the path of my academic
career in an enormous way. While working on my undergraduate degree within the college,
I met John Judge and since then he has become a mentor of sorts. From assisting me
with my research grant application to acting as a sounding board when I despaired of
ﬁnding solutions, from working on my transfer report right through to aiding in Viva
preparation and dispelling pre-Viva nerves, John has played an unmistakeable role and I
will be eternally grateful for all he has done.
Beginning in my very ﬁrst year of college and continuing right through to the years
of research on this work, Redbrick has been an incredibly important part of my life. It
has broadened both my social and academic circles within the college and beyond to other
academic institutions around the country. I would like to thank the original founders of
the society for starting what would prove to be such a huge part of so many lives over
the years. I would also like to thank all the people available in #lobby, via hey and on
the boards for providing technological advice, interesting conversation to distract when
research hit a roadblock and even occasionally providing the perfect new angle I hadn't
vii
thought of yet.
To my friends, who have been so very patient with me every time I was stuck at a
computer screen rather than being able to go out and play, who were there with tea and
sympathy when I needed it, and who regaled me with entertaining (and distracting!) stories
when my mind was overloaded, you have no idea how much I have appreciated this. Una,
your teasing served to remind me that there would be life after college, while your "gentle"
comments about my capability made me remember why we're friends. To the Scoobies,
who accepted that I disappeared from life for many months at a time with only minimal
teasing and who have been a great source of sanity in an insane time of my life, thank you
for not kicking me out of the group.
Words do not exist to convey the amount of gratitude and appreciation I feel for
everything that Eoghan has done for me over these years. His unquestioning belief in my
ability to succeed has been a light during some very dark times and his help has been
invaluable in so many ways, from chapter upon chapter of proof reading to help with
automating simulation runs through scripting. For all the nights in with pizza and tv
because going out was just not possible, for your willingness to make the most absurd
wishes come true (including my pony) just to keep me smiling, for your support and for
your mere presence, thank you.
I was lucky enough to have been born with parents, David and Jacqueline, who believed
their children should follow their dreams. They taught me to always try my best, and even
when I thought this was far beyond what I was capable of, their belief that this was within
my reach has never wavered. They have suﬀered through every rough patch and celebrated
every milestone along the way, no matter how small. My siblings, Erica and Declan, have
been with me every step of the way, keeping me aﬂoat with their belief in my ability when
my own had run out. Their patience has seemed unending, and though I have tried to
repay them for all their support with baked goods, I know that what they have given me
is priceless and no amount of brownies could ever compare.
In addition to an extraordinarily supportive family, I have been blessed with an ex-
tremely close extended family. Sinèad, Eoin and Gina, you have been there since the
beginning, living through all the stress and worry and savoring all the successes. You have
listened to my thoughts and even sat through presentations. You probably know my work
viii
best out of everyone beyond Eoghan. Thank you for everything and I promise not to make
you read beyond the acknowledgements. Auntie Jean and Uncle Colm, better support
parents I couldn't ask for, and I know you will appreciate my freedom in France from now
on. Thank you for your emergency air conditioning, as many of the thoughts in this work
would probably be a puddle on the ground in Vias if you hadn't stepped in.
My grandparents, both maternal and paternal, have always been involved in my life,
and nothing made them prouder than to hear about their granddaughter's progress through
the school system and on into third level academia. Though I didn't become the nun as
my grandad wanted, I know that the pride he felt on the day I graduated from my B.Sc.
is nothing to what he feels now. Oftentimes, the thought of being able to show him my
ﬁnal parchment motivated me to keep going when I was extremely low, and I credit him
as one of the main reasons I didn't leave my research by the side of the road.
"Nothing worth having ever comes easily" is a statement I've heard a lot over the last
few years. Though at times it's seemed like this just wasn't worth the trouble, the people in
my life have kept things in perspective and prevented me from throwing it all away. Saying
"thank you" just isn't enough, but I hope that they understand everything it conveys.
ix
List of Figures
3.1 Employing the Binary Metric Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 The Path of a Direct Message (IEEE802.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 The Path of a Proxied Message (IEEE802.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Emulation Results of Proxied and Direct Exchanges Performed Over an
IEEE 802.3 Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5 The Path of an Emulated Proxied Exchange in an IEEE 802.11 Environment 42
3.6 Emulation Results for Direct vs Proxied Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1 The Structure of the Location Veriﬁcation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 The Proof Gathering Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3 Transmission Cost Comparison - Data and Time Costs . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4 Generation Cost Comparison - Practical Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5 Veriﬁcation Cost Comparison - Practical Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.1 Performance Comparison of Summation-based Veriﬁcation Across Increas-
ingly Hostile Environments, Using a Minimum of Five Proof Providers . . . 180
6.2 Performance Comparison of Trust-based Veriﬁcation Across Increasingly
Hostile Environments, Using a Minimum of Five Proof Providers . . . . . . 182
6.3 Selection Method Comparison Within the 160_40 Environment . . . . . . . 184
x
List of Tables
2.1 Summary of Positioning-based Localization Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Summary of Veriﬁcation-based Localization Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1 Benchmark Speeds Used in Practical Cost Computation . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2 Message Component Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3 Transmission Cost Comparison for Claim Involving Five Proof Providers,
Each Doing Ten Distance Bounding Exchanges (Quantity of Data Trans-
mitted, in Bits) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4 Transmission Cost Comparison for Claim Involving Five Proof Providers,
Each Doing Ten Distance Bounding Exchanges (Time Required to Transmit
Messages, in ms) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Transmission Cost Comparison Formulae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.6 Generation Cost Comparison (in Milliseconds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.7 Generation Cost Comparison (Number of Cryptographic Generation Oper-
ations per Extension) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.8 Veriﬁcation Cost Comparison (in Milliseconds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.9 Veriﬁcation Cost Comparison (Number of Cryptographic Veriﬁcation Oper-
ations Per Extension) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.10 Overall Comparison of Time Costs (in Milliseconds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.1 Veriﬁcation Results for Extension One of the SLVPGP . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.2 Veriﬁcation Results for Extension Two of the SLVPGP . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.3 Veriﬁcation Results for Extension Three of the SLVPGP . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.1 Comparing Minimum Proof Provider Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
xi
6.2 Performance Comparison of Summation-based Veriﬁcation Across Increas-
ingly Hostile Environments Using a Minimum of Five Proof Providers . . . 179
6.3 Comparison of Veriﬁcation Rates Across Increasingly Hostile Environments 180
6.4 Performance Comparison of Trust-based Veriﬁcation Across Increasingly
Hostile Environments Using a Minimum of Five Proof Providers . . . . . . 181
6.5 Comparing Failure Rates of Lying Clams Between Veriﬁcation Approaches 182
6.6 Comparison of Veriﬁcation Rates Using Trust-based Veriﬁcation, Across In-
creasingly Hostile Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.7 Selection Method Comparison Within the 160_40 Environment - Lying
Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.8 Selection Method Comparison Within the 160_40 Environment - Honest
Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
xii
List of Algorithms
1 Building Event Histories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
2 Setting the Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
3 Computing a Verdict - Summation Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
4 Computing a verdict - Trustworthiness Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
5 Description of Simulated Veriﬁer Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6 Description of Simulated Claimant Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7 Description of Simulated Proof Provider Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
8 Selection Method 1 - All Available Volunteers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A
9 Selection Method 2 - Most Trustworthy Volunteers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A
10 Selection Method 3 - Most Suitably Located Volunteers . . . . . . . . . . . B
11 Selection Method 4 - Random Subset of Volunteers . . . . . . . . . . . . . B
12 Counter-Algorithm for Selection Methods 1 & 4 - All Available & Randomly
Selected Volunteers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C
13 Counter-Algorithm for Selection Method 2 - Most Trustworthy Volunteers . C
14 Counter-Algorithm for Selection Method 3 - Most Suitably Located Volunteers D
xiii
Index of Abstract Protocol Notation
Over the course of this work, multiple protocols are presented, modelled in abstract protocol
notation. For the sake of clarity, we include here an index of this notation employed.
A, B Identities of participating devices
A→ B : Preﬁx indicating the sender (A) and recipient (B) of a message
N Nonce (randomly generated long number)
NA Nonce generated by or destined for A
H() The hash function
HA Hash generated by or destined for A
HA,k The kth hash in a hash chain, generated from HA
TA Timestamp generated by A
KA Cryptographic key belonging to A
K+A Public key belonging to A
K−A Private key belonging to A
KAB Session key shared by A and B
{}K+A Empty message encrypted with A's public key
{||}K−A Empty message digitally signed using A's private key
{N}K+A Nonce encrypted with A's public key
{|TA|}K−A Timestamp signed with A's private key
xiv
Index of Casper Syntax Employed
Over the course of this work, multiple protocols are presented, translated into Casper. For
the sake of clarity, we include here an index of the Casper syntax employed.
Notation:
A -> B: Preﬁx indicating the sender (A) and recipient (B) of a message
{} Empty message
{}{PKAgent(A)} Empty message encrypted using Agent A's public key
m % var Stores message m in variable var. This notation allows participants to receive
encrypted messages without possessing the ability to decrypt them.
var % m Sends message m (currently stored in variable var) to recipient. This allows
participants to forward encrypted messages without possessing the ability to
recreate them. The recipient must possess the ability to decrypt the message.
symbolic Keyword used with functions indicating that Casper produces its own values
to represent the function's results
Componants:
Agent Process type representing Claimant
Prover Process type representing Proof Provider
Veriﬁer Process type representing Veriﬁer
OracleType Process type representing Oracle
n* Nonce
xv
h* Hashed value
t* Timestamp
dV Veriﬁer's ﬁnal verdict
xC Claimant's location
PKVeriﬁer() Custom function to return the public key of a Veriﬁer
SKVeriﬁer() Custom function to return the secret key of a Veriﬁer
PKProver() Custom function to return the public key of a Prover
SKProver() Custom function to return the secret key of a Prover
PKAgent() Custom function to return the public key of an Agent
SKAgent() Custom function to return the secret key of an Agent
Contents of Casper script sections:
#Free_variables Deﬁnition of all variables employed within the script
#Processes Information about the participants running in the protocol
#Speciﬁcation Requirements of the protocol
#Protocol description Description of the protocol's message sequence
#Actual variables Actual values to be employed in the system being checked
#Functions List of functions deﬁned in the #Free variables section
#System List of participants to be included in the system to be checked
#Intruder Information Intruder's identity and set of data values known at initiation
xvi
Index of Abbreviations/Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AoA Angle of Arrival
C Claimant
CBS Covert (Hidden) Base Station
CSP Communicating Sequential Processes
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DoS Denial of Service
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FDR Failures-Divergences Reﬁnement
GPS Global Positioning System
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IP Internet Protocol
IR Infra Red
LBS Location Based Service
MANET Moble Ad-hoc Network
MBS Mobile Base Station
PDF Probability Density Function
PP Proof Provider
xvii
PPS Precise Positioning System
RF Radio Frequency
RFID Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
RSS Received Signal Strength
RSU Roadside Unit
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SLVPGP Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gathering Protocol
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDoA Time Diﬀerence of Arrival
ToA Time of Arrival
UDP User Datagram Protocol
US Ultrasound
UWB Ultra-Wideband
V Veriﬁer
VANET Vehicular Ad-hoc Network
VM Veriﬁable Multilateration
WoA Window of Acceptance
XML Extensible Markup Language
xviii
Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a deﬁnite shift towards ubiquitous computing. One of
the main advances in this area is the increased importance of mobile computing, such as
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) [79] and Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) [59].
More and more services have moved to a mobile setting, relying upon mobile networks
such as these. For this reason, context has become a key factor, with a user's location
becoming a critical piece of contextual information. It allows security systems to grant
access based on establishing a user's presence within a speciﬁc area and provides a method
for businesses to tailor services to their customers. It even allows customers to get more
out of existing services in the form of Location Based Services (LBS) [87, 75]. Information
regarding a user's location can be gathered in two main ways, either where a user provides
their location directly (self-location) or where an external entity can locate any user directly
(remote-location).
In the case of self-location, a user supplies the requesting entity with its location. One
simple example of self-location with a Location Based Service would be a user locating
cinemas, restaurants, etc in their vicinity. The user provides their location to a central
look-up service, with the service returning results in the vicinity of the supplied location.
This location may be sourced in a number of ways, from a direct input by the user based
on his or her own knowledge to being provided by a device such as a Global Positioning
System (GPS) unit [46]. As the user is supplying this location information directly, the
information provided cannot be guaranteed to be accurate. In fact, even if the GPS unit
is contained within a Tamper-Resistant Module, the resulting location is not guaranteed,
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as GPS signals can also be interfered with from outside the unit (spooﬁng). These spoofed
signals can result in the computation of an incorrect location, leading to the provision of
a false location to the LBS.
In the case of remote-location, an external entity locates the user itself, rather than the
user providing its location. In order to accomplish this, the user must be carrying some
form of device which the entity can access. It is this device which the entity locates, and not
the user themselves. An obvious example of such a situation would be a mobile telephone
network. Through the use of triangulation and other techniques, mobile phone companies
can calculate the location of a user of their network, once the user remains within the area
of the network. This method of locating a user is somewhat more diﬃcult to tamper with,
but some simple approaches can be employed. An example of such an approach is the use
of a Faraday Cage or Hoﬀman Box to block or restrict the signal emitting from the user's
device. However, this form of tampering requires some form of physical interference with
the device, which may not always be viable. Therefore, while remote-location is vulnerable
to interference, it is not as susceptible as self-location. Remote-location's primary weakness
is its reliance on infrastructure to provide a location. This reliance limits the use of any
remote-location system to those areas containing an infrastructure presence and restricts
applicability of the system based on the use of speciﬁc devices.
As self-location cannot be relied upon to provide trustworthy location information and
remote-location requires adherence to a speciﬁc device or area in which infrastructure
exists, a new approach must be found. An alternative solution to this is to redeﬁne the
problem. Rather than attempting to locate a user's device, the user's device makes a
claim regarding its location that can then be veriﬁed. By altering the approach taken, the
problem of providing a trustworthy location becomes much more manageable. The issue of
locating the user is eliminated and the focus is placed on the veracity of the claim. Rather
than a system attempting to prove the location of the user, the user provides proof of
their claim. This prevents the need for special and costly hardware or an overly complex
solution.
To date, similar to the case of remote-location, the trend in localization techniques
relies upon a pre-existing infrastructure to provide trusted devices with which claiming de-
vices can interact. However, reliance upon a ﬁxed or limited infrastructure in this manner
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reduces the applicability of localization technology. In addition to this, the cost of employ-
ing the system increases dramatically. With mobile devices and mobile networks becoming
a staple of current technology, the need for a speciﬁc infrastructure of devices is no longer
present. This approach is particularly suited to the vehicular network environment, with
devices in this type of network behaving in predictable patterns and possessing suﬃcient
power to perform even complex encryption.
This thesis presents research on the development of a centralised location veriﬁcation
system, designed without the requirement of a pre-existing device infrastructure for use
as evidence providers (Proof Providers), to verify the location of a user's claiming device.
Instead, the location veriﬁcation system employs untrusted devices in the vicinity of the
claiming device (Claimant) as Proof Providers. The system's central entity extracts a
verdict from the Proof Provider collective, based either on a majority verdict or the trust
values of those involved. This verdict indicates the likelihood of the claim being legit-
imate. The location veriﬁcation system employs a novel distance bounding metric (the
binary metric) when computing evidence, to distinguish between direct and proxied com-
munications over a wireless network. This system was initially developed for use within
VANETs, but has not been deployed in a physical VANET to date. Therefore it is unknown
if the high levels of mobility reached by vehicular mobile devices prevents the system from
attaining useful levels of veriﬁcation accuracy. However, the system is also suitable for use
in MANETs composed of handheld mobile devices, as these do not usually reach the same
mobility levels.
The development of the location veriﬁcation system presented here is achieved through
the combination of three main research strands. The ﬁrst strand presents a novel metric
for use in distance bounding [13], employing round trip times to detect proxy attacks.
The second strand introduces a new security protocol designed to protect the gathering of
proof by a device making a location claim. Finally, the third strand presents the design of
a central entity and two approaches to the judging of a location claim.
We present a novel metric for use with distance bounding which indicates whether
or not a device communicating directly or via a proxy, thus providing a method for the
detection of proxy attacks. We discuss the concept of a window of acceptance (WoA) for use
with this metric, to distinguish between the time required for a direct communication and
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that required to complete a proxied exchange. We brieﬂy discuss the design of a proxied
exchange, outlining the form of proxy that this approach can detect. We present a pair
of protocols for use in establishing the WoA for a speciﬁc situation. We perform timed
emulations of distance bounding in both wireless and wired settings. These emulations
demonstrate that the employment of this metric is reasonable in both settings, i.e. that the
time required to perform distance bounding between two devices is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
where more than a single network hop is performed.
Following from this, we present the Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gathering Pro-
tocol (SLVPGP), a security protocol designed to protect the process of gathering proof
for use in a location claim. This protocol employs the distance bounding binary metric
in the proof calculation stage of evidence gathering. We study the security properties re-
quired to build a satisfactorily secure protocol for use in a proof gathering scenario. We
discuss the reasons for developing a three tiered protocol rather than employing a single
all-encompassing approach. We analyse each tier's relative costs incurred in increasing the
level of security provided. This analysis demonstrates that while the third tier incurs a
greater transmission cost, its cryptographic costs are slightly less than those of the second
tier, thus providing a higher level of security with fewer cryptographic operations.
In order to conﬁrm the upholding of each tier's hypothesised security properties, we
formally analyse the protocols' security. This analysis is carried out in the form of model
checking. We employ a high level modelling language (Casper [58]) to describe the design
and generate a mathematical model for each tier. We then verify these models using
the FDR [83] model checker. The results of this process support the hypothesis that the
desired security properties for each protocol tier hold within the speciﬁed environment. As
a supporting side work, we formally investigate the security of broadcasting secure messages
within a system. This investigation is also performed through model checking. The results
of this investigation support the already-held belief that broadcasting a message does not
impact the security of that message, unless said message is insuﬃciently protected through
encryption.
Finally, we present two designs for a veriﬁcation engine, one employing majority verdicts
and one employing trustworthiness values of the participating devices. We employ an
existing set of techniques such as the beta Probability Density Function [29], used in Josang
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and Ismail's beta reputation system [50], to calculate the trustworthiness of a participating
device at the time of a location claim. This trustworthiness calculation system provides a
method of establishing the trustworthiness of a device's verdict, for use in a trust-based
veriﬁcation approach. Additionally, the inclusion of a reputation system provides a method
of Proof Provider selection with which a Veriﬁer can select only those devices most likely
to behave honestly for use in a speciﬁc claim.
The veriﬁcation system has been designed to address the reliance of most localization
systems upon trusted devices. We have designed two approaches to veriﬁcation, one based
on majority verdicts and the other based on the trust values of those devices providing
evidence for that claim. In the summation-based approach, the Veriﬁer employs a majority
verdict system to compute the possibility of a location claim. Rather than relying on
uniformly trusted infrastructure units, trust is placed in a group as a whole, and the
prevailing verdict on a claim's veracity indicates the claim's possibility. In the trust-based
approach, the Veriﬁer computes the overall trust value of a claim from the individual
device trust values of those providing supporting evidence, rather than treated each device's
verdict as equal. By computing the trust value of each device based on previous actions,
a distinction can be made between honest and dishonest devices, thus removing the need
for uniformly trusted units.
We employ percentage-based thresholds to dictate the levels the claim's value must
reach to receive a speciﬁc verdict, thus creating a ﬂexible system. Through a simulation of
both veriﬁcation approaches, we demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of each approach. We prove
that summation-based veriﬁcation successfully detects fraudulent claims while awarding
positive verdicts to honest claims. This creates a location veriﬁcation system designed for
mobile networks which requires no existing infrastructure or speciﬁcally trusted devices for
use as evidence providers.
The thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter two introduces localization and location veriﬁcation before discussing ex-
isting approachs to solving this problem. We outline several key localization techniques
employed within the ﬁeld. We discuss a selection of existing schemes, provide context
and background information for the research presented in this thesis. We also identify the
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primary attacks attempted on localization schemes and techniques.
Chapter three examines the process of distance bounding and describes a novel twist
on the traditional method of employing the technique, in the form of a novel metric. We
present the concept of a Window of Acceptance (WoA) and describe two protocols for use
in computing the WoA in practice. We also present emulation data which supports the
plausibility of employing distance bounding in this manner and discuss remaining open
issues in this matter.
Chapter four presents the primary aspect of our contribution to the area of localiza-
tion: the Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gathering Protocol. We discuss the security
properties desired for this protocol and outline the design process undertaken to achieve a
protocol supporting these properties. We propose three variations on the basic design of
the protocol and discuss the relative costs of each variation in comparison to the security
gained.
Chapter ﬁve examines the security of the Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gather-
ing Protocol in each of the three variations, using the formal veriﬁcation technique of model
checking. We outline the limits of formal veriﬁcation and explain how the model checking
process functions. We discuss the process of formally verifying the protocols through model
checking, including the application of safe simpliﬁcations. We then analyse the ﬁndings of
the performed veriﬁcations.
Chapter six presents the design for a central verifying entity (Veriﬁer) responsible for
the veriﬁcation of location claims. We discuss the notion of trust in a device and employ
existing techniques to establish the trustworthiness of all devices within the system. We
outline the responsibilities of the Veriﬁer during the initialization of a claim, including
the method by which volunteers are gathered and Proof Providers selected. We describe
two approaches for use in the veriﬁcation of a device's claim: extracting a majority verdict
from the selected group of Proof Providers and employing trust values to calculate a claim's
overall trust level. Finally, we present simulations results demonstrating the accuracy of
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each approach.
Chapter seven sums up this work and discusses several remaining open questions,
outlining possible areas of interest for future work.
The research presented in this work has been published in the proceedings of several
peer-reviewed conferences. [35] gives an early overview of the location veriﬁcation system
as a whole. [37] presents the SLVPGP and its extensions in an earlier form. It also brieﬂy
discusses the model checking process performed in order to formally verify the security of
the protocols. Our work on distance bounding and the binary metric is presented in [36],
with discussion and analysis from this presentation leading to the development of the WoA
computation protocols. Finally, [38] presents a recent overview of the system as a whole.
In this paper, we approach the location veriﬁcation system as a method of abstracting
the process of location veriﬁcation away from any LBS wishing to employ veriﬁed location
information in their services.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the context and relevent background for the research presented
in this work. We deﬁne the concept of device localization and outline the core techniques
employed in localization to estimate the distance between two devices (ranging techniques),
along with common attacks against them. After explaining the techniques involved in
localization, we discuss its primary research direction, positioning (Section 2.3.1). We
then discuss the speciﬁc focus of the research presented in this work, location veriﬁcation
(Section 2.3.2). We provide a comparative overview of existing positioning and veriﬁcation
systems within these headings, beginning with Want et al's ActiveBadge system [101]. We
then discuss our own work in comparison to these systems, outlining their inﬂuence on the
ﬁnal design of our work.
2.2 What is Localization?
Within this work, localization is deﬁned as the act of determining a user's location,
with location taken to mean a user's position either in the real world or relative to other
devices within a particular system. Currently, users can only be located relative to the
devices they carry due to the current limitations of technology. Therefore, localization is
eﬀectively the act of determining a device's location, under the assumption that a speciﬁc
user is located in proximity to that device. There are a number of research substrands
within the area of localization, including positioning (localization's main research topic)
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and location veriﬁcation. While positioning has received more research attention due to
its commercial appeal, research into systems designed to conﬁrm a device's location allows
location information regarding devices to be employed in new ways, such as access control.
We discuss both of these areas in further detail in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
2.2.1 Localization Techniques
A device's location can be determined relative to other devices within a particular system,
or at an absolute (real world) level. In order for a device's absolute location to be computed
through localization techniques, at least some of the other devices within the system must
be in possession of their own absolute location. This is accomplished either through the
device being in possession of a GPS unit or through being assigned a ﬁxed position and
programmed with this set location information. These devices are commonly referred to
as beacons. In order to calculate a device D's actual location, D must be able to calculate
its location relative to at least one beacon within the system. With D's relative position
known, it can then calculate its absolute location. The more beacons D can calculate its
location relative to, the more accurate a location can be calculated. With only a single
relative position known, D can compute a set of possible locations surrounding the beacon,
based on the estimated distance. As the number of beacons increases, the size of this set
decreases, with at least three required to compute a speciﬁc position for a 2d system.
Localization has been investigated in many diﬀerent media settings, such as Ultra-
Wideband (UWB), Infra Red (IR), Radio Frequency (RF) and Ultrasound (US). The
primary method of localizing a device is through the employment of ranging techniques.
The main ranging techniques employed focus on the measurement of three diﬀerent signal
attributes; the received signal strength, the angle at which a signal arrived and the time
taken to receive a signal. Here, we give a brief outline of these techniques. These allow
for the calculation of a device's location relative to at least one other device within the
system. The greater the number of devices that participate in the localization process, the
more accurate a location can be extracted from the process. A more detailed discussion of
these techniques can be found in [25].
Received Signal Strength (RSS) In ranging approaches based on Received Signal
Strength (RSS) measurements, the distance a signal travels is estimated based on the dif-
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ference between a device's stated transmit power and the power of the signal received.
This loss in power is the result of signal propagation over a distance, based on the as-
sumption that a signal's strength decreases at a speciﬁc rate as it travels. Once the signal
strength loss is calculated, either theoretical or empirical models can be used to extract an
estimate regarding the distance over which the signal travelled. The models employed to
estimate the distance traveled by a signal assume that the environment in which the signal
is propagating is constant and does not contain any unexpected materials which may aﬀect
the rate at which the signal's power is expected to decrease. It also assumes that signal
reﬂections (resulting in multipath signals) do not occur, as this can lead to incorrect dis-
tance estimations. Through the combination of distance estimates from multiple devices
and their positions, a location for the source device can be extracted. However, a device
may subvert this approach through supplying a false power level to the receiving devices,
thus allowing the calculated power loss and consequentially the distance estimate to be
controlled to a degree.
Angle of Arrival (AoA) In Angle of Arrival (AoA) approaches, the angle at which a
signal arrives is estimated and a device's location extracted based on the combination of
AoA information from multiple sources. The AoA technique is primarily employed within
sensor networks, where nodes are equipped with an array of directional antennas rather
than a single omni-directional one. The angle of arrival of a signal is deﬁned as the
angle between the propagation direction of an incident wave and some reference direction,
known as orientation [72]. For each node, orientation is deﬁned as a ﬁxed direction
and represented in degrees moving clockwise from North. Using the multiple directional
antennas on the node in conjunction with the RSS of a signal allows the relative AoA to
be estimated. Calculating the AoA of a signal can be employed to calculate a device's
location through node co-operation. If node X is being localized, multiple other nodes in
its vicinity attempt to estimate the AoA of a signal from X, relative to their orientation.
This information can then be combined and a point of overlap found, giving a location.
However, AoA approaches must contend with an issue that also aﬀects RSS localization:
multipath signals. These are caused by a signal hitting a surface in its path and reﬂecting
back oﬀ it on another direction, resulting in a multipath signal. The ability of signals
to reﬂect oﬀ surfaces means that the angle at which a signal is received may not be the
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angle from which it was originally sent. The multipath problem can be addressed using
maximum likelihood algorithms [76, 104], which calculate the most likely angle of arrival
of a signal based on statistics.
Time Based Approaches There are two main time-based ranging techniques: Time
of Arrival (ToA) and Time Diﬀerence of Arrival (TDoA). In both approaches, the time
at which a signal reaches a receiving device is recorded and employed to calculate the
distance between two devices. In ToA-based approaches, this time is used to calculate the
time required for a signal to propagate from its source to the receiver. In practice, the
most common method of accomplishing this is through timing the round trip of a signal
using a challenge-response exchange, a concept also refered to as distance bounding [13].
However, in order for this approach to function correctly, the device being localized (D)
must not be able to respond to a challenge signal prior to receiving it. If this stipulation
is not upheld, D could transmit a response early, thereby reducing the round trip time
calculated and decreasing the estimated distance between the receiver and D. We discuss
distance bounding and its role in localization in greater detail in Chapter 3.
In the case of TDoA-based localization, a signal's recorded time of arrival is employed
slightly diﬀerently. Rather than timing round trips between the device being localized (D)
and a single receiver (R), D transmits a single signal which is received by several devices
in its vicinity, and its time of arrival is recorded. The time at which D's signal arrives at
each receiving device is slightly diﬀerent, due to the diﬀerence in distance between D and
each receiver. These time diﬀerences are then converted to distance diﬀerences and used
to estimate D's location through hyperbolic computations. A hyperboloid is a surface with
a constant distance diﬀerence from two points (in the case of localization, two devices).
Where three receivers (therefore two hyperbola) are available, a device may be localized in
two dimensions through ﬁnding the intersection of the hyperbola. Where four receivers are
available, this process can be employed to localize the device in three dimensions. It must
be noted that in order to function correctly, TDoA-based localization requires receiver
devices to possess a tightly synchronised clock. This ensures the time of arrival recorded
by each receiver is comparable to those recorded by the others involved. The most well
known TDoA-based system is the Global Positioning System [27], which applies the TDoA
technique to received satellite signals in order to compute a device's location relative to the
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positions of the transmitting satellites. This approach to positioning is further discussed
in Section 2.3.1.
2.2.2 Localization Attacks
As localization technology has increased in importance, more attention has been given to
designing methods to subvert the techniques employed in the localization process. These
attacks have been designed to interfere with the accuracy and functionality of localization.
They range in scale from lone devices interfering with local traﬃc to collaborative eﬀorts
by multiple devices. There are two possible approaches which can be used to undermine
the outcome of a localization attempt: attacks directed at the underlying localization
techniques employed in the system and those which attempt to manipulate the system
itself. These approaches are described below.
Common Attacks on Localization Techniques
One of the simplest attacks which can be attempted on a communications system is a
Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The primary objective of a DoS attack in this situation is to
prevent a speciﬁc device or devices within an area from localizing others or being localized
themselves. In an RF-based system where an attacker does not have access to the internal
workings of other devices, this is achieved through interfering with the devices' ability to
receive and send messages (signals), usually through ﬂooding the network with messages
of its own. Where an attacker has access to specialized equipment, it can conduct an
alternative DoS attack, using a signal jamming device to disrupt radio signals in the area.
This prevents those devices present from receiving or sending messages, thus rendering
them incapable of localizing or being localized using RF-based approaches. A similar
jamming approach can also be employed on US and UWB systems, assuming the attacker
is in possession of the correct jamming equipment.
However, while DoS attacks are eﬀective at removing a device's ability to participate
in localization, they are not particularly suited to manipulation of the process's outcome.
In order for a malicious device to increase the distance estimated based on localization
techniques, it must employ some form of attenuation attack. In an attenuation attack,
specialised equipment, such as an absorbing barrier, decrease the speed and strength at
which a signal can propagate. This makes it appear as though the signal has travelled
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farther, thereby tricking the receiver into believing that the source device is farther from
the receiver than it truly is. Inversely, in an ampliﬁcation attack, a malicious device may
employ specialised equipment, such as a directional antenna with an extended range, to
achieve localization at a location closer to the receiver devices than it truly is. However,
while ampliﬁcation attacks can impact localization results where RSS is employed, the
time-based approaches employed in localization are not as easily defrauded. This is because
even though the signal transmitted has been strengthened, the time required for it to reach
a receiver from its source cannot be altered. Therefore, in order to inﬂuence a receiver's
localization result, malicious devices perform collusion or proxy attacks. These attacks
operate at a system level rather than on localization techniques and are discussed in the
following section.
Common Attacks on Localization Approaches
In this section, we discuss attacks aimed at localization approaches, rather than those
aimed at altering the results produced by the localization techniques employed. The most
common attack attempted on localization systems is the collusion attack. In this form
of attack, a malicious device attempts to inﬂuence its own localization results by having
a colluding device masquerade as the device being localized and transmit signals from
a closer position to the receivers. The receivers therefore calculate the location of the
colluding device, rather than that of the device being localized, thus providing a malicious
device with a false location in closer proximity to the receivers. This form of attack is
eﬀective primarily due to the fact that ranging techniques (such as those described above)
localize the source of a signal, not a speciﬁc device. Measures regarding the security of
the exchange are left to the scheme in which the techniques are employed. Proxy attacks
capitalise on this weakness by substituting the device being localized with an alternative
source closer to the signal receivers. However, this weakness can be addressed by the
localization scheme tying any signals (or messages) involved to the source device in some
manner. This forces the malicious device to attempt a terrorist fraud [22] in order to deceive
the system, where the messages are forwarded to the receiver by a colluding device acting as
a proxy for the device originating the messages. This approach increases the amount of time
required for the signal to reach the receiver. Therefore, unless there exists an accelerated
means of communication between the colluding device and the device being localized, the
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advantage of employing a colluder is lost, assuming the goal of the device being localized
is to appear closer. If said device wished to appear farther from the recipient, a terrorist
fraud attack (without the use of accelerated communications equipment) would allow it to
do so. However, this can be achieved using far simpler approaches, such as by delaying the
sending of its response message and falsifying any incriminating time stamping within the
message.
Another form of collusion attack is the wormhole attack [47], in which an attacker
records messages transmitted within its range. It then tunnels them to another area for
retransmission, either by another node under its control or by a colluding agent within
the network. Tunnelling involves transmitting the recorded messages directly from one
agent to another, without forwarding through multiple nodes. In the case of tunneled
distances longer than the range of a single wireless hop, or where the replay has a time-
critical element, the colluding devices may employ an enhanced long-range wireless link
or a direct wired link. In the case of the latter, systems involving distance bounding may
ﬁnd themselves vulnerable to terrorist fraud, due to the decrease in latency incurred by
transmitting messages over a higher-speed connection.
Finally, there also exists a common form of attack with a similar impact to the col-
lusion attack, but with only a single attacker involved. This is known as the sybil attack
[26]. In this attack, a system believes itself to be employing several diﬀerent devices in
a localization, when in reality it employs only one. This is achieved through an attacker
creating multiple identities for itself and attempting to pass them oﬀ as individual devices,
a simple task without the presence of some central authority registering all devices. Where
a central authority is employed, an alternative method may be used to circumvent this
measure, where the attacker steals the identity of another device within the system. This
approach may not be detected if the attacker prevents the legitimate owner of that identity
from communicating with the central authority, or if the owner is not active at that point.
2.3 Localization Methods
While the focus of our work is on location veriﬁcation, many security and design issues
raised in veriﬁcation approaches are also found in positioning systems. For this reason, we
have conducted research into both positioning and veriﬁcation approaches to localization.
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In this section, we discuss the development of research in both areas, outlining a selection
of schemes put forth and the subsequent improvements made by those following, up to the
present day. This is summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. We then discuss the contribution
made by this work to the area of localization and how it addresses the issues of current
approaches.
2.3.1 Positioning
Within this work, positioning is deﬁned as the determination of a device's location, either
relative to other devices in a system or on a global level. The Global Positioning System
(GPS) is the most well known and widely used technology to position a device, employing
TDoA to calculate the position of a device relative to a constellation of satellites orbiting
the Earth. However, GPS readings can be forged, and even if users were prevented from
interfering with the output of a GPS unit through including the GPS within a device's
Tamper-Resistant Module, GPS signals can be spoofed [33]. This renders GPS an untrust-
worthy method for localization. The United States military has created a similar system to
GPS known as the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) which encrypts all signals to prevent
spooﬁng, but this technology is unavailable to civilians. An alternative to GPS, known as
Galileo, has been proposed and is undergoing construction in Europe. Galileo's proposed
design is a signiﬁcant improvement on that of civilian level GPS, with an increased level
of resistance to jamming in addition to including encryption within the signal, thus pre-
venting spooﬁng [70]. However, although GPS and similar satellite-based systems can be
useful for determining a device's position, their usefulness is limited to external locations.
In addition to this, the level of accuracy reached by satellite-based systems decreases sig-
niﬁcantly when employed within highly built up areas. Therefore, alternative approaches
to positioning are required.
The ﬁrst major positioning system proposed was ActiveBadge [101], created by Want
et al. Designed to track objects within a speciﬁc area, ActiveBadge functions through the
combination of a wearable device periodically emitting its unique identity over IR and a
ﬁxed infrastructure of receivers which receive these beaconing messages. The beaconing
message emitted by the device bounces oﬀ (but does not escape) the walls bounding the
room, thus ensuring the signal ﬁlls the room. The receiver ﬁxed within the room receives
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the message and can infer that the device is located within its walls. However, IR is vul-
nerable to dead-spots and interference from other light sources, leaving devices unlocatable
in some areas. Also, due to the poor range of IR, the ActiveBadge system scales poorly.
Want et al presented an improved approach to positioning in the form of the ActiveBat
system, which removed the technology's reliance on IR and instead employs US and RF
TDoA techniques. In the ActiveBat system, a combination of base stations, receivers and
devices are employed to calculate a device's location. An RF-based base station acts as a
centralized starting pistol, transmitting an RF signal to each device in turn to indicate that
they are to be localized. Upon receiving this signal, the device being localized sends an
US signal, which is heard by the receivers in the vicinity. The receivers have also received
the initialisation signal sent by the base station and calculate the time diﬀerence between
receiving this and receiving the device's US signal. From this diﬀerence, each receiver can
extract the distance between their location and that of the device being localized and send
this information back to a central hub. This central hub can then combine the distances
from multiple receivers at ﬁxed locations and calculate an location for the device.
Despite addressing some issues within the ActiveBadge system, ActiveBat is heavily
dependant on a centralized approach with a ﬁxed infrastructure, thus limiting its applica-
bility. In contrast, the Cricket [74] system, has been developed to be highly decentralized
and reduce overheads. Though Cricket also employs US and RF techniques, the system
operates in reverse to the approach taken by both ActiveBadge and ActiveBat. The devices
being located (referred to in Cricket as listeners) do not transmit their location. Instead,
beacons concurrently transmit RF messages indicating their location, along with an US
signal. The listener records the location information from the received RF message, along
with its ToA and waits to receive the corresponding US signal. Upon receipt of the US
signal, the listener can compute the TDoA for the message and consequently calculate its
distance from that beacon. It then combines the location information gathered from all
beacons within range and extracts its own location. Through reversing the ﬂow of infor-
mation, the listener's privacy is preserved and the system does not rely on a centralized
architecture. However, this approach is vulnerable to attack by malicious beacons broad-
casting false information or transmitting their US signals prior to sending the RF messages,
thus tampering with a listener's location calculation. In addition to this, the burden of
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computation is placed on the listening devices, requiring an increased amount of power to
be contained within the devices.
Despite Cricket's decentralized approach, there remains a reliance upon a pre-existing
infrastructure of beacons. In the Ad-Hoc Localization System (AHLoS) [86], Savvides
et al presented an alternative to this approach by designing a localization system which
does not rely on any form of infrastructure. Instead, localization is done in an ad-hoc
fashion, with those nodes already in possession of their location (beacons) aiding in the
localization of unknown nodes - i.e. nodes without knowledge of their own location. Once
an unknown has calculated its location, it becomes a beacon and aids in the localization
of other unknowns. Similar to Cricket and ActiveBat, AHLoS employs US and RF TDoA
to calculate location, with beacons broadcasting their location simultaneously over RF
and US. Also included within the system is a method of localizing unknowns where three
beacons are not within range, however this approach has been questioned [93]. In addition
to this, while the beacons are not technically infrastructure, some percentage must have
been in possession of their location at the time of system initialisation. Due to the nature of
the nodes employed in the system and its design as an indoor system, ruling out the use of
GPS or similar systems to establish a location, this implies that some position information
was input upon installation.
Many other systems have been proposed which include some variant on the approaches
described above. Systems such as the Precision Asset Location (PAL) system [31, 30]
employ TDoA techniques within an UWB setting to compute asset locations in an indoor
setting. Similarly, an UWB relative location system was put forth by Correal et al [20]
which employs distance bounding to calculate a location relative to other nodes within the
system. However, within the schemes presented to this point, attacks such as the sybil
attack [26], wormholes [47] and collusion attacks have been left undefended against. In
particular, decentralized systems such as Cricket and AHLoS are particularly vulnerable
due to their reliance on the word of other devices. The introduction of SeRLoc [54, 55],
Lazos and Poovendran's Secure Range-Independent Localization scheme for wireless sen-
sor networks brought this issue into the spotlight. Its range-free approach to localization
removes any possibile vulnerabilities from attacks seeking to disrupt the measurement of
distance between devices, as it does not rely on ranging techniques to compute a loca-
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tion. Instead, locator nodes equipped with sectored antennas transmit beacon messages
encrypted with a global symmetric key (shared by locators and regular sensor nodes), com-
posed of their location and the sector of the antenna from which the message was sent.
This sector information indicates the angle at which the message is transmitted at from the
locator. The beacon message is received by devices in the locator's vicinity and employed
to calculate their current location through combining the information received from mul-
tiple beacons to ﬁnd their point of overlap. SeRLoC is robust against sybil attacks, with
the exception of the compromise of a locator's set of secret data. SeRLoC is also robust
against wormholes, as those with a retransmission point in close proximity to the source
of the original beacon message are detected due to the antenna sector uniqueness prop-
erty. This property states that no device can receive multiple beacons originating from the
same locator which were sent through diﬀerent antenna sectors, as they are transmitted on
diﬀerent, non-intersecting, trajectories from the locator. Additionally, even when beacons
are tunneled a signiﬁcant distance away, the presence of legitimate beacons in that area
indicate to a sensor that it is under attack.
However, despite increasing security awareness within the area of localization and ad-
dressing both the sybil and wormhole attacks, SeRLoC remains vulnerable to jamming
attacks. This issue is addressed in Lazos et al's Robust Position Estimation (ROPE) sys-
tem [56]. ROPE combines SeRLoC's approach to location information dissemination with
the Veriﬁable Multilateration (VM) technique put forth in SPINE [98, 95], Capkun and
Hubaux's range-dependent secure positioning system based on distance bounding. In VM,
the distance between the sensor being localized and each of at least three locators (at
known positions) is calculated using distance bounding. Each distance is used to compute
the radius of the circle centred at that locator's position, and the sensor's position is deter-
mined by calculating the point of intersection between these circles. Through employing
at least three locators in this process, a triangle is formed around the sensor. Due to basic
geometric principles, it is unable to maliciously alter its location with one locator without
also correcting the distance results obtained from the others. If this correction is not per-
formed, the device's malicious behaviour would be discovered, as the distances computed
would not agree. Assuming that all distance bounding exchanges are performed simula-
teously, the employment of distance bounding prevents the sensor from achieving this, as
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it cannot decrease the distance calculated between itself and a locator, only increase it.
If it increases the distance between itself and a locator, it must decrease at least one of
the other distances involved, which is impossible where distance bounding is employed.
However, this functionality requires at least three locators to be in the vicinity of a sensor,
therefore the number of locators required within the ﬁeld is very high. ROPE improves on
SPINE's VM implementation by providing an alternative approach to positioning for use
if three or more locators are not available. In this approach, the sensor's location request
is disseminated farther aﬁeld by the locators that initially received it. Those locators re-
ceiving the disseminated request send a message indicating their location and details of the
area covered by the antenna employed to transmit the message. The initial sensor receives
these messages and calculates its location based on the intersection of areas contained
within and a pre-computed region of intersection. Through the inclusion of this back up
approach, the number of locators required within the ﬁeld is signiﬁcantly decreased. While
ROPE cannot protect against a complete jamming-based DoS attack, it is robust against
selective jamming attacks, where attackers jam speciﬁc transmissions at will. If a sensor is
capable of communicating with just one locator, it can estimate its position to some point
within transmission range of the locator's known position. However, jamming to this level
incurs a very high cost, making it infeasible to employ.
2.3.2 Location Veriﬁcation
As mentioned previously, the focus of our work on localization has been in location ver-
iﬁcation. The concept of location veriﬁcation is that a device may prove its location or
presence in a particular area to a central entity or other device. Excluding those approaches
which employ self-localization, many of the schemes described in the previous section for
positioning can also be employed for the veriﬁcation of a device's location. If a device's
supplied location matches the location estimated by the positioning scheme, the supplied
location is proven. However, a number of approaches have been designed solely to verify a
device's provided location or presence in a given area, with the latter being designed as a
method of access control [4]. These approaches rely primarily on time-based ranging, with
many employing distance bounding [13] to conﬁm a claiming device's presence within a
given distance of another device.
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One of the ﬁrst distance bounding based location veriﬁcation schemes was proposed
by Sastry, Shankar and Wagner in [85]. In this work, they propose the Echo protocol, a
protocol designed to gauge the upper bound on the distance between 2 devices, allowing
the device to prove its presence in a particular location. This is accomplished using a
combination of RF and US signal ToA measurements. RF is used by a veriﬁer node V
to transmit a packet containing a nonce to device D. When D receives this packet, he
echoes the nonce back to V using ultrasound. As the reply relies on the initial message, D
cannot cheat and transmit the packet early. Therefore D cannot pretend to be closer to V.
However this protocol is vulnerable to a proxy attack, as a colluding device (C) between D
and V can allow D to echo the nonce over RF as far as C. C can then replay the reply back
to V using ultrasound. As RF has a faster propagation time than ultrasound, the attack
would not be detected. Sastry et al also proposed a keyed variant [85] to this protocol, as
the original protocol does not combat the localization vulnerability exploited by collusion
attacks. It proves only that a device is in the area claimed, not that a speciﬁc device is
located there. However, this variant is still susceptible to the same attack as the encrypted
message can be forwarded by the colluding device as easily as the unencrypted message
could be.
Also in 2003, Waters & Felten proposed the Proximity-Proving Protocol [102], a pro-
tocol also designed to prove a device's presence in a particular area. Similar to Sastry et
al's work, Waters & Felten's approach uses distance bounding in the round trip times of
packets to calculate an upper bound on the distance between devices, However, its reliance
solely on RF removes the primary vulnerability found in Sastry et al's approach: its suscep-
tibility to collusion attacks due to the inclusion of US technology in the challenge-response
exchange. An additional advantage of employing RF is that it is a increasingly common
technology, present in the majority of mobile nodes, therefore it is far more widely employ-
able. Despite this improvement, the Proximity-Proving protocol remains vulnerable to the
terrorist fraud form of collusion attack. This is due to the protocol lacking some form of
tie between the distance bounding portion of the protocol and the device being located. A
colluding device acting as a proxy for a malicious prover could participate in the distance
bounding aspect of the protocol in place of the prover. This shrinks the time taken for
a reply to reach the receiver, making the prover appear closer. In addition to this, the
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protocol relies upon an infrastructure of trusted entities, limiting its range of applicability.
In [97], Capkun et al proposed a novel approach to address a previously unconsidered
aspect of the veriﬁcation problem. Traditionally, where an infrastructure is employed in
location veriﬁcation, the locations of the locators or base stations are known in advance.
This gives an attacker an advantage in its attempt to deceive them, as it is possible to
compute the time required to give a speciﬁc distance in distance bounding, an advantage
of particular relevance when dealing with non-simultaneous VM. Capkun et al's proposal
employs hidden or mobile base stations within the veriﬁcation process, removing that
advantage from the attacker. In the case of veriﬁcation employing covert (hidden) base
stations (CBS), the device being veriﬁed has no knowledge of the location of the CBS and
transmits blindly. When verifying using mobile base stations (MBS), the device may know
the location of the MBS prior to receiving a localization challenge. However, when the
device acts on this challenge (after waiting for a given time limit), the MBS has changed
location. These base stations measure the TDoA between messages sent simultaneously
over RF and US from the device being localized. As the device cannot tell where the base
stations are in either case, it does not know how to correct the timing of the messages to
achieve a diﬀerent location. Although it is possible to identify and locate a device based
on ﬁngerprinting [77], meaning that a hidden base station may be detectable and thus lose
its advantage over an attacker, this is not yet a practical attack.
In addition to those infrastructure-dependent localization schemes developed speciﬁ-
cally to verify a device's location, some positioning systems have the potential to also be
amended for use as veriﬁcation schemes. In the case of SPINE, location veriﬁcation is
easily achieved once a device is within range of at least three locators. If the locators deem
the device being veriﬁed to be in the same location as has been claimed by that device,
then the claim is veriﬁed. However, this requires a high number of locators to be deployed
in the ﬁeld, a requirement which ROPE addresses. Due to its self localization approach,
ROPE is not immediately employable as a veriﬁcation scheme, though authors do include
a simplistic approach to veriﬁcation. In this approach, a device proves itself to be within
range of a single locator node through distance bounding. Unfortunately, no mention is
made of tying the interaction to a speciﬁc device, leaving the approach open to collusion.
The authors note that this is only a simplistic approach and that a more thorough solution
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could be designed.
Recently, Capkun et al have presented an updated version of their approach to secure
veriﬁcation which includes a move away from reliance upon infrastructure. In [99], ver-
iﬁcation within mobile ad hoc networks is achieved using neighbouring devices in place
of base stations. The neighbouring devices employ TDoA on a signed message which has
been broadcast simultaneously over US and RF to calculate a distance to the device being
veriﬁed, although the authors do stipulate that any form of passive ranging may be em-
ployed within the scheme. The transmitted message contains the location being claimed
by the device, along with its identity and a timestamp. If the distance computed by the
neighbouring device corresponds to the distance from there to the included location, that
neighbour issues a signed and encrypted statement indicating that the location was veriﬁed
to it. These statements can either be transmitted directly back to a central server or sent
via the device being veriﬁed. However, while this does address the issue of infrastructure
reliance, the scheme does not address the issue of colluding neighbours working either for
or against the device being veriﬁed and leaks personal data to all devices in its vicinity.
Additionally, unless all devices are tightly time-synchronised, a terrorist fraud form of col-
lusion attack is still possible as the only method of retaining a sense of timeliness is through
the inclusion of a timestamp.
2.3.3 Our contribution: the Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gather-
ing Protocol
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarise a variety of the proposed approaches to positioning and
veriﬁcation within the area of localization. A closer look at the Weaknesses column
reveals that though signiﬁcant progress has been made in the area, one of the biggest
issues is that of infrastructure-reliance. While schemes such as AHLoS [86] and Capkun et
al's Mobile/Hidden/Covert Base Stations [97] do address this issue, they are in the minority
and, in the case of AHLoS, sacriﬁce participant privacy in order to achieve infrastructure-
independance. The approach presented in this work attempts to create an alternative
method of localization, speciﬁcally in the area of location veriﬁcation, that is not only
infrastructure-independant but also addresses two other major issues in the area - terrorist
fraud and private information leakage (privacy).
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Name Technique Strengths Weaknesses
GPS/PPS/
Galileo
TDoA using
satellites
Highly accurate
Vulnerable to spooﬁng
(depending on approach);
Only feasible for external
locations; Relies on
infrastructure; Accuracy
decreases in heavily
built-up areas
ActiveBadge
Device emits
location-limited
beacons
Functions indoors
Relies on infrastructure;
Scales poorly; Dead zone
issues due to use of IR
ActiveBat US & RF TDoA
Functions indoors;
Employs more
reliable technology
(RF & US instead of
IR)
Relies on centralized
system & infrastructure
Cricket US & RF TDoA
Functions indoors;
Highly decentralized;
Preserves privacy of
participants
Vulnerable to spooﬁng;
Requires infrastructure; All
computation done by
device being positioned
AHLos US & RF TDoA
Functions indoors;
No need for
infrastructure;
Ad-hoc/communal
approach
Requires some level of
start-up knowledge; No
regard for privacy issues
SeRLoc
Combining
beacon
messages with
source locations
& angles of
transmission
Functions indoors;
No reliance on
ranging techniques;
Robust against Sybil
attacks & wormholes
Vulnerable to jamming;
Sector uniqueness property
may cause honest messages
to be discarded due to
reﬂections; Reliant on
infrastructure
ROPE &
SPINE
Veriﬁable
Multilateration
(Distance
Bounding)
Functions indoors;
VM can detect false
location claims; High
tolerance to jamming
(ROPE)
SPINE vulnerable to
jamming; ROPE reliant on
infrastructure
Table 2.1: Summary of Positioning-based Localization Approaches
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Name Technique Strengths Weaknesses
Echo
Protocol
RF & US TDoA -
US renders scheme
vulnerable to
replay attack;
Requires
infrastructure; No
identiﬁers used to
tie speciﬁc device
to location being
proven (addressed
in encrypted
varient);
Vulnerable to
jamming
Proximity-
Proving
Protocol
Distance Bounding
Employs a more
generic medium (RF
only); Protects
privacy of participants
Vulnerable to
terrorist fraud;
Requires
infrastructure;
Covert/Hidden/
Mobile Base
Stations
US & RF TDoA
Device being localized
cannot predict where
receiver will be;
Recent revision
removes reliance on
infrastructure
Possible future
vulnerability to
device
ﬁngerprinting,
thus removing
main strength
Table 2.2: Summary of Veriﬁcation-based Localization Approaches
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Privacy
With information regarding participants (such as identity or location) being transmitted
during the course of location veriﬁcation, privacy is of grave concern. In order to protect the
integrity and privacy of this information, we have created the Secure Location Veriﬁcation
Proof Gathering Protocol (SLVPGP) [37]. This protocol provides a three tiered approach
to security and privacy, employing an increasing combination of digital signatures and
encryption to protect any private data being transmitted. The structure of the protocol
has been based on that of the Proximity-Proving protocol, however alterations have been
made that address some of the original scheme's vulnerabilities, notably those which leave
it vulnerable to terrorist fraud. The SLVPGP's basic design has been extended to three
practical protocols, with each increasing the level of security provided to protect the privacy
of participants. The ﬁrst level is on par with schemes such as ROPE, which call for the
unsecured transmitting of private information. The second level secures these transmissions
through encryption for the devices involved in the exchange, which protects those involved
from eavesdroppers but not malicious internal nodes. The third level provides complete
privacy, preventing the leakage of any personal information regarding any participant.
Terrorist Fraud
As discussed previously, a terrorist fraud (or proxy attack) is where two or more de-
vices collude to convince the system that a speciﬁc device is in one location when it is
really in another, through proxying its messages to the correct area. Many veriﬁcation
schemes (including both the Echo protocol and the Proximity Proving protocol) are vul-
nerable to terrorist fraud, making reliable location veriﬁcation diﬃcult. In order to protect
our location veriﬁcation approach from terrorist fraud, we have presented a new distance
bounding metric for use in the SLVPGP. This Binary Metric is used to conﬁrm that a
distance bounding exchange has not been proxied. It does so by timing the exchange and
comparing the result to a previously calculated limit. The limit is calculated to be less than
that required to proxy a message over a single additional hop, and so if a distance bounding
exchange is less than this limit, it must be a direct exchange. The design of the SLVPGP
prevents any circumventing of this metric by ensuring that the distance bounding portion
of the protocol contains a connection to the device being veriﬁed. By including a digital
signature on the distance bounding response, it forces the claiming device to produce this
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message itself. If it wishes to prove a false location, it must therefore proxy any distance
bounding responses back to the correct area, which would be detected by the binary metric.
If the message has not been proxied, it must originate in the area, thus providing proof
of a device's location. An exception to this statement is where ampliﬁcation equipment
is employed by the claiming device to extend its reception and transmission ranges. This
exception is discussed more fully in Chapter 3.
Reliance on Infrastructure
Similar to Capkun et al's ad hoc veriﬁcation scheme, the SLVPGP does not rely upon
infrastructure to enable veriﬁcation. Instead, it employs neighbouring devices to supply
proof to a central server for ﬁnal judgement. By employing only RF distance bounding
to conﬁrm or deny the presence of a speciﬁc device at a claimed location, the majority of
wireless devices can participate in location claims, making it a highly generic approach.
Just as in schemes employing an existing infrastructure of locator devices designed to verify
a device's location, a device can gather proof of its presence at a speciﬁc location by distance
bounding with random neighbouring devices to conﬁrm it is within their transmission
range.
However, it is not enough to merely allow a claiming device to gather proof of its
location from all devices in its vicinity and supply this as evidence, as there is far too
much scope for abuse. For this reason, we have designed a management entity known as
the Veriﬁer, which serves as a back-end to the system. This entity manages the selection
of suitable local devices from a pool of volunteers and calculates the trustworthiness of the
devices involved based on their behaviour during past interactions with the system. The
Veriﬁer is also responsible for extracting a ﬁnal verdict on the veracity of a location claim,
based on the evidence supplied to it by the claiming device.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced the area of localization. Research in this area focuses
primarily on positioning approaches, with some attention being paid to the concept of
verifying a device's location claim or presence in a speciﬁc area (location veriﬁcation). It
is within this sub-strand that our research lies.
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We deﬁned the concept of localization before giving a brief description of some of the
key ranging techniques employed in the area of localization, including TDoA and ToA. We
then discussed some of the major threats to ranging techniques and localization schemes
as a whole, such as DoS, ampliﬁcation and collusion attacks.
With the area of localization and its common techniques outlined, we proceeded to
discuss the research areas of positioning and location veriﬁcation, moving from the Active-
Badge [101] positioning system to more recent works such as Capkun et al's hidden and
mobile base stations [99]. We discussed each scheme's contribution to the progression of
research, while identifying unaddressed ﬂaws which have still to be addressed.
Finally, we discussed our own work on the SLVPGP and how it relates to already
existing research, identifying our inspiration for the scheme's structure and how it addresses
open issues within other schemes in the area.
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Chapter 3
Distance Bounding and the Use of a
Binary Metric
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we outlined a number of ranging techniques for use in localization, designed
to estimate the location of a device relative to others within its system or on a more global
level. A common method of computing this information was through the estimation of
distance between devices. One such method of estimating distance is distance bounding
[13], in which a challenge-response scenario is used to gauge the time required for a message
to be received. This information allows a distance to be extracted, through combining the
time required for a message to be received with the speed of the communications medium
being employed to give a maximum possible distance traveled in that space of time.
In this chapter, we discuss the technique of distance bounding and its use within our
localization system (Section 3.2). We outline an alternative metric which foregoes the
precise calculations traditionally employed by distance bounding and indicates whether
a pair of devices are in direct communication, or if one device is attempting a collusion
attack (Section 3.3). We investigate the usefulness of the binary metric in IEEE 802.3
[6] (wired) and IEEE 802.11 [5] (wireless) environments through emulation, discussed in
Sections 3.4 and 3.5. In Section 3.6, we introduce the concept of a window of acceptance
and outline a method for its computation, before discussing the need for authentication
within the exchange in Section 3.7. Finally, we summarise the contents of the chapter in
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Section 3.8.
3.2 Distance Bounding
Before discussing our work on the binary metric, an alternative metric for use in distance
bounding, we outline the technique of distance bounding itself. We discuss proxy attacks -
the main form of attack launched on this form of ranging technique - on both a basic and
a more technologically complex level.
3.2.1 What is Distance Bounding?
Distance bounding is a process in which bits are sent rapidly between two devices, in order
to establish a limit on the distance between the two. The process involves a device A (the
sender) sending a challenge bit to device B (the prover) and timing the delay between
transmission and receiving the corresponding response bit. This delay time is then used to
calculate an upper bound on the distance between devices A and B. In practice, a series of
these exchanges is done to lessen the eﬀects of network delays on the overall result. This
process is primarily useful in limiting the distance within which a device could be found.
This makes it a prime technique for use in the location proving area.
Distance bounding is employed within this research to provide proof of a device's pres-
ence in the area for use by the location veriﬁcation system. The technique allows the loca-
tion veriﬁcation system to distinguish whether a device is within a claimed area, through
the claiming device (the Claimant) distance bounding with neighbouring devices (Proof
Providers) from that area. In the distance bounding exchange, the Claimant plays the role
of the prover, with the Proof Provider taking the role of the sender. This proof is used by
the system to corroborate a device's claim of being in a particular location at a given time.
However, distance bounding is vulnerable to many attacks [44]. Examples of these attacks
include prematurely responding to challenges and proxy attacks with the aid of colluding
devices. Proxy attacks are discussed further in Section 3.2.2.
The premature response method of attack is technically simple, whereby the prover
sends its response prior to even receiving the challenge bit. This gives the impression that
the prover is closer to the sender than they are, by shortening the time taken to respond
to the challenge. This attack can be prevented in a number of ways. Examples of these
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include forcing the bits being sent back by the prover to depend on those bits received from
the sender, or by the sender sending out bits with randomly chosen delay times, preventing
the prover from anticipating the time at which the bit will be sent.
3.2.2 Proxy Attacks
As discussed previously, a proxy (collusion) attack on a ranging technique is where two or
more devices work together in order to convince a third that one of the attackers is in its
vicinity. In the case of a proxy attack on distance bounding, the prover colludes with one
or more interim devices in the hope of convincing the sender to unknowingly give a false
reading for its location. When a sender directs a challenge to the prover, the colluding
or proxy device can either respond in place of the prover or forward the challenge on
to receive the appropriate response. If the proxy has the ability to respond as the prover
without detection, the attack is invisible to the sender. However, the response may require
some piece of information that only the prover has access to and cannot share. An example
of such a situation would be where the appropriate response is to encrypt the frame, using
encryption keys only available in a tamper resistant unit. In this case, the proxy is forced to
forward all challenges received from the sender to the prover and wait for the appropriate
response in return. The forwarding of messages between the receiving device and the proxy
in this manner greatly delays the sending of the response back to the sender, thus allowing
the attack to be detected.
Within our system, the simplest form of proxy attack involves only a single additional
device acting as a proxy between the Proof Provider (the sender) and the Claimant (the
prover). However, this basic form attack has two distinct subtypes, with vastly diﬀering
levels of impact. In the ﬁrst and simplest basic subtype, all devices communicate using
the same medium, thereby meaning that a proxy attack would require at least twice the
time taken by a direct challenge-response exchange. In the second subtype, the proxy and
Claimant communicate over a much faster medium, thus providing the attackers with an
advantage and decreasing the time required to complete the challege-response exchange.
While the time required in this situation would still be greater than that required to com-
plete an honest exchange, the additional hops incurred could, depending on the communica-
tions medium employed, be so rapidly accomplished that an attack would be undetectable.
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For example, if a Proof Provider was to communicate with a proxy device using wireless
communications, it would expect a reply back using the same medium. This medium is
relatively slow, particularly in comparison with wired communications, which can reach
speeds of over 1 gigabit/s. If the proxy was in possession of a direct wired connection
to the Claimant, it could easily complete the additional hops required to transmit the
challenge to the Claimant and receive back its response for forwarding without adding any
signiﬁcant period of time to the overall exchange, due to wireless's slow transmission speed.
However, this approach requires the existance of a wired connection between the Claimant
and its proxy, a requirement that is not usually common of a mobile node. Therefore,
when discussing proxy attacks throughout this work, we deal solely with the ﬁrst subtype,
where all devices employ the same communications medium, and acknowledge that further
work is required to investigate the detectability of the second form of basic proxy attack.
Although a similar eﬀect could be achieved within the wireless medium through the use
of a directional antenna with increased power levels, the impact on time would be greater
than where a wired connection is employed, increasing the likelihood of detectability.
In order to discover whether a proxy attack could successfully receive a false positive on
a location claim through completing distance bounding within the time frame of an honest
exchange, a security analysis of the ﬁrst basic proxy subtype scenario was conducted. This
analysis was carried out through the emulation of both honest and proxied exchanges in
various network settings, and the resulting times from each were compared.
3.3 The Binary Metric
In this section, we outline the premise and examine the usefulness of a binary metric
for use with distance bounding in a wireless network. The binary metric proposed is a
yes/no "visibility" metric. It is assumed that a device can only participate in a distance
bounding exchange via a direct connection to a verifying device or through a proxying
device. Therefore if a Claimant appears visible to a Proof Provider, it is either participating
honestly or is attempting to mount a proxy attack. The binary metric employs this fact to
detect whether or not a Claimant is a single wireless network hop from its Proof Provider.
As the distance over which a message can travel in a single hop on a wireless network
is limited, this deﬁnition provides an upper bound on the possible distance between the
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Claimant and its Proof Provider.
We employ the binary metric within the Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gathering
Protocol (SLVPGP), which protects the proof gathering exchange. The binary metric
protects the integrity of the verdict produced by distance bounding through conﬁrming
that the Claimant involved is not attempting to perpetrate a proxy attack. Neighbouring
devices (Proof Providers) within the wireless network produce a yes or no verdict indicating
whether the Claimant is able to communicate with them within a reasonable time limit.
It is these verdicts which are utilised as a tool to verify the location claim, in place of
the round trip times used by other approaches. If a distance bounding exchange results
in a positive binary metric verdict, then the Claimant participating in that exchange is
both able to communicate with the Proof Provider and is not communicating via a proxy,
proving that they are in the area. One possible exception to this is where a Claimant
employs ampliﬁcation equipment to extend its transmission range, thereby allowing its
direct message range to extend beyond that of a normal device.
3.3.1 Honest vs Proxy Exchanges
The proposed use of a binary metric in distance bounding removes the reliance on timing
to calculate an upper bound on the possible distance between the Claimant and a Proof
Provider. However when dealing with the binary metric, a upper bound is placed on the
allowable delay time between the Proof Provider sending its challenge and receiving the
Claimant's response. This limit is included to distinguish between a proxy attack and
an honest distance bounding exchange. The calculation of the limit is further discussed
in Section 3.6. When a Proof Provider engages in distance bounding with an honest
Claimant, the response time is 2x+d, where d is the computational delay and x is the
message's transmission time for a single network hop. However, when a Proof Provider
engages in distance bounding with a malicious Claimant via a proxy, the response time must
be greater than 2x+d. This is because during the course of a proxy attack, the message
being transmitted undergoes one or more additional network hops in each direction, rather
than only a single hop. Finally, when a Proof Provider distance bounds with a Claimant
employing ampliﬁcation equipment, the time required to complete an exchange is 2y+d
(where y is the message's transmission time for a single ampliﬁed hop). This is because the
32
signal is required to travel farther in both directions. However, unlike in proxied exchanges,
the computational delay remains unchanged as only one set of devices are involved in the
exchange.
In an honest exchange, a challenge is sent by the Proof Provider to the Claimant and
the Claimant's response is sent directly back. However, during a proxy attack, the Proof
Provider's challenge is sent to a proxy device within its transmission range. The proxy then
forwards it on through at least one network hop to reach the Claimant. The Claimant's
response must then also travel the extra steps to reach the proxy before being relayed
back to the Proof Provider. It is these additional message hops that increase the response
time of a proxy attack. We propose to use this ﬂaw in the proxy attack's design to detect
its occurrence. A Claimant cannot communicate with its Proof Providers without either
a direct or proxied connection. Therefore, the ability of the binary metric to detect the
presence of a proxy attack also allows it to function as a veriﬁcation method, proving that
the Claimant is in the claimed area. However, while this is the case for comparing proxied
and direct exchanges, it is not necessarily so for ampliﬁed exchanges. Computational delay
is higher than signal transmission times, and while proxied exchanges incur multiple rounds
of this form of delay (with the number depending on the number of proxy devices involved),
ampliﬁed exchanges incur only one. This diﬀerence means that ampliﬁed exchanges can
be expected to require less time to complete than proxied exchanges, and therefore may
not be as easily detectable, particularly in a congested/high-traﬃc network.
In order for the binary metric's method of detection to function, there must be a sub-
stantial diﬀerence between the times required to complete a proxy attack in comparison
to that required for an honest exchange. If there is no overlap between the possible time
taken for an honest Claimant to complete its distance bounding and a malicious Claimant
to perform a proxy attack, then the occurrence of a proxy attack is easily detectable. One
danger when dealing with this method of detection is that the computational delay will
drown out the diﬀerence in transmission times between an honest exchange and a proxy
attack. This would make honest and proxied exchanges indistinguishable from each other.
In order to conﬁrm that this issue does not pose a threat to the functionality of the ap-
proach, we have conducted multiple emulations in both IEEE 802.3 (wired) and IEEE
802.11 (wireless) environments. These emulations are discussed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
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The research presented in this work focuses on the ability of the binary metric to distin-
guish between direct and proxied exchanges. Due to equipment limitations, no emulations
have been attempted to ascertain the diﬀerence between direct and ampliﬁed exchanges.
Therefore, while the binary metric has been conﬁrmed to distinguish between direct and
proxied exchanges, there is no evidence to support its capability of detecting ampliﬁed
exchanges, meaning that a device may still reside beyond the area of the claimed location.
This possibility represents an avenue for future research.
As is common in this area of research, the value of d (computational delay) is left as
an unknown, with no attempt to address it. The Proof Provider/receiving device removes
the computational delay incurred by itself, as this value is known, leaving a ﬁnal value
composed of the transmission time plus the computational delay incurred by any other
participating devices. Therefore the possible distance traveled will be slightly less than that
calculated, as part of the time attributed to transmission has been used for computation.
As the deﬁnition of distance bounding is a process to compute the maximum possible
distance a signal can travel, and is not intended to give an exact distance, this is considered
acceptable.
3.3.2 What Does a Yes Verdict Mean?
When using the binary metric to detect the presence of a proxy attack, there are two
possible verdicts which a Proof Provider may provide: the Claimant is visible to it during
distance bounding (yes), or the Claimant is not visible (no). While these two verdicts
appear to be straightforward, their meanings are not so. If a Claimant is found to be
visible by a Proof Provider and a proxy attack is not deemed to have occured, then that
Claimant is deemed to be within the area of that Proof Provider. It is impossible for a
Proof Provider to mistakenly ﬁnd that a Claimant is in its area when it is not, due to the
employment of digital signatures on the response portion of the exchange. This is dealt
with in further detail in Section 3.7.
If a Proof Provider deems a Claimant visible during distance bounding, it must ﬁrst
have received multiple valid responses to its challenges from that Claimant. Within this
work, we assume that the Claimant is not in possession of ampliﬁcation equipment and
therefore if it is not in the claimed area, it requires the assistance of a proxying device
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located within the area. Without the aid of a proxy device at a location closer to the Proof
Provider than its own or ampliﬁcation equipment to increase its reception and transmission
capabilities, the Claimant is not capable of proving itself to be in the area of the Proof
Provider. Proxy attacks are ruled out through employing an upper bound on an acceptable
round trip time, as discussed in Section 3.3.1, and so any positive visibility results on the
part of a Proof Provider cannot be a mistake.
3.3.3 What Does a No Verdict Mean?
Unlike in the case of a positive visibility verdict, there are many possible reasons for a
Proof Provider deeming a Claimant not visible during the distance bounding process. The
three main reasons for a negative visibility verdict are: the Claimant is not present in the
area, the Claimant is in the area but not within range of the Proof Provider or that there
are network issues preventing the Claimant from completing distance bounding within the
time limit.
The simplest reason for a negative verdict is that the Claimant is not present in the area.
There are various causes for this to occur, both innocent (where a Claimant mistakenly
having made a false location claim) and malicious (where a Claimant attempts to deceive
the system). Additionally, the device could have moved on from that location before the
distance bounding occurred, a distinct danger if the system is based in the area of VANETs
[79], where participants are usually in motion during exchanges.
The remaining reasons for a negative verdict are caused by a failure of the technology
upon which this system is built. Although the Claimant is in the area in both cases, a
falsely negative verdict is received. Either the range of the Proof Provider is too limited
to allow for the Claimant to distance bound directly with it, or the network over which
distance bounding is to occur is too unreliable to allow it. Distance bounding is undertaken
multiple times to lessen the eﬀects of network issues on the eventual outcome. However, if
the network is consistantly poor, either too noisy or too lossy, then the Claimant will not
be able to distance bound successfully within its allowed time frame. It is for these reasons
that we do not factor negative visibility verdicts into the calculation of location at the end
of the distance bounding process. In some cases, negative verdicts are genuinely deserved.
However, there are also multiple scenarios in which a false negative is received, which could
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Figure 3.1: Employing the Binary Metric Results
pollute the location calculations. Therefore, as there can be no mistaken positive verdicts
we employ only these in the ﬁnal location calculation. This is discussed further in Chapter
6.
3.3.4 The Binary Metric vs Precise Calculations
Typically, distance bounding through location veriﬁcation is used to verify that a device is
within range of a speciﬁc resource or location ([80, 43, 96, 94]). This is achieved through
calculating an upper bound on the possible distance between the device and required
resource/location and conﬁrming that this location is within an allowable range. In order
to discover this upper bound, the delay between a Proof Provider sending a challenge and
receiving the appropriate response back from the Claimant is precisely timed. This round
trip time is then used to calculate a greatest possible distance, through using the speed at
which the signal can travel. In the case of the Echo protocol [85], both the speed of sound
and the speed of light are factored into the calculation of distance. When dealing with
distance bounding in wireless networks, such as with Waters and Felten's proximity proving
protocol [102], the processing time on the part of the Proof Provider is subtracted from the
round trip time. This ﬁgure is halved and multiplied by the speed of light (approximately
3 ∗ 108m/s) to calculate an upper bound on the possible distance between the Claimant
and the Proof Provider.
The above approach is similar to that applied in this work, however the work put forth
here does not require the upper bound limit to limit the distance. Instead, this upper
bound merely distinguishes a proxy attack from an honest exchange. Receiving a positive
visibility verdict from multiple Proof Providers regarding the same location claim allows
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for the area in which that Claimant could be located in to be reduced down through a
form of triangulation. In this process, the possible broadcast ranges for each of the Proof
Providers contacted are noted, and the broadcast areas (usually circles or spheres) are
overlaid. This is shown in Figure 3.1. In this ﬁgure, the Claimant has distance bounded
with Proof Providers A, B, C and D. This has resulted in the Claimant's possible location
being reduced down to a minimally sized area of intersection. This area of intersection
of the transmission ranges of all Proof Providers involved is the only region in which the
Claimant could possibly be located, thus giving a location for the Claimant and potentially
proving the location claim being investigated. This concept is employed in the extraction
of a more precise location in Section 6.8 of Chapter 6.
3.4 Distance Bounding Emulations in an IEEE 802.3 Wired
Network
In order for the binary metric to be considered practical for reliable location veriﬁcation,
it must be able to detect whether a proxy attack is underway during a distance bounding
exchange. If the metric cannot detect this attack, results gained with this approach would
not be trustworthy. The nature of a proxy attack on an exchange increases the transmission
time of any given message and it is this increase in response time which the Proof Provider
checks for when calculating its visibility verdict, in order to conﬁrm that a proxy attack is
not being carried out. However, one of the main issues with this method of proxy detection
is the possibility that the time lost to network latencies and computational delays would
drown out the diﬀerence between honest and proxy exchanges. In order to conﬁrm that this
does not threaten the integrity of the detection approach, we have emulated the round trip
of a message in both situations. An emulation of the two scenarios was carried out rather
than employing a simulation tool such as ns-21, as we wished to gather practical results
rather than relying upon assumptions made within third party software. The emulations
were performed on the DCU computing network at normal hours, with multiple users active
at the time. As the scenarios were emulated on a real network, the exchanges incurred a
normal level of packet loss and network delay due to existing network traﬃc.
The experiments conducted deal with two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, devices
1http://www. isi. edu/nsnam/ns ns-2
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Figure 3.2: The Path of a Direct Message (IEEE802.3)
behave honestly when engaged in a distance bounding exchange. In the second, they
behave dishonestly and conduct a proxy attack on the system ("cheating"). Ethernet
frames are sent back and forth for distance bounding. These were chosen to minimise the
eﬀect of computational delay on the results, as they are the most basic networking building
blocks available and are at the lowest point in the networking stack. This decreases the
delay between when the frame is received by the device and when it is analysed by the
emulation program. UDP has been selected (User Datagram Protocol, from the Internet
Protocol suite) [73] as the packet type for use when transmitting between the proxy device
and the ﬁnal device. This was done as unlike TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) [69],
UDP gives the option of performing no error checking on the packet for the sake of speed,
giving as fast a result as possible while still using a routed protocol.
3.4.1 IEEE 802.3 Emulation Outlines
To emulate distance bounding in a vehicular network, we conducted experiments within an
IEEE 802.3 wired CAT5 Ethernet network. Though the transmission protocol employed
within vehicular networks is based on this (IEEE 802.11 is based on IEEE 802.3), it is
inherently diﬀerent due to the medium over which it transmits. Wireless transmissions are
lossy by nature, with a higher level of transmissions lost than over wired networks due to
a high level of interference from objects in the environment. However, vehicular networks
have the advantage of being ad-hoc in nature. This allows for direct transmission between
devices, thus cutting out extraneous devices such as switches which add further hops to the
journey. Mobile networks cannot achieve such high transmission speeds as an IEEE 802.3
network due to the limitations imposed on the bandwidth by the radio spectrum, as there
is only a small segment available for wireless transmissions. With a wired network there
is a dedicated transmission medium with no other objects interfering and less competition
for slots in which to send data.
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Figure 3.3: The Path of a Proxied Message (IEEE802.3)
However, though there are diﬀerences between the theoretical mobile network setting
of IEEE 802.11 and the IEEE 802.3 network in which these emulations are set, the results
remain useful as they represent the optimal possible round trip time for an attack. The
minimum round trip time produced by our emulations for a proxy attack scenario is still
nowhere near a reasonable response time for an honest exchange. This is despite higher
transmission speeds and fewer packet losses than in the theoretical mobile network, thus
proving that there is no possibility of a proxy attack deceiving the system and receving a
positive result from distance bounding.
The direct exchange of a message between two honest agents in a network is emulated
by the transmission of a single ethernet frame to the ethernet address of the receiving agent
(modelling the Claimant). The receiving agent then creates a new frame and transmits
this frame back to the ethernet address of the initial agent (modelling the Proof Provider).
These frames are forwarded through a switch device, causing each frame to be transmitted
twice, once from the sender to the switch and a second time from the switch to the intended
recipient. This path is shown in Figure 3.2.
The emulation of a proxy attack is structured in a similar manner to that of the direct
exchange emulation. However, due to the increase in participating agents, the number of
agents and the type of message container are altered. The emulation models a simple form
of proxy attack - the message is only proxied through a single extra agent, but there is
additional infrastructure involvement also. As the message must be proxied outside of the
local area, its contents are copied from an ethernet frame to a UDP packet, to allow for
IP (Internet Protocol) routing.
The path a message must travel during a proxy attack is depicted in Figure 3.3. The
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Figure 3.4: Emulation Results of Proxied and Direct Exchanges Performed Over an IEEE
802.3 Network
message begins as an ethernet frame, which is transmitted from the sending agent (mod-
elling the Proof Provider) to the proxy agent's ethernet address via a switch device. The
contents of this frame are then copied into a new UDP packet and sent to the IP address
of the true recipient (the agent modelling the malicious Claimant). As the packet is being
routed, it travels from the proxy agent to a switch and from there is forwarded to a router.
The router forwards the packet to the correct switch and this switch transmits it to the
true recipient. The true recipient copies the received contents to a new UDP packet and
returns the new packet back over the same route it arrived on.
The network equipment employed for these emulations was comprised of three pcs,
each with a 100 mb/s (megabit per second) network card connected by 10/100 ethernet
to a Cisco 2498G switch. The switch was connected to a Cisco 6509 router using a ﬁbre
backbone, with a speed of 1 gigabit/s. The switch employed a "store and forward" approach
to frame forwarding, to allow for complete error checking. A "store and forward" approach
involves the switch storing all message data until the entire frame has been received, rather
than starting the forwarding process prior to receiving the complete message.
3.4.2 IEEE 802.3 Emulation Results
The graph seen in Figure 3.4 displays the result times of both the direct round trip and
proxy attack emulations for 5000 message exchanges. The lower line (solid black with grey
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peaks) represents the direct exchange emulation results, while the upper line (in white)
represents the proxy exchange emulation times. The graph shows that the average round
trip time of an honest exchange is roughly half that of the average round trip time for a
proxy exchange, with a clear break between the time required for direct exchanges and
that required for proxied. This break between average round trip times provides a large
window within which to establish a acceptance limit. This concept is discussed further in
Sections 3.5.2 and 3.6.
The average time required by a direct exchange emulation run to complete a message
exchange was discovered to be 710 microseconds. This is less than half the average time
of 1560 microseconds required by a proxied exchange. This diﬀerence in round trip times
is clear evidence that there is enough of a distinction between a direct exchange and a
proxied exchange to allow for detection of attacks on distance bounding and the binary
visibility metric. Aalthough there were a small number of overlaps between the results
returned for direct exchanges and proxy results, these can be attributed to network issues
and are an expected occurrence within our ﬁgures. The addition of multiple iterations
of distance bounding removes this issue from question, as the odds of network problems
repeating over a series of distance bounding exchanges are very low.
3.5 Distance Bounding Emulations in an IEEE 802.11 Wire-
less Network
While the employment of a time-based metric to distinguish honest from proxied exchanges
initially seems like an ideal solution to the collusion detection problem, if the window for
a reasonable exchange is extended, proxy attacks again become an issue. The IEEE 802.3
practical emulations of distance bounding provided a positive result on the impossibility
of a proxy attack going undetected. However, the issue remains as to whether or not
employing the binary metric to distance bounding set in an IEEE 802.11 wireless network
will work in practice. The practical reality of data transmission in wireless networks is
that due to only one device in a certain range having transmission capability at any one
time, data collision algorithms are heavily relied upon. These algorithms slow the sending
of frames through the employment of techniques to avoid collisions. Collision detection
algorithms also employ delay windows in retransmission approaches, again slowing down
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Figure 3.5: The Path of an Emulated Proxied Exchange in an IEEE 802.11 Environment
sending speeds. Finally, in addition to interference from non-computing devices, even with
algorithms to detect and avoid collisions, at times packets simply get lost. These issues
mean that employing the binary metric to distance bounding in a wireless setting may
simply not be feasible, due to the high time windows which would be required to allow
for a successful exchange. Therefore, in order to conﬁrm the practicality and suitability of
employing the metric in this environment, emulations similar to those described within an
IEEE 802.3 setting have been carried out. These emulations indicate whether the variation
in time required for a direct round trip will mask the extra time required to carry out a
proxy attack on the devices. If this was the case, the binary metric would be ineﬀectual in
this situation as it cannot diﬀerenciate between a direct exchange between honest devices
and a proxy attack involving malicious devices. However, unlike in the case of the IEEE
802.3 emulations, the IEEE 802.11 emulations were not carried out on a live network,
due to a lack of available equipment. Instead, the emulations were performed on a small
test network, featuring only the devices involved in the emulations. Although this does
decrease the accuracy of the results, it also allows the results to be analysed to detect
the diﬀerent between direct and proxied communications without any interference. While
the emulation results do include reasonable computational delay, the network load and
traﬃc levels were signiﬁcantly lower than those expected in practice. This issue is further
discussed in Section 3.5.2.
3.5.1 IEEE 802.11 Emulation Outlines
The network equipment employed for the IEEE 802.11 emulations was comprised of three
laptop computers, each running ubuntu with a minimum of one gigabyte of memory and
an IEEE 802.11b network card. The units were connected to an ad-hoc network with
a maximum connection speed of 11mb/s. As in the case of our wired emulations, the
direct exchange of a message between two honest neighbouring agents is emulated through
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the transmission of a single ethernet frame by the initialising agent (modelling the Proof
Provider) to the ethernet address of the receiving agent (modelling the Claimant). The
receiving agent copies the contents of the received frame into a new message and transmits
this frame back to the initialising agent's ethernet address.
Unlike the case of an honest message exchange, a proxy attack on distance bounding
may be executed in a number of ways. However, at its most basic level, every proxy attack
involves at least one extra device forwarding messages in order to enable communications
between a two devices, in this case a Claimant and its Proof Provider. The functionality
of this interim device may be repeated over multiple other devices, allowing a Claimant's
communication capability to be extended enormously. In extreme cases, an attack may
even involve the routing of messages over the internet to a Claimant located many miles
from its claimed location. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the proxy attack scenario consid-
ered within this work involves both the Claimant and the Proof Provider communicating
via a single proxy device, using a wireless communications medium. For this reason, the
proxy scenario employed as a test of the binary metric within this work is composed of only
three devices: the Claimant, a Proof Provider and a single additional device functioning
as a proxy (Figure 3.5).
In this emulation, the Proof Provider transmits a frame to the address it believes
belongs to the Claimant. In reality, the frame is transmitted to an interim proxying
device. The proxy device then forwards the received frame on to the true Claimant. As in
the honest emulation, the Claimant copies the contents of the received frame into a new
frame. The new frame is transmitted back to the Proof Provider via the proxying device,
thus allowing the Claimant to trick the Proof Provider into believing it to be located closer
than it is in reality.
3.5.2 IEEE 802.11 Emulation Results
Graph (a) seen in Figure 3.6 displays the results recorded for 5000 message exchanges
within direct and proxied round trip attack emulations. The lower line (black) represents
the results recorded for direct exchanges, while the upper line (grey) displays the proxied
exchange results. The graph shows that the average round trip time of an honest exchange
is signiﬁcantly lower than that required for a proxied exchange. It was discovered that
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Figure 3.6: Emulation Results for Direct vs Proxied Exchanges
the time required for a message to complete a round trip between two devices ﬂuctuated
over several thousand microseconds. However, a fraction of the results of direct exchanges
overlapped with those received for proxied exchanges. This overlap poses a problem for
the practicality of the binary metric, as without a clear division between the expected
time for the completion of a direct exchange and that required for a proxied exchange, the
metric cannot reliably function. However, upon further analysis of these ﬁgures, a window
of acceptance (WoA) emerged (Section 3.6), within which 92.04% or 4602 of the 5000
direct exchanges graphed were received. This WoA was discovered to extend to within
2000 microseconds of the fastest round trip time achieved within that emulation's run.
The WoA provides an upper bound on the acceptable amount of time taken to complete
a direct round trip. Graph (B) shown in Figure 3.6 depicts the ﬁltered result set, where
any exchanges with a round trip time of greater than 2000 microseconds above the fastest
exchange are removed from the original result-set from which graph (a) is generated. By
removing any results beyond the upper limit on the window of acceptance, the issue of
overlapping timings is resolved, as demonstrated by graph (B). Note that there is now
a clear distinction between direct and proxied exchange results. We applied the window
of acceptance ﬁlter to a extended set of 27 direct emulation runs, each containing 10000
exchanges. When applied to the results of each emulation run, an average of 93.67% were
deemed acceptable as direct exchanges.
The average fastest time achieved for a round trip over the 27 emulation runs was found
to be 3256 microseconds, with an average of 9362 frames per emulation received within
2000 microseconds of this time (5256 microseconds). Therefore if this ﬁgure were enacted
as an upper limit on the time in which a frame could acceptably be received in during direct
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distance bounding, 93.62% of the frames transmitted during these experiments would be
accepted by a Proof Provider. The inclusion of multiple iterations of distance bounding in
the interaction aims to reduce the risk that a single frame's slow round trip would remove
the ability of the Claimant to prove itself visible.
The results gathered from the outlined emulations support the hypothesis that the
binary metric can function within an IEEE 802.11 environment. However, further study
is required to evaluate the eﬀect of a densely populated network on the performance of
the metric. While the emulations outlined have been conducted within an environment
comparable to a real world wireless ad hoc network, the population of the network vastly
diﬀers from that of an ad hoc network. The environment in which the emulations were
conducted contained only the devices playing a role in the emulation itself. This was done
to gain a clear picture of whether or not the binary metric would function in an IEEE 802.11
environment and to discover what the minimum possible exchange time achieveable was.
A more populated environment would interfere with the gathering of this information, as
participating devices would be required to compete for slots in which to transmit messages.
In addition to the level of collisions and required retransmissions, this will cause a slower
response rate, masking any information regarding minimum exchange times. In the future,
it is advised that the metric be tested in a larger network to discover its viability.
Whilst carrying out these emulations, it was discovered that employing devices with
vastly varied speciﬁcations and capabilities led to inaccurate and inconclusive distance
bounding results. This is due to the need for predictability in the resulting round trip
times. If Claimant A) can complete an exchange in 3564 microseconds, but Claimant
B) has slower equipment and can only complete the exchange in 12834 microseconds, it
will appear to the Proof Provider as though Claimant B) is attempting to carry out a
proxy attack even if Claimant B) is behaving honestly. For this reason, equipment used to
carry out distance bounding employing the binary metric must be standardised to achieve
roughly the same speed of exchange. An alternative approach to standardisation could
be employed whereby the Proof Provider is informed of the speed to be expected from a
Claimant prior to completing distance bounding. However, this is vulnerable to attack, as
the Claimant could lie about its minimum possible exchange speed, thus allowing enough
time to carry out a proxy attack without detection.
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3.6 Deﬁning the Window of Acceptance
In the previous section, it was shown that a window of acceptance can be deﬁned to provide
an upper bound on the time taken for a round trip in order to distinguish between a direct
and a proxied exchange. Those exchanges with round trip times within the window are
deemed acceptable and considered to be direct exchanges, while those with round trip times
of greater than the maximum time in the window are rejected. Therefore, the window of
acceptance forms the basis of the binary metric, through providing it with a method of
distinguishing direct from proxied exchanges.
In the examples shown in the previous section, the window was computed retroac-
tively, based on the results gathered. However, this is not a practical approach and so
some method of computing a window of acceptance based on the current state of the
surrounding network is required. We propose a scheme in which the network speed is
periodically assessed, thus providing devices with a relatively up to date estimate of the
network's performance and the probable performance to be expected for an exchange. This
assessment is achieved using a two stage process, with the ﬁrst stage estimating a reason-
able time frame for direct exchanges and the second estimating the same for a proxied
exchange.
1. A→ B : Rdir
2. B → A : NB
3. A→ B : NB, NA
4. B → A : NA
In the ﬁrst stage, basic distance bounding is performed with multiple devices in the area
to gauge the local network's current performance capability. This is illustrated above,
using abstract protocol notation. For the sake of clarity, an index of this notation has been
provided at the beginning of this work. Device A initiates the process through transmitting
a direct estimation request (Rdir) to a local device of its choice, B. In practice, this may
be done using broadcasting over the local network, advertising that A wishes to gauge the
speed of the network. B starts its timer and responds with a nonce (NB) indicating that it
has begun the estimation process. A starts its own timer and replies to this with a message
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containing both B's nonce and a new nonce of its own (NA). Finally, upon receipt of the
nonce pair, B stops its timer and responds to A with A's nonce. A then stops its own
timer, ending the process. Both B and A can then compute the time required for a direct
exchange. This process is repeated multiple times in order to better gauge the network's
current level of performance.
In the second stage, distance bounding including intentional proxying is performed to
estimate the time required to complete a proxy exchange with a single additional device. A
selects an interim device, B, through which it can proxy messages. B then selects a device
to forward these messages on to (using the same approach as A), thus creating a proxy
exchange circuit. In addition to providing both the initiating (A) and ﬁnal destination
(C) devices with proxied exchange timings, this approach also provides the device acting
as a proxy (B) with direct exchange timings from two devices, A and C.
1. A→ B : Rpx
2. B → C : Rpx, Ackpx
3. C → B : NC
4. B → A : NC , NB1
5. A→ B : NA, NB1 , NC
6. B → C : NA, NB2 , NC
7. C → B : NA, NB2
8. B → A : NA
The design for second-stage performance estimation is shown above, described using basic
protocol notation. In this exchange, device A initiates the estimation through transmitting
a proxied estimation request (Rpx) to a random local device, B. B, noting that there is
no acknowledgement included in this message, forwards the request on to a third random
local device, C, along with an acknowledgement of the presence of a proxy in the chain
(Ackpx). C, upon receiving the request to estimate proxied timings and knowing that
a chain is already in place due to the inclusion of Ackpx in the request message, starts
its timer and transmits its nonce (NC), beginning the exchange. B, having received C's
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message, starts its own timer and sends both C's nonce and the ﬁrst of its own nonces
(NB1) to A. A receives this message and starts its own timer, then attaches its nonce (NA)
to the message and sends it back to B. B stops its timer, records the time (which will be
used to compute the time required to complete a direct exchange between itself and A)
and starts the timer again, transmitting both C and A's nonces back to C along with the
second of its nonces (NB2). C receives this message and stops its timer, then sends back
both NB2 and NA to B. B receives the pair of nonces from C and stops its timer for the
second time before forwarding the nonce NA to A. Finally, A stops its timer and computes
the time required to complete proxied distance bounding between itself and C, while B
computes the time required to complete direct distance bounding between both itself and
C and itself and A. As in the case of direct performance estimation, this multi-hop process
is repeated with multiple devices to better gauge the local network's current performance
level.
With both ﬁrst and second stage measurements taken, a device can then compare the
fastest proxied results with the slowest direct exchange results and set an upper bound
to create that device's acceptance window. This boundary should be selected such that
a clear distinction is created between the two sets of results. It should be less than the
fastest proxied result acheived, but should also accept a reasonable percentage of direct
round trip times. Additionally, by each device computing its own window of acceptance,
there is a greater degree of ﬂexibility within the system. However, there are two main
drawbacks to this approach to gauging acceptance windows - device windows may vary
greatly and it relies upon honest behaviour on the part of the participating devices.
While the process described in this section does allow information to be gathered re-
garding the current performance level of the local network, it relies upon honest behaviour
among neighbours. If a device wished to skew the windows of acceptance for other devices
in its vicinity, it could cause artiﬁcially high measurements for those entering into the es-
timation protocols with it through holding messages rather than responding immediately.
This attack would be undetectable, except in an area where device behaviour is predomi-
nently honest. In this situation, the results provided or caused by a malicious device would
be overridden by those generated using honest devices.
The second issue with gauging acceptance windows in this manner is the permittance
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of devices to set their own windows. While this may provide the system with a greater level
of ﬂexibility, the results reﬂected by these windows may not be equally reliable. Under
the system's current design, each device's acceptance window is unknown to all but that
device, including the Veriﬁer. Therefore even if one device's window is excessively small
or large, the results it determines carry equal weight to those based on more reasonably
sized windows. This issue can be addressed without the standardization of window sizes,
through the provision of information on each device's individual window size along with
any verdict information. However, this approach is vulnerable to abuse due to its reliance
upon honest behaviour on the part of the participants, repeating the secondary ﬂaw in the
original design.
Finally, it should also be noted that the size of a device's window does not guarantee
that that device will behave accordingly, i.e. a device with a very small window of ac-
ceptance will not necessarily mean that the device will always report its results honestly.
For example, a device may employ a very strong window, composed of only a small accep-
tance range, within which any messages received are sure to be honest responses, but then
lie about the number of responses it received within the window. This aspect of device
trustworthiness is dealt with in Chapter 6.
3.7 Authenticating the Exchange
In order for distance bounding to function as a method of detecting a terrorist fraud at-
tack, the Claimant must be required to actively participate in the exchange. Fulﬁlling
this requirement ensures that the challenge reaches the location of the Claimant and not
just an interim proxy device. A common approach to fulﬁlling this requirement employs
pre-commitment to tie the Claimant to exchange. In this scheme, distance bounding is
comprised of a series of single bit exchanges, rather than complete nonces. Prior to the
timed portion of the exchange, the Claimant commits to a sequence of bits for use in
generating its responses. The Claimant XOR's a received challenge bit with the corre-
sponding bit from its pre-committed sequence before returning it to the Proof Provider.
As the generation of this commitment employs a secret key shared between the prover and
a Proof Provider, the Claimant is tied to the sequence. This approach was ﬁrst proposed
in Brands & Chaum's initial discussion of distance bounding [13], and has inspired many
49
others. However, it does not truly ensure that the Claimant is involved in the challenge-
response portion of the exchange. Agents wishing to deceive a Proof Provider regarding
the location of a Claimant can circumvent this approach through supplying an interme-
diate device with the sequence and having them reply in place of the Claimant. Some
schemes, such as [13] and [96], also require that the process terminate with the Claimant
signing some message generated from the bits received and supplying this message to the
Proof Provider for veriﬁcation. However, this stage is not timed and therefore a dishonest
Claimant could compute this message himself and supply it either directly to the Proof
Provider or to the proxy for forwarding without detection.
This ﬂaw is also found in another common approach, employing tables of values calcu-
lated based on two nonces, one supplied by each party in the exchange. The response to
each challenge can be found in the table, saving time usually required for calculation during
the time-critical section of the exchange. As in the case of XOR-ing with pre-commitment,
a malicious Claimant could supply a colluding device with this information prior to the
timed phase of the exchange, thereby successfully deceiving the Proof Provider. An exam-
ple of this approach can be found in Hancke & Kuhn's RFID distance bounding protocol
[43].
In order to achieve this condition within the system, an online form of authentication
has been employed, where authentication is done during the timed phase of the exchange.
A digital signature has been included on the return leg of the challenge-response exchange,
forcing the Claimant to receive the message and compose the corresponding reply, rather
than a proxy device doing so in its stead. This also almost erases the possibility of the
Claimant guessing the appropriate response and transmitting it prior to receiving the
message.
When dealing with authentication during distance bounding, the concept of employing
any form of encryption is usually dismissed. This is due to the belief that when using
distance bounding to gauge physical distance, the time required to encrypt something will
overpower the time required to send a message on a round trip. In particular, Clulow
et al [19] argue that this approach introduces inaccuracy into the calculation of distances
based on response times, in addition to allowing an advantage to those with more powerful
hardware. However, the impact of authentication using encryption techniques upon the
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time required for a distance bounding exchange may be removed. In order for a distance
bounding exchange to be completed, the return message must be authenticated by some
device. Therefore, authentication must be performed at some point within the exchange.
Through employing tamper-resistant devices to complete the required calculations
within a known amount of time, the process can be standardised and the impact of authen-
tication upon the time required for an exchange is removed. Therefore, in order for the
binary metric to function accurately, it requires the use of standardised tamper-resistant
hardware. As the time needed for authentication is known due to the use of standardised
hardware, it can then be subtracted from the overall time, leaving only the time taken to
complete an exchange. As this approach to distance bounding is not intended as a method
of gauging distance itself, the issue of introducing inaccuracy into the distance calculated
from these ﬁgures is removed, thereby negating both aspects of the argument.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the technique of distance bounding, as put forth by Brands and
Chaum. We have proposed the concept of the binary metric, a metric which diﬀerenciates
between an honest distance bounding exchange and an exchange in which a proxy attack
is being perpetrated. Under this metric, the results of a distance bounding exchange no
longer indicate an upper bound upon the distance between two devices. Instead, distance
bounding determines whether the time required for the exchange to take place is reasonable
for a direct exchange. We have acknowledged the limitations on the applicability of the
metric, put in place by the assumption that Claimants do not have access to ampliﬁcation
equipment allowing them to extend reception and transmission range. We have deﬁned
both the positive and negative meanings of the metric, as only a positive is intuitively
understood. In the case of a positive result, there can be no misunderstanding or mistake,
as the exchange includes authentication. However in the case of a negative outcome, a
direct exchange may have been in progress but due to issues beyond the detection of
the metric, the delay in receiving responses causes the time required for an exchange
to fall outside the window of acceptance. We have presented a method of calculating
the window of acceptance in practice, using neighbouring devices to estimate the time
required for both a direct exchange and an exchange proxied via one additional device. We
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have demonstrated the applicability of this metric over both IEEE 802.3 and IEEE 802.11
networks through emulations of both direct and proxied distance bounding exchanges. Our
analysis of the IEEE 802.11 network applicability is limited to networks containing only
the devices participating in an exchange, therefore it is recommended to pursue further
trials in more densely populated networks to investigate the eﬀect of increased network
traﬃc upon the time required for both proxied and direct distance bounding exchanges.
In addition to dealing with the detection of a proxy attack, we have outlined the need
for some form of tie between a participating Claimant and the distance bounding exchange,
in order to ensure that the device itself participates. We have discussed the concept of
committing to values for use within the distance bounding process prior to entering into the
timed phase of the process, but dismissed this approach as it can easily be circumvented
by colluding devices wishing to deceive the system. We have proposed the use of digital
signatures on the response leg of the distance bounding exchange, in order to tie the
Claimant to the exchange during its timed phase. We address the issue of impractibility
through proposing the use of tamper-resistent hardware to standardise the time required
for a signature to be generated. The standardisation of this requirement allows for its
removal from the time taken for an exchange, allowing for an accurate round trip time to
be established whilst including online authentication of the participating Claimant.
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Chapter 4
The SLVPGP - A Security Protocol
for the Protection of the Location
Veriﬁcation Process
4.1 Introduction
As wireless networks become increasingly ubiquitous and location becomes a highly sought-
after piece of context information, the demand for a method of securely locating a device
has increased dramatically. When dealing with VANETs in particular, this ability has many
novel applications for users, including the possibility of vehicular insurance directly related
to the area in which the vehicle commonly travels. In general, LBS [87] are commonplace,
however traditionally they rely upon self-location, with no guarantee of the location being
accurate (Chapter 2). As we discussed in Chapter 2, researchers have proposed a variety
of positioning and location veriﬁcation algorithms for use in sensor and ad-hoc networks.
However, many of these algorithms rely on a pre-existing infrastructure in order to function,
an extremely limiting requirement. In addition to this, many do not include a method of
verifying a speciﬁc device's participation in the distance estimation process, leaving them
vulnerable to collusion attacks.
In this chapter we outline our approach to the gathering of evidence for use by a device
to prove its location - the Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gathering Protocol (SLVPGP)
[37]. Our protocol design aims to satisfy three security properties, authentication of origin,
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conﬁdentiality of location and anonymity of identity, in order to provide a complete level
of security for the protection of the proofs gathered and the privacy of those involved. We
make use of the binary metric, also dicussed in Chapter 3, to provide a method of detecting
the execution of a proxy attack, allowing a Proof Provider to come to a verdict regarding
the presence of a Claimant within its transmission range. It is assumed that the binary
metric is an accurate method of gauging a Claimant's presence within range of a Proof
Provider. Once this is the case, the SLVPGP will function as intended, i.e. the accuracy
of the binary metric is a required property for the accurate functionality of the SLVPGP.
If the binary metric is unable to correctly infer whether a Claimant is within range of
its Proof Providers, the resulting verdicts supplied within the SLVPGP cannot be relied
upon. In order to provide ﬂexibility in the level of overheads incurred when attempting
the veriﬁcation of a location, we have developed three versions of the protocol, each with
a diﬀerent level of security and consequentially a diﬀerent level of overhead costs incurred.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: In Section 4.2 we describe the system model
and its assumptions. We outline possible attacks on the system and discuss the reasons
for the selection of our three security properties. In Section 4.3 we outline the protocol's
basic design, devoid of any security. We discuss the security concerns and vulnerabilities
which the complete protocol should address. In Section 4.4 we repeatedly extend the basic
protocol to create three versions with increasing levels of security. In Section 4.5 we analyse
and compare the costs incurred by each extension. Finally, in Section 4.6 we summarize
the chapter.
4.2 The Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gathering Pro-
tocol
In this section we discuss the technical information pertaining to the Secure Location Ver-
iﬁcation Proof Gathering Protocol (SLVPGP). We outline the system model, terminology
employed and assumptions made regarding those nodes involved, the powers of an intruder
and the system itself. We discuss the relevent threats which the SLVPGP must protect
against and the security properties required in order to meet our deﬁnition of a complete
and secure protocol. Finally, we brieﬂy outline the role of the Veriﬁer within the protocol,
a topic further elaborated on in Chapter 6.
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Figure 4.1: The Structure of the Location Veriﬁcation System
4.2.1 System Model, Assumptions and Terminology
Our system consists of a set of untrusted mobile nodes and a central trusted entity knows
as the Veriﬁer (V). An untrusted device known as a Claimant (C) wishes to prove its
location to the Veriﬁer within an untrusted IEEE 802.11 based environment [5]. The
Claimant sends a message to the Veriﬁer stating its identity and claimed location. This
message is known as a location claim. The Veriﬁer provides a list of devices in the vicinity
of the location included within the location claim for use as Proof Providers (PPs). The
Claimant engages in distance bounding (see Chapter 3) with each of the Proof Providers
to ascertain that it is within transmission range of that device, thus proving itself to that
particular Proof Provider. It is assumed that the distance bounding process employed will
provide an accurate reading of the proximity of the Claimant to a Proof Provider. The
ability of distance bounding to accurately place a device in an area is an underlying security
property of the SLVPGP and is required for its correct functionality. It is also assumed that
proxy/terrorist fraud attacks will be detected through the use of the distance bounding
employed. The results of the distance bounding exchanges are supplied to the Veriﬁer via
the Claimant. The Veriﬁer then makes its decision based on this proof information. This
situation is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The system was initially designed with the intention of deployment within Vehicular
Ad-Hoc Networks [79], and as such employs the standard technological assumptions for
that setting (outlined below). However, during development it was realised that the high
levels of mobility reached by vehicular networks could impact the accuracy and usefulness
of the system in this environment. With devices moving at speeds of 50 kilometers per hour
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and up, and with the potential to reach upwards of 120 kilometers per hour, the duration
of connectivity between devices is unknown. Therefore the ability of a vehicular device to
gather evidence from others in its vicinity is questionable. For this reason, VANETs are
one of the hardest environments in which to prove a device's location using proof gathered
from local devices. As there was no access to a physical VANET for testing purposes, there
is currently no evidence to gauge the system's practicality in this environment.
However, networks composed of less powerful devices with lower levels of mobility are
highly suited to the system. The communications medium employed by this approach to
location veriﬁcation is standard IEEE802.11 wireless transmission, the same employed by
all internet-ready mobile devices. The rate of advancement in power and technology in
hand-held mobile devices is high, with Moore's law of increasing power and decreasing size
holding true. Therefore, smaller devices have become powerful enough to successfully deal
with complex calcuations and encryption/decryption at high speeds. Additionally they
can now support high levels of communication without worries over battery consumption.
For these reasons, assuming they meet the requirements outlined below, this location
veriﬁcation system is employable on smaller devices.
Communications within the system are secured using public key cryptography, employ-
ing a suﬃciently secure keysize. Possible examples of suitable asymmetric cryptosystems
include RSA [82] and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [53, 64]. In order to provide a
suitably strong resistance to attacks, the keysize required by RSA is quite large, with keys
as large as 512 bits factorised and their cryptographic strength broken [18]. In comparison,
the same level of security can be provided by ECC using keys of a much smaller size. For
example, a 1024 bit RSA key provides equivalent security as a 160 bit ECC key. However,
while the data transmitted within the system is only useful for a short period of time after
its transmission, using a lower key-strength would leave the key vulnerable to attack and
discovery. This is a particular danger if a key-owner is malicious, as they have control
over the data being encrypted and could attempt a chosen-plaintext attack to compute
their private key. Therefore, all keys employed within the system should be of signiﬁcant
cryptographic strength.
We assume that all nodes are capable of encrypting and decrypting messages and
generating and verifying digital signatures, employing the relevant cryptographic keys. As
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the Claimant and Proof Providers are untrusted devices, we do not trust them to retain
direct control of their key pairs. Instead, it is assumed that they contain tamper-resistant
modules in which all cryptographic keys are stored, along with a reasonably accurate clock
to provide loose time synchronization for timestamps. The storing of a device's keys in
such a module prevents the sharing of keys and other private information with others in
an attempt to sabotage the system's security. This tamper-resistance is central to the
functionality of the location veriﬁcation system. If a device can gain control of their own
keys or the keys of others, they can share them with other malicious entities. If this occurs,
the authentication aspect provided by cryptography would be lost, and a malicious device
could pass itself oﬀ as another without fear of detection.
Within this location veriﬁcation system, a device's public key functions as their identity.
This allows any device the ability to communicate with another in ciphertext once it
possesses that device's identity, rather than requiring consultation of a table to access
the correct public key. In order to provide an additional layer of security and privacy
to all participants in the system, each device's tamper-resistant unit contains a list of
multiple cryptographic key pairs. This provides multiple identities for use within the
system. However, the use of public keys as identities creates a limitation on the system,
as where a device's identity is required to be kept secret (to ensure anonymity), it cannot
receive encrypted communications. This key pair list can be reloaded with new values,
maintaining their freshness and reducing the probability of a device being traceable or
linked to a previous identity. The Veriﬁer has knowledge of all public keys for each
device within the system, allowing it to match participation using a particular identity
to the correct device and preventing devices from successfully performing a sybil attack
(Chapter 2).
4.2.2 Threat Model
Honest nodes behave exactly as their roles within the system dictate. They can communi-
cate with any device within transmission range of their location. In addition to this, they
can communicate with the Veriﬁer. They can receive all messages broadcast within their
range, but do not act on messages not intended for them. Malicious nodes fall into three
categories: malicious Claimants, malicious Proof Providers and intruders, i.e. malicious
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nodes external to the exchange. Malicious nodes cannot occupy the role of the Veriﬁer
as this is a trusted, un-compromisable entity. All malicious nodes share the capabilities
of honest nodes, in that they can communicate with any device within their transmission
range, and can communicate with the Veriﬁer. They can receive any message transmitted
within their range, but unlike honest nodes, they can act on messages not intended for
them. If a message transmitted within their range is sent in cleartext, they have complete
knowledge of its contents. However, if an overheard message is transmitted in ciphertext,
the eavesdropper can only gain access to its contents either through procuring the cor-
rect decryption key from its owner or through breaking through the message's encryption.
Malicious nodes can also manipulate and retransmit received messages in an attempt to
circumvent the system's security or damage the chances of participants.
A malicious Claimant is a malicious node participating in the protocol in the role of
Claimant. The aim of a malicious Claimant is to manipulate the location veriﬁcation
system to provide it with a veriﬁed false location claim. As it is a genuine participant in
the claim, it may have access to information that an intruder would not have, such as the
identities and locations of all other participants. It possesses its own public and private
key pair, along with being provided the public keys of other participants. It can make both
false and genuine location claims, and can select which pieces of proof are forwarded on to
the Veriﬁer in support of its claim.
A malicious Proof Provider is a malicious node participating in the protocol as a Proof
Provider. A malicious Proof Provider may wish to cause a Claimant's claim to fail or it
may wish to lie in order to support the claim of a friendly device. While it has access to
more information than an intruder, it cannot manipulate the process in the same ways as
a Claimant. It can decide whether or not to provide a proof for a location claim and can
control the proof's contents, but cannot ensure that it will be included in the Claimant's
ﬁnal list of proofs. Additionally, it has access to information on the Claimant involved in
a claim, but not on other Proof Providers.
When analysing the vulnerabilities of the SLVPGP, multiple attacks are considered.
The majority of these attacks are attempted by malicious Claimants attempting to inﬂu-
ence the result of their location veriﬁcation. The ﬁrst considered is the guessing attack. In
this scenario, a malicious Claimant attempts to guess the correct response to a challenge
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and transmit it prior to even receiving the challenge itself. If this process was successful, the
malicious Claimant would successfully prove itself to be within range of the Proof Provider.
However, this attack is only a realistic threat to schemes employing single bit challenges.
As the SLVPGP employs long random numbers (nonces) as challenges, the odds of a mali-
cious Claimant successfully guessing the correct response even once are prohibitively high.
Therefore, the SLVPGP is not considered vulnerable to guessing attacks.
The second attack considered is a form of collusion attack known as the terrorist fraud
(Chapter 2). This attack was ﬁrst described in [22] and involves a malicious Claimant col-
laborating with another device willing to act as a man-in-the-middle between the Claimanat
and the verifying device. It allows the malicious Claimant to convince the Proof Provider
that he is closer than he truly is. This attack in particular is of great concern when dealing
with a location veriﬁcation system, as the system must verify that a speciﬁc device is at
a speciﬁed location, not just some device is at that location. The terrorist fraud or proxy
attack is addressed within the SLVPGP through the employment of the binary metric (see
Chapter 3) in conjunction with distance bounding.
A more general attack which the SLVPGP is vulnerable to is the denial of service
(DoS) attack (Chapter 2). In this attack, a malicious device in the area of the Claimant
attempts to prevent the participation of other devices through ﬂooding the network with
useless packets (congestion-based DoS). The transmission of these packets prevents any
other devices from also transmitting, eﬀectively cutting oﬀ communication. An extension
of this attack is the distributed denial of service attack (DDoS), where multiple devices
participate in the denial of service attack. DoS attacks can also occur accidentally, where
other devices in the area are all attempting to transmit at once. This reduces the speed
at which messages can be transmitted to a crawl. Proposed solutions to the DoS attack
lie at the MAC layer of the network and are discussed in [41] and [11]. Also of concern
is a protocol-speciﬁc form of DoS attack, whereby malicious devices transmit false proof
messages to the Claimant in the hope of deceiving him into forwarding them back to
the Veriﬁer as part of his ﬁnal proof collection. This attack and its solution are further
explained in Section 4.4.3.
Finally, in a snooping attack, an intruder attempts to gain access to location or identi-
ﬁcation information through eavesdropping on protocol runs. As any device within trans-
59
mission range can receive all transmitted messages, this method of attack is both easily
achieved and potentially highly destructive to the security of the participants. This attack
is thwarted through the employment of encryption on messages containing private infor-
mation. If messages are no longer transmitted in plaintext, only devices possessing the
correct decryption key are capable of learning their contents upon receipt.
However, although cryptography is used on messages transmitted within protocol ex-
tensions two and three, the absence of encryption during the distance bounding portion
of the protocol constitutes a security issue and leaves the SLVPGP vulnerable to a more
subtle form of eavesdropping attack, relying on identiﬁers. When an observer eavesdrops
on traﬃc being transmitted in its vicinity, it can see the contents of the message headers,
along with the data contained within the message's payload. If the data is encrypted and
the observer is not in possession of the appropriate key, it cannot identify whether it is a
stage within SLVPGP or a completely unrelated message. As the nonce messages are not
encrypted, the contents and structure of the message are visible, meaning that the observer
knows that the devices exchanging these messages are involved in a run of the protocol.
Though the values of Hi,k and H
′
i,k are not connectable by an observer, N
′′
i is present in
both distance bounding messages. By matching the N ′′i values being transmitted between
the Claimant and various Proof Providers and analysing the structure of the messages,
the observer would be able to infer which sender is the Claimant and which are Proof
Providers. The observer could then check the message headers to discover the MAC ad-
dresses of these devices, allowing them to be identiﬁed again at a later date. Without this,
only the Claimant's messages would be connectable to the device transmitting them. This
is because the Proof Provider messages do not employ their digital signature or contain
any information pertaining to their identity, unlike those sent by the Claimant.
With identiﬁers known for each of the participants in the distance bounding exchanges,
the observer is left with two similar possible approaches to attempt a location extraction.
If the observer is also a participant in the location veriﬁcation system and has very recently
completed a veriﬁcation of its own, it may be in possession of the locations of some of the
devices employed as Proof Providers for the Claimant's current claim. It can then check
the IP or MAC addresses within the headers for these devices to see if any of the identiﬁers
matches those of a device employed in the current claim. Alternatively, if the observer
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requests a veriﬁcation of its own, it can check the IP or MAC information of the Proof
Providers supplied and use this to identify any devices that were involved in the original
Claimant's veriﬁcation. Once it receives the proof messages from those Proof Providers, it
is also in possession of their current location. Using this information and the knowledge
that the Claimant is distance bounding with them, the observer can then attempt to
extrapolate an area of intersection. If the location information of the Proof Providers is
still accurate relative to when they interacted with the Claimant, meaning that the devices
involved have not been highly mobile and the observer's claim was very recent, then the
Claimant's location should be within this area of intersection, thus compromising location
conﬁdentiality.
However, as stated previously, this attack is reliant upon an observer's ability to label
the devices involved in the claim. If the observer cannot assign identiﬁers to the partic-
ipating Proof Providers, it cannot distinguish between devices and cannot complete the
ﬁnal stage of the attack, where identiﬁers and locations are combined to provide an area
of intersection. Due to the fact that all messages have source and destination information
embedded in their structure, in addition to permanent unique identiﬁers (MAC addresses)
the issue of providing anonymity is a major issue in the area of IEEE 802.11 networks.
Research is being carried out in the area of disposable identiﬁers and preventing the tying
of one pseudonymous identity to the next to prevent the labelling and tracking of devices
as they move through a network [48, 39, 32, 89]. By employing some of these techniques to
prevent the labelling of Proof Providers when participating in claims, an observer would
no longer be able to extract location information regarding a Claimant, thereby protecting
conﬁdentiality of location.
Finally, due to a Claimant relying upon neighbouring devices in order to prove himself
at a particular location, the SLVPGP is also vulnerable to another protocol-speciﬁc form
of attack. In this attack, the Proof Providers involved in a claim behave maliciously and
attempt to prevent an honest Claimant from proving his claim, through the provision
of false proofs. This form of attack is addressed using device behaviour histories and
reputation values in order to detect devices with a pattern of perceived dishonest behaviour.
The concept of reputation and its uses by the Veriﬁer within the location veriﬁcation system
are discussed in Chapter 6.
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4.2.3 Securing the Exchange
Before designing the SLVPGP, we ﬁrst analysed the security properties required from such
a protocol. After considering both the needs of the users involved in an exchange and
those expected to accept ﬁnal proofs from the system, we identiﬁed three key properties
required in order to meet their demands. These properties are authentication of origin,
conﬁdentiality of location information and anonymity of identity. Therefore, we deﬁne a
secure and complete protocol for employment within this situation as one which satisﬁes
these three properties.
Authentication of Origin
This location veriﬁcation system is based upon the idea of a Claimant proving itself
to be at a speciﬁc location. However, the distributed nature of the system prevents the
Veriﬁer from gaining any ﬁrst hand information regarding the veracity of a location claim.
Instead, the Veriﬁer employs other devices in the supposed location of the Claimant to act
as Proof Providers. These devices provide the Veriﬁer with a verdict regarding the claim's
veracity. As the Veriﬁer is not present at the location, it cannot access these verdicts
directly. Instead, it must have them transmitted to it from a remote location. In order
for the Veriﬁer to have any conﬁdence in the verdicts being received, it must have some
method of verifying their origin. Therefore, we deﬁne a secure and complete protocol in
this situation to support the property of authentication of origin. This property requires
that the origin of any given message must be known and veriﬁable, and guarantees that
any proofs supplied to the Veriﬁer can be traced back to the Proof Provider that created it.
The inclusion of this property prevents the Claimant from providing false proofs without
detection, as the origins of all messages are known. We further extend this property to
also guarantee the detectability of tampering or alterations to any message. This prevents
a Claimant or any other device with malicious intent from altering a valid proof message
to support its desired outcome.
Conﬁdentiality and Anonymity
In order for a user to trust any location veriﬁcation system, they must be sure that private
data, such as identity and location information, pertaining to their devices is protected.
Without this trust, the system would have little value as many users would be unwilling to
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participate in claims, either of their own or as Proof Providers. Therefore, we require that
for a protocol to be considered secure and complete within this system, it must uphold the
security properties of anonymity of identity and conﬁdentiality of location information.
We formally deﬁne anonymity of identity to mean that a device's identity may not be
discoverable by any party other than the Veriﬁer, other than where expressly given. In
addition to the use of encryption within the protocol to protect identity information, each
device possesses a list of multiple identities, thus reducing the probability of a device
being traceable even if an identity is learned.
Conﬁdentiality of location information is formally deﬁned as the promise that the loca-
tion of a device with a speciﬁc identity may not be discovereable by any party other than
where expressly given to it. As distance bounding in a wireless network leaks information
regarding locations to those in the vicinity of the exchange [78], protecting the transmission
of location information does not guarantee that a device's location will remain unknown
at a local level. Therefore, protecting location information at this level does not truly
protect the location of a device. However, it is simpler to protect location information
throughout the protocol than it is to protect only messages sent beyond the local area.
Additionally, should the issue of location leakage through distance bounding be addressed
in future research, the protocol itself does not leak any location information.
The formal deﬁnitions of anonymity and conﬁdentiality lend themselves to a graduated
approach, where each incremental increase in the security of the protocol provides a more
rigorous version of protection. As some applications require a lesser amount of security
when dealing with this information, we have developed a two-tier deﬁnition for both se-
curity properties. Where there is a greater need for protection on the part of the users,
complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality are employed. Complete anonymity and conﬁden-
tiality guarantee that no device can learn any identity or location information regarding
another device. However, where users do not require such stringent security, external con-
ﬁdentiality and anonymity are employed. When this property is upheld, it guarantees that
only those devices participating in a particular exchange are granted access to identity and
location information regarding other participants. Neither intruders on the exchange nor
devices participating in other exchanges can learn this information, whether or not they
are in range of the pertinent transmissions. This partial form of the desired properties
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allows the protocol to provide a medium level of security without incurring high secrecy
costs (see Section 4.5).
4.2.4 The Role of the Veriﬁer
Unlike the Claimant and its Proof Providers, the Veriﬁer is a special trusted device located
outside of the participating devices' mobile networks. It possesses the identities and public
keys of all devices within the entire Location Veriﬁcation system and is trusted to behave
honestly with this information. It is charged with deciding on the possibility of a location
claim and is given the location information of all devices involved in a location claim. The
exact functionality of the Veriﬁer is dealt with fully in Chapter 6. However, in order to
understand the protocol's part in our approach to solving the location veriﬁcation problem,
the Veriﬁer's basic processes involved in the protocol are outlined here.
The SLVPGP relies upon the Veriﬁer for two tasks; A) supplying suitable Proof
Providers for use during a run of the protocol, and B) determining the ﬁnal verdict on
a claim using the proofs gathered from these Proof Providers. The selection of neigh-
bouring devices for use as Proof Providers is a diﬃcult task. Without a secure process
for selecting Proof Providers, the SLVPGP is vulnerable to undetectable collusion attacks
which render the entire protocol insecure prior to any distance bounding step occurring. If
the Claimant is involved in the selection of Proof Providers, it has the ability to manipulate
the process. This allows it to select devices which will participate in a collusion attack,
giving it complete control over the claim's ﬁnal verdict. Therefore, even if the Claimant
is many miles from the claimed location, its location claim will always be successful. For
this reason, the Claimant is not involved in the Proof Provider selection process. This is
discussed more fully in Chapter 6.
The principle task of the Veriﬁer is to assess the possibility of a location claim, based
on pertinent information gathered by the Claimant from its Proof Providers. This is
acheived using one of two veriﬁcation approaches, summation-based or trust-based. These
approaches are discussed further in Chapter 6.
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Figure 4.2: The Proof Gathering Process
4.3 Designing the Protocol - the Basic Outline
The basic premise of the location veriﬁcation is the gathering of proof from neighbouring
devices by a Claimant in order to prove itself in that area. This proof either supports
or refutes the possibility that a Claimant is indeed within transmission range. The basic
process by which this is achieved is shown in Figure 4.2. However, in order for the proofs
gathered by the Claimant to be credible, the process must be protected. In this section we
outline the steps taken in developing a protocol for the securing of this process.
4.3.1 Protocol Outline
In order to understand what security risks are present in the proof gathering process, we
ﬁrst model a protocol devoid of any security, written in abstract protocol notation (deﬁned
at the beginning of this work). This model depicts the framework within which devices
participating in a claim provide evidence of a Claimant's presence in their vicinity for
the Veriﬁer. We outline the protocol as a sequence of steps taken by the parties involved
in the exchange: the Veriﬁer (V), the Claimant (C) and N Proof Providers (Bi where i
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∈{1...N}). Up to M iterations of distance bounding are completed, with k used to index
through them (k ∈{1...M}).
1. C→V: C, XC
The Claimant sends a message to the Veriﬁer containing its identity (C) and location
(XC), requesting that its location claim be veriﬁed.
2. V→C: B1, B2, ...BN
The Veriﬁer sends a list of devices in the claimed area to the Claimant for use as
Proof Providers.
3. C→ Bi: C,Bi,N i ,N ′i
The Claimant broadcasts a message for each Proof Provider containing their iden-
tity and two nonces (long random integers), N i (the initiating nonce) and N ′i (the
replying nonce).
4. The Claimant and Proof Providers create two chains of M hashes, one for each of
the received nonces. This is explained in detail in Section 4.3.2. The hashes are
noted as Hi,k (the initiating chain) and H
′
i,k (the replying chain) respectively, where
i ∈ {1...N} and k ∈ {1...M}.
5. Distance Bounding
This stage is performed multiple times to lessen the eﬀect of any network issues which
may arise.
(a) Bi starts its timer.
(b) Bi →C: k, Hi,k, N ′′i
Bi sends a message to the Claimant containing a new random nonce N ′′i , a
randomly selected value from the initiating hash chain, Hi,k, and its position
in the chain, k. k decreases with each iteration of distance bounding. The
Claimant checks whether the kth value in the N i hash chain matches Hi,k and
if so, continues to the next step.
(c) C→ Bi: H ′i,k, N
′′
i
The Claimant sends a message to Bi containing N ′′i and the kth value in the
replying hash chain. Bi compares this with the kth value in its replying hash
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chain. If the two values match and the received value of N ′′i matches its own
sent value, Bi stops its timer and calculates the round trip latency (subtracting
out its own internal processing time).
6. Bi →C: Bi, Ti, Xi, Li
Bi sends the Claimant its proof, comprised of its identity, its current location (Xi)
and overall decision regarding the presence of the Claimant in its vicinity (Li). Bi
also includes a timestamp in the proof to tie the location to this speciﬁc point in
time.
7. C→V: C, TC , XC ,
B1, T1, X1, L1,
...,
BN , TN , XN , LN
The Claimant compiles all the proofs gathered from its Proof Providers and for-
wards them to the Veriﬁer, along with its identity C, the current location XC and a
timestamp TC , tying the proofs to that point in time.
8. The Veriﬁer combines the evidence gathered by the Claimant and extracts a ﬁnal
verdict (DV ) on the validity of the location claim.
9. V→C: DV , XC , TV
The Veriﬁer sends its ﬁnal verdict to the Claimant for use as proof of its presence in
the claimed location (XC). Additionally, V includes a timestamp to tie the location
proof to this speciﬁc point in time. This proof can be supplied to other entities
and systems as veriﬁed evidence of the Claimant's presence in the stated area at the
stated time.
4.3.2 Protocol Discussion
The simplistic protocol depicted above represents the basic design for a proof gathering
protection protocol. It deﬁnes a method to allow a Claimant to submit a location claim to
the Veriﬁer, indicating its interest in having its location veriﬁed in a provable fashion. The
protocol goes on to deﬁne a framework for the gathering of proof from a pre-approved list of
neighbouring devices and speciﬁes the components required within a valid proof message.
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Additionally, the protocol deﬁnes distance bounding as the method by which a Claimant
proves itself to be within contact range of a Proof Provider and speciﬁes a framework for
the exchange.
Due to the possibility of network issues such as delays and lost packets, the result of
a location claim could be aﬀected through the true results of a single distance bounding
exchange being distorted. To compensate for this possibility, multiple distance bounding
exchanges have been included within the protocol's design. In order to avoid increases in
data overheads, a hash chain [42] has been employed to calculate multiple nonces from a
single initial nonce. This chain is constructed as follows: The initial nonce is hashed using
the hash function H(N ), producing the value H1. This value is then hashed using the same
function (H(H1)) to produce H2. Therefore, the kth value Hk in a hash chain is calculated
from N using the formula Hk = Hk(N ). New values are created with this formula until
a suﬃcient number of entries have been created within the chain. However, one danger of
creating chains in this manner is that if given the value Hk an intruder could then calculate
all values above Hk in the chain. In order to address this, the value of k should decrease
with each iteration of distance bounding, moving downwards through the chain. Although
this reduces the number of useable values within the hash chain, it removes the risk of a
security leak.
Two chains are employed in the protocol, one initialised using Ni and the other using
N ′i . These are used within the distance bounding exchange as a method of ensuring that
both devices involved, i.e. the Claimant and Proof Provider Bi can conﬁrm that they are
interacting with their expected exchange partner. The hash chain values generated from
the initiating nonce, Ni, prove to the Claimant that the message originated from a Proof
Provider engaged in the current location claim. The values from the hash chain derived
from the replying nonce, N ′i , are used by the Proof Provider to verify that the message
received originated from the Claimant involved in that speciﬁc location claim.
In order to reduce the probability of a Claimant successfully guessing the approprite
response from the chain and transmitting its response before receiving the Proof Provider's
challenge, an echoing nonce N ′′i is included. As the Claimant's reply message contains both
a nonce from its reply chain and the echoing nonce, it is forced to wait until it receives
the value of N ′′i . This dramatically reduces the possibility of an early transmission attack
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successfully being accepted as a valid response, as the probability of successfully guessing
the value of N ′′i is very low. The use of a randomly selected value from the hash chain
(Hi,k, the kth value in the hash chain created from Ni) adds to the unpredictability of the
Proof Provider's distance bounding challenge message for the Claimant.
While the simpler and more intuitively correct approach to communicating the evidence
regarding the claim from the Proof Providers to the Veriﬁer is to have the Proof Providers
transmit their proofs directly to the Veriﬁer, we have chosen to employ a diﬀerent tack. In
our approach, the Claimant gathers the ﬁnal proofs from its Proof Providers and forwards
them to the Veriﬁer along with its ﬁnal message indicating the completion of the evidence
gathering process. Although this approach to the supplying of proofs does add complexity
to the protocol, it also protects the Claimant from a scenario where the Proof Providers
participate in distance bounding, but do not transmit their proof messages to the Veriﬁer.
In this situation, if the Claimant was to supply its ﬁnal message to the Veriﬁer, who
had received no supporting proof messages, it would assume that the claim was false and
decrement the Claimant's honesty value as punishment for submitting a false location
claim. By transmitting the proof messages via the Claimant, the Claimant is not deceived
into believing the Veriﬁer has received evidence regarding its claim, only for that evidence
never to materialise.
In order to ensure that the proofs supplied by the Proof Providers and the message
containing the Veriﬁer's ﬁnal verdict are unique and cannot be employed in a replay attack,
we have included timestamps within these messages. These timestamps can be generated
based on the reasonably accurate clock within the tamper resistant unit, thus providing
a loose level of syncronization. Upon initialisation of the claim, an acceptable window is
deﬁned by the Veriﬁer, and any messages timestamped within this window are deemed
applicable to this claim. As the Veriﬁer registers the time of initialisation, any messages
with a timestamp preceeding initiation of the claim can be detected and discarded, thus
preventing reuse of older proofs. However, as any proofs timestamped within the window
may be accepted, a highly mobile device (such as a vehicle within a VANET) may signif-
icantly change its location over the course of the window. This means that a device may
no longer be in the vicinity of the location being claimed by the time the claim is veriﬁed.
If a Claimant was to initiate two claims, one a short period of time after the other, it
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may be provided with a similar list of Proof Providers and could, in theory, provide proofs
gathered based on the ﬁrst claim's list. This is partially protected against through the
ability of the Veriﬁer to discard proofs dated prior to the initiation time of a claim, though
an overlap is possible. An alternative approach to this issue is to employ an identifying
nonce, which identiﬁes the claim a proof corresponds to. However, if nonces were employed
without timestamps, a device could gather proofs from its Proof Providers at one time. It
could then hold these proofs for a period of time and then supply them to the Veriﬁer,
thus generating a location veriﬁcation containing its earlier location, timestamped with a
current time. Therefore, even where nonces are employed, an acceptance window must
also be used.
As the protocol is currently presented, the security of both the ﬁnal proofs and the
Veriﬁer's verdict is compromised. Both the distance bounding exchange and the trans-
mitted proof messages are susceptible to tampering, either by an intruder or a malicious
Claimant which wishes to alter the verdict given by a Proof Provider or the Veriﬁer's
overall verdict. In addition to this, fraudulent proofs can be fabricated by a malicious
Claimant without making contact with a Proof Provider. Finally, the overall protocol is
vulnerable to the maﬁa and terrorist frauds as there is no method of tying the messages
sent during the distance bounding portion of the protocol to the Claimant. In order to
address these vulnerabilities, we have repeatedly extended this basic protocol design, in-
creasing security with each extension. In the following section we discuss these extensions,
their improvements to security and the costs incurred in enacting these.
4.4 Extending the Protocol
In the previous section we deﬁned a basic approach for the protection of the proof gath-
ering process. We designed a simplistic protocol to enact this protection and discussed
its functionality and ﬂaws. However, this simplistic approach is undeniably insecure and
upholds none of the security properties outlined in Section 4.2.3 which deﬁne a secure and
complete protocol in this situation. For this reason, we extend the basic protocol using
security techniques such as the employment of encryption and digital signatures to produce
a secure and complete protocol which fulﬁlls the requirements of the system.
The extension of the protocol has been split into three distinct iterations. In exten-
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sion one, we amend the basic protocol to support authentication of origin, thus preventing
false and amended proofs from being accepted. In extension two, we increase the level of
security provided by extension one to include external conﬁdentiality and anonymity, thus
protecting the private data of devices involved from intruders. The addition of these prop-
erties satisﬁes the deﬁnition of a secure and complete protocol within this system, creating
the ﬁrst complete version of the SLVPGP. Finally in the third extension, we increase the
level of conﬁdentiality and anonymity provided from external to complete. As with the
second extension, extension three satisﬁes the deﬁnition of a secure and complete protocol
within this system, creating a second secure and complete proof gathering protocol. Each
of the extensions outlined are discussed in depth in this section.
As before, we outline a protocol as a series of steps taken by the Claimant (C), Proof
Providers (Bi where i ∈ {1...N}) and Veriﬁer (V). We assume that all parties involved have
asymmetric key pairs associated with them. These key pairs are noted as K−A and K
+
A for
the private and public keys respectively, where A is the owning party's identity. We also
assume that the identity each party is referred to by is its public key. This means that if
a device has knowledge of another's identity, it can encrypt messages for their decryption.
4.4.1 The SLVPGP: Extension One
In this extension, we introduce the ﬁrst of our desired security properties: authentication of
origin. This property ensures that the Veriﬁer can trace the origin of any message received
back to its source, thus removing the danger of false proofs. However, this extension
does not provide a secure and complete protocol as the properties of conﬁdentiality and
anonymity are not supported. This extension has been designed as a lightweight version of
the protocol, to function in situations where conﬁdentiality and anonymity are not required
or highly desired security properties for a system.
1. C→V: {|C,XC |}K−C
2. V→C: {|B1, B2, ..., BN |}K−V
3. C→ Bi:
{
|Bi, C,
{
N i ,N ′i
}
K+Bi
|
}
K−C
4. The Claimant and Proof Providers create two chains of M hashes, one for each of
the received nonces.
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5. Distance Bounding (executed multiple times)
(a) Bi starts its timer.
(b) Bi →C: k, Hi,k,N ′′i
(c) C→ Bi: H ′i,k,
{
|N ′′i |
}
K−C
6. Bi→C: {|Bi, Ti, Xi, Li, C|}K−Bi
7. C→V: {|C, TC , XC |}K−C
{| {|B1, T1, X1, L1, C|}K−B1 ,
...,
{|BN , TN , XN , LN , C|}K−BN |}K−C
8. V→C: {|DV , XC , C, TV |}K−V
This extension to the protocol removes many of the vulnerabilities identiﬁed within the
basic design. The addition of encryption to the initiating and replying nonces, N i and N ′i ,
prevents intruding devices from gaining knowledge of these values without the collusion
of malicious involved parties. Previously, these values were sent in cleartext, negating the
reasoning behind their inclusion. With these values sent in an encrypted message, only
legitimate participants and devices colluding with malicious participants have access to
them for use within the distance bounding process, thus providing authentication. How-
ever, even if a colluding device was granted access to these values, the danger of a terrorist
fraud attack going undetected is negated through the addition of a digital signature on the
echoing nonce. By tying the Claimant device directly to the distance bounding process,
the protocol's vulnerability to proxying attempts is removed (see Chapter 3).
An alternative approach to authentication during distance bounding was also consid-
ered, in which a symmetric key is established between the Claimant and that Proof Provider
for use on the return leg of the exchange. Employing a shared key would reduce the com-
plexity of the protocol in further extensions and decrease the time required to complete
distance bounding. However, this option is only viable if such a key is held within the
tamper-resistant unit. Without this protection, a malicious Claimant would be free to
distribute this key to any colluding devices, thus removing the element of authentication
and reinstating the threat of undetectable collusion attacks. This issue can be negated
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through the use of a key-exchange protocol such as the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange [23],
which runs through the tamper resistant module, preventing the resulting key from being
supplied to other devices. If this approach is taken, the time requirements for distance
bounding would be signiﬁcantly reduced, due to the vast diﬀerence in computation time
required for symmetric key cryptography in comparison to asymmetric schemes, particu-
larly RSA. Additionally, the amount of data to be transmitted would decrease, as the key
size required for symmetric cryptography schemes is signiﬁcantly less than that required
for comparable security when using asymmetric schemes.
The use of digital signatures to provide authentication of origin also addresses other
security concerns within the protocol. A malicious Claimant can no longer fabricate proof
for the Veriﬁer, as it cannot generate the Proof Provider's signature to match the proof.
Nor can it undetectably alter the content of an existing proof from a Proof Provider, as
the signed hash of the message would no longer match the message being transmitted.
Similarly, neither the Claimant nor a malicious intruder can alter the Veriﬁer's overall
verdict in the ﬁnal veriﬁcation message. Additionally, the inclusion of the Claimant's
identity within the signed proof messages from the Proof Providers and the ﬁnal veriﬁcation
message prevents a malicious Claimant from using messages pertaining to another Claimant
as evidence of its own claim. Finally, an intruder cannot participate in the exchange as its
signature key would not produce a valid message signature, nor can it intercept the ﬁnal
message and undetectably insert false proofs.
4.4.2 The SLVPGP: Extension Two
In the previous section, we extended the protocol to provide authentication of origin and
prevent attacks such as the maﬁa and terrorist frauds. However, during the execution of
an SLVPGP extension one exchange, an intruder to the system can read all transmissions
in the exchange. Therefore, the properties of conﬁdentiality and anonymity are still not
upheld. In this section we further extend the protocol to provide a form of anonymity and
conﬁdentiality. We achieve this through the addition of encryption.
The functionality of the extension two protocol remains as in extension one, with
the Claimant requesting that the Veriﬁer allow it to prove its location using proof from
neighbouring devices (Step 1). The Veriﬁer again provides a list of devices it believes to
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be in the vicinity of the Claimant for use as Proof Providers (Step 2), and the Claimant
contacts each of these, using distance bounding to establish that it is within that device's
range (Steps 3-5). When the Proof Providers employed have decided on the veracity of
the Claimant's claim that it is within their range, they supply the Claimant with proof
messages (Step 6). The Claimant then provides these to the Veriﬁer for use in the ﬁnal
decision (Step 7) and ﬁnally, the Veriﬁer supplies the Claimant with its judgement on the
veracity of its location claim (Step 8). However, in this version of the protocol, the contents
of all messages (excluding those sent during the distance bounding stage) are encrypted for
the eyes of their recipient. This prevents those without the appropriate key from gaining
access to the private values contained within, more speciﬁcally the identities and locations
of the participants in the protocol.
1. C→V:
{
{|C,XC |}K−C
}
K+V
2. V→C:
{
{|B1, B2, ..., BN |}K−V
}
K+C
3. C→ Bi:
{{
|Bi, C,N i ,N ′i |
}
K−C
}
K+Bi
4. The Claimant and Proof Providers create two chains of M hashes, one for each of
the received nonces.
5. Distance Bounding (executed multiple times)
(a) Bi starts its timer.
(b) Bi →C: k, Hi,k,N ′′i
(c) C→ Bi: H ′i,k,
{
|N ′′i |
}
K−C
6. Bi →C:
{
{|Bi, Ti, Xi, Li, C|}K−Bi
}
K+C
7. C→V:
{
{|C, TC , XC |}K−C
}
K+V
,
{{| {|B1, T1, X1, L1, C|}K−B1 ,
...,
{|BN , TN , XN , LN , C|}K−BN |}K−C }K+V
8. V→C:
{
{|DV , XC , C, TV |}K−V
}
K+C
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While the ﬁrst extension to the protocol added authentication through the use of digital
signatures, the addition of encryption in this extension builds upon the existing framework
to include external anonymity and conﬁdentiality. Upholding these properties protects
the transmitted identity and location information of all parties involved from any device
external to the exchange. While the Claimant and any Proof Providers involved have
access to the location and identity information being sent over the run of the protocol, no
other devices can discover it, whether they are within range of the transmissions or not.
However, as discussed previously, location information is leaked when a device partic-
ipates in distance bounding. Therefore, though the transmitted location information is
protected, local observers within the network can still extract the location of devices in
their vicinity. Despite this leakage, the location information transmitted in steps ﬁve and
six has also been protected through encryption, as doing so provides a simpler message
structure. Additionally, the protocol structure remains ﬁt for employment should the issue
of location leakage be resolved.
As mentioned in the previous section, an alternative protocol structure may be built
in which a symmetric key is agreed upon between the Claimant and each Proof Provider.
This key may be agreed upon during the fourth step of the protocol. It could then be
employed during the distance bounding process to decrease speed and data transmission
costs, as well as to encrypt the Proof Provier's ﬁnal proof message. However, even if this
approach is employed, the Proof Provider's digital signature must remain present on the
proof message in order to provide authentication of origin to the Veriﬁer.
4.4.3 The SLVPGP: Extension Three
The previous extension to the SLVPGP increased the level of security surrounding the
proof gathering process. However although a form of anonymity and conﬁdentiality exist,
complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality have not yet been achieved. Devices participating
within the proof gathering exchange could record information on the parties involved while
they have access and then use this information maliciously at some point in the future. For
example, if a malicious observer is also a participant within the system and is provided with
information on other devices, including their identities, it can retain this information for
use at a later date. With the Claimant in an exchange identiﬁed through the observational
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analysis of traﬃc and message structure during the distance bounding stage, the observer
can then attempt to solve the equation:
N ′′i =
{{
|N ′′i |
}
K−C
}
x
by substituting x with each of the identities it has acquired over its time within the
system. Assuming the observer is in possession of the correct identity within its list of
previously encountered devices, both the identity and location of the Claimant would be
compromised. Although the identities of devices are frequently changing pseudonyms, it
should be noted that there is a possibility that the identity in use by the Claimant is
already known by the observer. For this reason, we extend the protocol once more to
provide complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality from all devices, even if they are involved
in the exchange. This security increase causes the protocol's complexity to increase greatly,
which is discussed in Section 4.5.
1. C→V:
{
{|C,XC |}K−C
}
K+V
2. V→C:|
{{
|B1,N 1 ,N ′1 ,KCB1 |
}
K−V
}
K+B1
, ...,
{{
|BN ,NN ,N ′N ,KCBN |
}
K−V
}
K+BN
|

K−V
,
{{
|N 1 ,N ′1 ,KCB1 , ...,NN ,N
′
N ,KCBN |
}
K−V
}
K+C
3. The Claimant decrypts and stores each of the nonces received from the Veriﬁer.
4. C→ Bi:
{{
|Bi,N i ,N ′i ,KCBi |
}
K−V
}
K+Bi
, {C}K+V
5. The Claimant and Proof Providers create two chains of M hashes, one for N i and
one for N ′i .
6. Distance Bounding (executed multiple times)
(a) Bi starts its timer.
(b) Bi →C: k, Hi,k,N ′′i
(c) C→ Bi: H ′i,k,
{
|N ′′i |
}
K−C
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7. Bi →C: H (KCBi),
N i ,

{
|Bi,
{
|N ′′i |
}
K−C
, Ti, Xi, Li, {C}K+V |
}
K−Bi

K+V

KCBi
8. C→V:
{
{|C,XC , TC |}K−C
}
K+V
,
{|
{{
|B1,
{
|N ′′1 |
}
K−C
, T1, X1, L1, {C}K+V |
}
K−B1
}
K+V
,
...,
{
|BN ,
{
|N ′′N |
}
K−C
, TN , XN , LN , {C}K+V |
}
K−BN

K+V
|}K−C
9. V→C:
{
{|DV , XC , C, TV |}K−V
}
K+C
With the extension of the protocol to provide complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality, a
new security issue emerges. Due to the presence of encryption, the Claimant is unable to
diﬀerentiate between valid and fraudulent proof messages. In this situation an intruder
could launch a denial of service attack, supplying the Claimant with fraudulent proofs for
inclusion as evidence for the Veriﬁer. The Veriﬁer would fail the claim for including proofs
from illegitimate sources, as it cannot distinguish whether or not the fraudulent proofs
were intentionally included by the Claimant in an attempt to deceive the system. This
dismissal renders the eﬀorts of those involved devices wasted. Therefore, the Claimant
requires a method of matching a received proof to one of its unknown Proof Provider.
For this reason, the Veriﬁer generates a symmetric key, KCBi , for each Proof Provider
involved in the claim. The Proof Provider creates a message containing its proof and the
original nonce N i (supplied by the Veriﬁer and known only by the Claimant, Veriﬁer and
that Proof Provider). It encrypts this message with the symmetric key and transmits
it to the Claimant, accompanied by a hash of the key. The hashed value allows the
Claimant to identify which key should be used to decrypt the message. If the Claimant can
successfully decrypt the message, that proof is conﬁrmed as being created by a legitimate
Proof Provider. This removes an intruder's ability to undetectably insert illegitimate proofs
into the exchange. However, the message being decrypted is a piece of ciphertext. Without
the presence of a known value in the message, the Claimant would be unable to diﬀerenciate
between a message sent by a legitimate Proof Provider and one supplied by a malicious
intruder. For this reason, the initiating nonce N i is included in the encryption. Upon
decryption using its symmetric key, the Claimant can immediately identify that nonce and
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conﬁrm that it matches the key employed to decrypt the message. This re-conﬁrms the
veracity of the received proof.
The functionality of KCBi , much like that of Ni and N
′
i , is tied to the fact that no
devices other than the Claimant and a Proof Provider have knowledge of its value. In order
to prevent intruding devices from learning the value of any of these nonces, the messages
containing them must be encrypted for each recipient. As a device's identity is its public
key, the Claimant is no longer capable of encrypting messages for its Proof Providers.
If the Claimant was capable of this, complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality would not
hold, rendering the protocol no longer complete. Therefore, a new approach is required
to maintain complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality whilst still enabling the encryption of
these values to protect them from eavesdropping attackers.
In order to fulﬁll these requirements, we have expanded the role of the Veriﬁer within
the protocol. In earlier extensions, the Veriﬁer's role consisted merely of transmitting a
list of the Proof Providers for use in the exchange. However, in this extension the Veriﬁer
assumes much of the initialisation role of the Claimant, generating the nonces for use within
the exchange and encrypting them for the participating Proof Providers. As the Claimant
also requires a copy of these values, the Veriﬁer is forced to create and encrypt two messages
per Proof Provider, one encrypted with the Claimant's public key and one encrypted with
that of the Proof Provider's. With these messages pre-encrypted, the Claimant need
then only broadcast them to all devices in its vicinity. It is through the implementation
of this approach, where the Claimant is forced to broadcast messages without knowing
the identity of their intended recipient, that complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality is
achieved. However, the satisfaction of these properties also precludes the participating
Proof Providers from successfully verifying the Claimant's digital signatures during the
distance bounding exchange. If unaddressed, this inability would render the protocol
vulnerable to collusion attacks, as the signature employed on the return leg of the exchange
could be undetectably falsiﬁed by any device. This negates any protection oﬀered by its
inclusion. In order to address this potential vulnerability, a randomly selected digitally
signed nonce from the distance bounding exchange is included by the Proof Provider in
its ﬁnal proof message. This signed nonce is forwarded to the Veriﬁer as part of the proof
message, where the Veriﬁer can conﬁrm the signature's authenticity as it possesses the
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appropriate public key. As the nonce is selected from the array sent during the exchange
at random, the Claimant cannot predict which run should be participated in correctly. If
it wishes to attempt a collusion attack and participate honestly in only a single run, it has
at best a one in x chance of successfully cheating the system (where x = the number of
distance bounding exchanges performed).
With the satisfaction of external conﬁdentiality and anonymity, the inclusion of a re-
newed protection against collusion attacks and the continued satisfaction of authentication
of origin, we believe that we have designed a second secure and complete protocol which
satisﬁes the three security properties outlined in Section 4.2.3 to the fullest degree. Un-
fortunately, the creation and transmission of two initialisation messages for each Proof
Provider involved, the inclusion of a signed nonce in the proof messages and the heavy use
of encryption causes this protocol extention to come at a high overhead cost. This cost ex-
plosion is discussed in detail in Section 4.5.3. However, the cost explosion may be lessened
through the further use of symmetric keys. As in the case of extensions one and two of
the SLVPGP, the use of symmetric keys between the Claimant and Proof Providers when
doing distance bounding would decrease both the transmission and time costs required
to complete the stage, as symmetric cryptographic operations are far faster and result in
smaller pieces of cipher text than asymmetric cryptography. This has the additional ben-
eﬁt of removing the need for a randomly selected signed nonce to be included in the proof
message sent to the Veriﬁer, as the Proof Providers would again be able to conﬁrm that
the value was encrypted correctly. The removal of this section of the proof message also
decreases the amount of data to be sent and time required for sending, thereby reducing
the cost explosion further.
However, though employing symmetric cryptography on this stage would decrease both
the time and data costs on the part of the Claimant, the costs incurred by the Proof
Provider would actually increase. In the current approach, the Proof Provider does not
incur any veriﬁcation costs, it does not possess the appropriate key. Therefore, there
is a trade oﬀ between the Claimant's savings and the increased costs incurred by the
Proof Provider. Future work on this protocol should investigate the beneﬁts vs costs of
switching to this approach. Additionally, the optimization possibilities of redesigning the
extension overall and completely incorporating symmetric keys into the structure should
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be addressed, as this may lessen the complexity of the protocol in addition to decreasing
the costs incurred.
4.5 Analysing the Protocol
In this section we discuss the various extensions to the SLVPGP and their associated
overhead costs. Each extension to the SLVPGP increases the security provided to those
participating, however in order to provide the increased security, the extensions require
additional data to be transmitted and computing time to generate encryptions or digital
signatures. We deﬁne the term costs to mean this additional data and/or time required in
order to increase the level of security provided. In this section we discuss the costs incurred
within each extension, in order to provide that extension's level of security (Sections 4.5.1-
4.5.3). We then discuss the practical costs incurred by each extension, broken down by
cost type (Section 4.5.4).
4.5.1 Extension One
In the ﬁrst extension of the protocol, support is added for authentication of origin. This
property is supplied through the application of digital signatures to messages within the
protocol. However, the employment of digital signatures causes an increase in the costs
associated with the protocol. As the digital signature for each message must be computed
and veriﬁed during the protocol's run, the length of time taken to complete each step
increases. In addition to this, the digital signature for each message must be transmitted
with that message, increasing the amount of data required to be transmitted. These
increased overhead costs apply to all messages including a digital signature.
In addition to the overhead costs associated with providing authentication, the ﬁrst
extension to the SLVPGP increases the level of security within the protocol through the
prevention of collusion attacks such as the terrorist fraud. This is achieved by tying the dis-
tance bounding stage of the protocol to the Claimant through employing a digital signature
on the echoing nonce. An improvement in costs may be made here, through the employ-
ment of symmetric cryptography instead of the currently employed asymmetric approach.
This would reduce both the time required for encryption and the size of the resulting
message. However, if the protocol's design is amended to incorporate this approach, an
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additional step must be included within the protocol, during which a key agreement scheme
(such as Diﬃe-Hellman [23]) is run. Though this does increase the costs incurred, the extra
amount of data being transmitted and time required is negated by the cost savings per
distance bounding iteration.
The security of the protocol is also improved upon by including the Claimant's identity
within the proof message. This incurs only a slight increase in data overheads, to tie the
proof to the Claimant involve and ensures that the protocol is not vulnerable to attack
from a dishonest Claimant wishing to use proofs concerning other Claimants within its
own veriﬁcation. As this message is digitally signed by the Proof Provider supplying it,
the Claimant is unable to undetectably remove this piece of evidence. This approach is
also employed in the ﬁnal message from the Veriﬁer to the Claimant, tying the veriﬁcation
to that Claimant. Again, as the message is digitally signed by the entity providing it,
the Claimant is unable to undetectably alter the identity included. This prevents it from
altering veriﬁcation messages pertaining to other devices to suit its own needs.
However, although the ﬁrst extension does protect the integrity of the information
transmitted, the lack of encryption and its associated overhead increases means that this
extension does not aﬀord the devices involved either conﬁdentiality or anonymity. These
properties are supplied in varying degrees within the second and third extensions.
4.5.2 Extension Two
The second extension to the SLVPGP increases the security properties supported to in-
clude external anonymity and external conﬁdentiality. In addition to authentication of
origin, these properties are achieved through the application of encryption to communi-
cations between the various parties. Encrypting these messages ensures the contents are
known only to those with the appropriate decryption keys and those with whom the key
owners share the contents. This newfound protection provides external anonymity and ex-
ternal conﬁdentiality - i.e. no device outside the exchange can learn identities or location
information without aid from a dishonest party participating in the exchange.
However, encryption greatly increases the transmission costs associated with the pro-
tocol. Whilst digital signatures require only the digest of a message to be encrypted,
encrypting an entire message increases the amount of data required to be transmitted im-
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mensely. This increase not only increases the data transmission costs incurred, but also
causes the amount of time required to transmit the message to increase. These increases in
costs are incurred many times over. In addition to this, the cost in time overheads also in-
creases as the encryption of each message must be computed, along with its corresponding
decryption. Overall, the application of encryption to the protocol is very costly, with large
increases incurred in both computation time and data to be transmitted. However, the
security purchased at this cost ensures a greatly increased level of all devices participating,
providing a degree of protection to both identity and location information.
Finally, the amendment of the protocol's design suggested in Section 4.5.1, where sym-
metric cryptography replaces digital signatures during distance bounding, would signiﬁ-
cantly decrease the costs incurred by that particular stage of the protocol. Additionally, the
savings can be increased by the employment of their symmetric key by each Proof Provider
to encrypt their proof message, although (as mentioned in Section 4.4.2) the proof must
remain digitally signed in order to retain the property of authentication of origin.
4.5.3 Extension Three
The ﬁnal extension to the SLVPGP incurs the greatest increase in transmission overheads
in an eﬀort to provide both complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality. The provision of these
security properties provides an increased level of protection and prevents a wolf in sheep's
clothing attack. In this scenario, a device participates (either honestly or dishonestly) in a
veriﬁcation exchange as either a Claimant or Proof Provider, but stores the information it
receives for use at a later date. As the device is participating within the veriﬁcation process,
it is granted access to the location information and identities of the devices involved.
Extension three of the SLVPGP prevents this through the protection of all information
from even those devices participating in the exchange, excluding the Veriﬁer.
However, increasing the protection provided by the protocol in this manner introduces
new complications, as the Claimant requires the ability to share secrets with each of the
involved Proof Providers during its claim. This is done to enable identiﬁcation during
the distance bounding portion of the protocol and to ensure that false proofs cannot be
inserted into the exchange by malicious devices. As the Claimant does not know the
identities or public keys of its Proof Providers, it can no longer securely provide them with
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these secrets. However the Veriﬁer, as a trusted entity, has knowledge of all public keys
within the system. It is employed to create the secrets shared by a Claimant and its Proof
Providers, encrypting them to secure them from intruders. This process increases the costs
associated with this extension, as for each Proof Provider involved, the Veriﬁer is required
to create, encrypt and transmit multiple nonces and a shared AES key for both that Proof
Provider and the Claimant.
In addition to this overhead increase, the proof message created by the Proof Providers
and forwarded by the Claimant increases in size. Each Proof Provider includes a randomly
selected digitally signed echoing nonce from its distance bounding exchange. As the Proof
Providers can no longer verify the validity of the received digital signatures, they enclose
a sample from the process, allowing the Veriﬁer to validate the proofs. This increases
the costs involved not only in the proof message received by the Claimant from each of
its Proof Providers, but also in the ﬁnal proof sent from the Claimant to the Veriﬁer.
However, the inability of the Proof Providers to verify the digital signatures including
during distance bounding causes a substantial decrease in costs, as shown in Figure 4.5.
Section 4.4.3 discusses the possibility of employing symmetric encryption on the distance
bounding stage of the protocol as a cost-reduction mechanism, but the issue of whether
this will decrease or increase the costs incurred remains open for future investigation.
It should be noted that while Figure 4.5 and Tables 4.8, 4.9 & 4.10 reﬂect the veriﬁcation
costs for extension three of the SLVPGP, these are the deﬁnite costs incurred. They do
not include any additional possible costs, such as the number of extra veriﬁcations to be
completed due to the employment of broadcasting and the inability of a device to be sure it
is not the intended recipient of a message. This aspect is not included in the computations
as it is impossible to know how many additional veriﬁcation operations are required for a
single run, even when operating in a vacuum. This is due to the unpredictability of the
network and its topology, as the location of devices continuously changes and not all Proof
Providers will necessarily be in range of each other. Therefore, while the veriﬁcation costs
incurred for extension three appear lower than those for extension two (Figure 4.5), these
are a minimum and this relationship cannot be guaranteed.
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Unit size Speed of cryptographic operation
SHA-256 1 byte 0.000008584 milliseconds
AES 1 128 bit block 0.00014 milliseconds
RSA encryption 1 1024 bit block 0.08 milliseconds
RSA decryption 1 1024 bit block 1.46 milliseconds
Table 4.1: Benchmark Speeds Used in Practical Cost Computation
Component Size (in bits)
Nonce (N ) 64
Timestamp (T ) 32
Location (X) 64
Proof/Verdict (L/DV ) 1
Identity 1024
Hash (h) 256
k 16
Table 4.2: Message Component Sizes
4.5.4 Extension Comparison
In order to fully analyse each extension within the SLVPGP and to illustrate the compara-
tive costs vs. the level of security provided, we have computed the practical costs incurred
for a single run of each protocol, using 1024 bit RSA [82] keys. These costs have been
divided into three categories; transmission (Figure 4.3), generation (Figure 4.4) and veri-
ﬁcation (Figure 4.5). In the case of veriﬁcation, we focus on the deﬁnite costs incurred, i.e.
those that will deﬁnitely be incurred by the participants. The additional costs incurred by
the use of broadcasting in extension three (mentioned earlier in Section 4.5.3) are discussed
at the end of the section, but are not included in the point by point comparison due to
their unpredictability. Also not included in this section are cost comparisons for alternative
protocol designs using symmetric cryptography instead of asymmetric approaches, though
these may be addressed in future work.
For each cost category, a graph is included depicting the incurred cost increases for
each extension. The breakdown of costs in each graph can be found in Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.6
and 4.8, based on the component ﬁgures shown in Table 4.2.
For the purpose of comparing the cost of each extension, the protocol is run with the
Claimant, Veriﬁer and ﬁve Proof Providers. Each Proof Provider completes ten distance
bounding iterations with the Claimant. We employ benchmark speeds from Crypto++'s
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Figure 4.3: Transmission Cost Comparison - Data and Time Costs
benchmarking page1 to calculate the time required to complete an encryption, decryption
or SHA-256 operation. These speeds were generated while running on an Intel Core 2
1.86 GHz processor, with only one CPU core employed during the benchmarking process.
The system ran Windows Vista (in 32-bit mode), with the code generating the benchmarks
written in C++. Where RSA is employed, the public exponent is set as 17. The benchmark
speeds employed are shown in Table 4.1 (Speed of cryptographic operation), along with
the size of the data being operated on in that time (Unit size). We acknowledge that these
device speciﬁcations are not representative of standard mobile devices, possessing greater
processing power than that of a mobile device. However, they do allow a comparison to
be made of the relative costs for each extension.
The speed employed in the calculation of transmission costs is based on a IEEE 802.11b
wireless network, employing 11mb/s transmission speeds. Based on this setting, the time
required to transmit a single bit over this connection is 111534336 seconds. Delays are not
factored into the calculation of time costs and the same transmission speeds are applied
to those messages sent between the Claimant and Veriﬁer as between the Claimant and
Proof Providers. This is done for clarity, as there is no way of gauging the number of hops
through which a message from the Claimant to the Veriﬁer would have to travel, though
in practice it is assumed that at least part of the journey would be done via an IEEE 802.3
network.
Transmission costs
Graphs (a) and (b) in Figure 4.3 depict the comparison of data and time transmission
1Crypto++ http://www.cryptopp.com/benchmarks.html
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Extension One Extension Two Extension Three
1) C→V: 2112 3072 3072
2) V→C: 6144 7168 19456
3) C→Bi: 20480 20480 25600
4a) Bi→C: 16800 16800 16800
4b) C→Bi: 67200 67200 67200
5) Bi→C: 15845 20480 32640
6) C→V: 19013 20480 34816
7) V→C: 2145 3072 3072
Total 149739 158752 202016
Table 4.3: Transmission Cost Comparison for Claim Involving Five Proof Providers, Each
Doing Ten Distance Bounding Exchanges (Quantity of Data Transmitted, in Bits)
Extension One Extension Two Extension Three
1) C→V: 0.183105469 0.266335227 0.266335227
2) V→C: 0.532670455 0.621448864 1.686789773
3) C→Bi: 1.775568182 1.775568182 2.219460227
4a) Bi→C: 1.456520774 1.456520774 1.456520774
4b) C→Bi: 5.826083097 5.826083097 5.826083097
5) Bi→C: 1.373724504 1.775568182 2.82981179
6) C→V: 1.648382707 1.775568182 3.018465909
7) V→C: 0.185966492 0.266335227 0.266335227
Total 12.98202168 13.76342773 17.51431552
Table 4.4: Transmission Cost Comparison for Claim Involving Five Proof Providers, Each
Doing Ten Distance Bounding Exchanges (Time Required to Transmit Messages, in ms)
Extension One Extension Two Extension Three
Step 1 X + 2x 3x 3x
Step 2 xn+ x x ∗ (n+ 2) 3xn+ 4x
Step 3 4xn 4xn 5xn
Step 4a n ∗ (y ∗ (k + h+N )) n ∗ (y ∗ (k + h+N )) n ∗ (y ∗ (k + h+N ))
Step 4b n ∗ (y ∗ (h+N + x)) n ∗ (y ∗ (h+N + x)) n ∗ (y ∗ (h+N + x))
Step 5 n ∗ (3x+ T +X + L) 4xn n ∗ (h+ 2N + 6X)
Step 6 3x+ T +X + n ∗ (3x+ T +X + L) 5x+ 3xn 4x+ 6xn
Step 7 2x+DV +X + T 3x 3x
Table 4.5: Transmission Cost Comparison Formulae
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Extension 1 Extension 2 Extension 3
SHA-256 0.057490267 0.052683227 0.088215622
RSA Encryption 5.6 10.64 10.64
AES Encryption 0 0 0.00686
Total 5.657490267 10.69268323 10.73493562
Table 4.6: Generation Cost Comparison (in Milliseconds)
costs incurred by each of the three extensions, i.e. the amount of data transmitted over
the course of a single protocol run and the time required to transmit that data. The
trend lines shown here behave exactly as expected, with the cost of increasing the level of
provided security from authentication to authentication, external anonymity and external
conﬁdentiality being relatively minor in comparison to that incurred by the addition of
complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality. These ﬁgures are computed based on the Claimant
exchanging messages with ﬁve Proof Providers. The ﬁgures shown against steps 4a) and
4b) in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 depict the data and time costs for transmitting ten distance
bounding exchanges with these ﬁve Proof Providers. The formulae for the calculation of
the ﬁgures shown in Table 4.3 are shown in Table 4.5, with x = the size of the RSA key
employed (1024), y = the number of distance bounding exchanges undertaken (10) and
n = the number of Proof Providers employed (5). The remaining notation employed is
drawn from Table 4.2. Table 4.4 is computed by multiplying the time required to transmit
one bit by the number of bits per step (found in Table 4.3).
As shown in Table 4.3, the increase in transmission costs incurred by moving from
extension one to extension two is relatively low, at 9013 bits. or a little over one kilobyte.
Similarly, Table 4.4 shows the time required to complete a run of extension two to be less
than a millisecond more than that required to complete a run of extension one. However,
the data and time costs incurred by extension three are a signiﬁcant increase on those
incurred by extension two, with an increase of over 3.5 milliseconds in time costs and
43264 bits in data costs. This makes the third extension of the SLVPGP clearly the most
expensive in terms of all transmission costs.
Generation costs
The ﬁgures shown in Table 4.6 compare the generation costs (in milliseconds) for each
extension, i.e. the data processing time incurred by creating digital signatures and encrypt-
ing messages. Digital signature costs are computed based on the time required to hash
87
Figure 4.4: Generation Cost Comparison - Practical Costs
Extension # # Digital signatures # Encryptions
Extension 1 5 + 2n + ny n
Extension 2 5 + 2n + ny 5 + 2n
Extension 3 6 + 2n + ny 4 + 4n
Table 4.7: Generation Cost Comparison (Number of Cryptographic Generation Operations
per Extension)
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Figure 4.5: Veriﬁcation Cost Comparison - Practical Costs
a message using SHA-256 and encrypt the hashed data with the applicable public key.
Contrary to the situation seen when comparing the transmission costs incurred by each
extension, the diﬀerence between extensions two and three in generation costs incurred is
minimal, with a diﬀerence of less than a millisecond. However, there is a drastic decrease
in cost when moving from extension two to extension one, illustrated in Figure 4.4, with
the cost incurred by extension one equalling just over half that incurred by extension two.
This decrease is primarily due to the low level of RSA encryption employed in the ﬁrst
extension, as RSA encryption is the most expensive generation operation in terms of time
costs. As seen in Table 4.7, RSA encryption is used in n messages (where n = 5, the
number of Proof Providers involved in the claim, and y = 10, the number of distance
bounding exchanges completed) in extension one, less than half the RSA cost of extension
2. However, Table 4.7 does not factor the number of components of the message being
operated on into its formulae. It merely indicates the number of cryptographic operations
generated within each extension, i.e. the number of digital signatures generated and mes-
sages encrypted. This accounts for the apparent extensive diﬀerence in encryption costs
between extensions two and three, despite having similar time costs in Table 4.6.
Veriﬁcation costs
Table 4.8 shows the breakdown of deﬁnite veriﬁcation costs incurred by each extension
89
Extension 1 Extension 2 Extension 3
SHA-256 0.068998192 0.069684912 0.085125382
RSA encrypt 5.6 5.6 1.68
RSA decrypt 7.3 106.58 97.82
AES decryption 0 0 0.00686
Total 12.96899819 112.2496849 99.59184538
Table 4.8: Veriﬁcation Cost Comparison (in Milliseconds)
of the SLVPGP, illustrated by the graph in Figure 4.5. It should be noted that the cost
of verifying a digital signature is split into the cost of hashing the message using SHA-256
plus the cost of encrypting the hash, using RSA. The trend lines for AES decryption and
SHA-256 operations are almost identical across the three extensions, with AES masking
SHA's line entirely within the graph. Similarly, the time cost for RSA encryption (in order
to verify digital signatures) remains level between extensions one and two, with extension
three's RSA encryption costs coming in slightly below these. However, the total cost of
veriﬁcation for extensions two and three is very high, leaving extension one with the only
veriﬁcation cost total below 15 milliseconds. This increase is cost is due to the explosion
in RSA decryption costs, a fact shown by the mirroring of the RSA decryption trend line
in the overall costs trend.
Within the benchmarks employed (Table 4.1), RSA decryption requires 1.46 millisec-
onds per key-sized block of data (1024 bits in this example), 18.25 times the time required
to encrypt the same quantity. While the method employed for RSA decryption matches
that of RSA encryption, the speed at which it is achieved diﬀers greatly, due to the dif-
ference in composition between the encryption and decryption exponents employed. The
speed at which RSA's modular exponentiation process is completed depends upon the
number of bits set to 1 within the exponent. The encryption exponent employed with
RSA is traditionally selected from a small pool of options and contains only two bits set,
chosen to ensure a speedy encryption process. However, the decryption exponent contains
a much larger number of set bits, thus increasing the time required to complete the mod-
ular exponentiation process decrypting a message. This spike in costs pushes the overall
cost of veriﬁcation to an extremely high level.
Although extension three possesses the largest quantity of cryptographic content, it
does not incur the highest deﬁnite veriﬁcation costs. The reason for this is twofold. The
ﬁrst is that the Proof Providers are unable to verify all digital signatures transmitted during
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the distance bounding phase of the protocol. As the Proof Providers no longer possess the
Claimant's public key, they can no longer verify the Claimant's digital signature. Instead,
only a single veriﬁcation from this phase is veriﬁed per Proof Provider, with the y factor
(the number of distance bounding iterations) removed entirely from the cost calculation
equation. This is illustrated in Table 4.9, which shows the number of veriﬁcation operations
required for each extension. As in Table 4.7, n = the number of Proof Providers involved
in the claim, and y = the number of distance bounding iterations.
The second reason for the decrease in deﬁnite veriﬁcation costs is that the Claimant is
unable to decrypt and re-encrypt the ﬁnal proof messages. This is because the Claimant no
longer possesses the identities (and consequentially their public keys) of its Proof Providers.
Therefore, it is reduced to forwarding without conﬁrmation of the proof messages' content,
thus reducing the number of veriﬁcations completed. In addition, this decreases the number
of messages to be re-encrypted (thereby also decreasing the generation costs).
A similar contradiction exists in both extensions one and two, between the number
of digital signatures generated and the number veriﬁed. As seen in Table 4.7, there are
5 + 2n+ ny signatures generated in both extensions. However, Table 4.9 lists the number
of signature veriﬁcations as 5 + 3n + ny, an increase of n signatures. This diﬀerence is
caused by the veriﬁcation of the signature of each Proof Provider's proof message twice,
once by the Claimant and once by the Veriﬁer. This is not done in extension three, for the
reasons discussed above.
Unlike extension three's blind forwarding approach, extension two's design is based
around external anonymity, which grants the Claimant knowledge of the contents in each
message being forwarded to the Veriﬁer. However, a by-product of this design is the
explosion of extension two's costs due to the regular use of RSA encryption and decryption,
in addition to the use of the Claimant as a central message hub in the area (a situation
which also incurs additional encryption and decryption operations). However, while the
diﬀerence between extensions two and three is marked, the diﬀerence between extension
one and the SLVPGP's subsequent extensions is drastic. Extension two costs just over
8.65 times the veriﬁcations costs incurred by the ﬁrst extension. This is due to the low
level of RSA operations within extension one, whereas in both extensions two and three,
encryption and decryption are used with great frequency.
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Extension # # Digital signature veriﬁcations # Decryptions
Extension 1 5 + 3n + ny n
Extension 2 5 + 3n + ny 5+ 2n
Extension 3 6 + 3n 4 + 4n
Table 4.9: Veriﬁcation Cost Comparison (Number of Cryptographic Veriﬁcation Opera-
tions Per Extension)
Extension 1 Extension 2 Extension 3
Transmission time 12.98202168 13.76342773 17.51431552
Generation time 5.657490267 10.69268323 10.73493562
Veriﬁcation time 12.96899819 112.2496849 99.59184538
Total 31.60851014 136.7057959 127.8410965
Table 4.10: Overall Comparison of Time Costs (in Milliseconds)
However, as mentioned above, the cost comparisons discussed here only factor in the
deﬁnite veriﬁcation costs incurred by extension three. They do not include the additional
costs caused by the employment of broadcasting and the lack of knowledge on the part of
the participants. While it is impossible to establish the impact of these additional costs on
the overall veriﬁcation costs for extension three, it can be deﬁnitively stated that they will
certainly increase them. As increase is relative to the number of Proof Providers active
in the area, both on this claim and on others, the veriﬁcation costs for extension three
become unpredictable, with only a minimum value available.
4.5.5 Comparison Summary
Each of the three extensions to the SLVPGP are fully secure against collusion attacks,
in addition to maintaining the integrity of the proof messages supplied to the Veriﬁer by
the Claimant. While extension one provides only authentication and protection against
tampering, extension two introduces anonymity and conﬁdentiality on an external level
(protecting private data from those not participating in that particular claim). Extension
three then increases these properties from external to complete. Though the complexity of
extension three appears vastly greater than that of extensions one and two, it is comprised
primarily of forwarding and, as such, is structurally quite simple.
Table 4.10 shows the overall time costs (in milliseconds) for each protocol extension,
broken down by category. The data shown here indicates that extensions two and three of
the protocol are quite costly, particularly in terms of the veriﬁcation time required. The
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employment of RSA cryptography within the protocol increases the quantity of data to be
transmitted (Table 4.3), both due to the size of the identities employed and due to the block
size messages are padded to in order for encryption to occur. However, if an alternative
form of public key cryptography was employed, these costs could be dramatically reduced,
as schemes such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) require less time for encryption
and decryption, in addition to employing smaller keys, thus reducing the quantity of data
to be transmitted.
If the situation in which location veriﬁcation is to be employed requires a lightweight
protocol, due to the employment of smaller devices with lower power and slower transmis-
sion speeds, extension one is the most appropriate selection. It incurs the fewest overheads,
costing 31.6 milliseconds to complete and requiring the transmission of 149739 bits of data.
However, if device privacy is required, then extension one is unsuitable for use and exten-
sions two or three must be employed. Extension two incurs the highest deﬁnite overall
time costs, due to the high cost of RSA decryption coupled with the quantity of data to
be decrypted, though extension three may exceed these if executed in a high-traﬃc area.
However, extension three incurs the highest data transmission cost, requiring the transmis-
sion of 43264 bits more than extension two. Therefore, if the deployment scenario places
a higher premium on speed, extension three would be most suitable (assuming the area in
which it is run does not have high levels of network traﬃc), while if data transmission is
required to be lower, extension two should be employed (assuming full anonymity is not
also a requirement).
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we outlined our design for a secure proof gathering protocol. We discussed
the approach taken in creating this design and the security properties required in order
to provide a secure and complete proof gathering protocol. These properties have been
selected based on the requirements of the system's users and those which protect the
integrity of the proofs gathered within the protocol. In order to analyse the basic approach
designed, we have outlined the bare-bones protocol, devoid of security measures. From
here, we created three variations of the protocol, each with an increased level of security.
This was done to provide ﬂexibility in the amount of security relative to its costs. Each
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extension has been deﬁned and its security and vulnerabilities discussed. We have designed
a single secure lightweight extension which can be used in situations where anonymity and
conﬁdentiality are not an issue. This extension protects the integrity of the proofs gathered,
but does not protect the private data of the participants. The second and third extensions
to the protocol represent two variants of a secure and complete protocol, in which all
three security properties are supported in diﬀering degrees. In order to gauge the level
of cost incurred relative to each increase in security, we have analysed each extension's
generation, veriﬁcation and transmission costs. This analysis demonstrates the marked
increase in costs required to provide complete anonymity and conﬁdentiality, proving the
second and third extensions quite similar in costs, despite the appearance of additional
complexity and cost in extension three.
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Chapter 5
Proving the Security of the Secure
Location Veriﬁcation Proof
Gathering Protocol
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, we discussed the need for the process of gathering location proof to be secured
in some way. We outlined the design of the Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gathering
Protocol (SLVPGP) and discussed its intended security properties and the reason for their
inclusion. In this chapter, we outline the process of converting these protocols from security
notation to mathematical models, before formally verifying them using model checking.
The SLVPGP is a complex protocol, designed to protect the distance bounding ex-
changes between a Claimant and its corresponding Proof Providers in order to ensure that
the proofs received at the end of the exchanges are not tampered with in any way. In
order to ensure that the proofs received are not vulnerable to tampering or any form of
malicious interference, we wish to validate the protocol's correctness through formal ver-
iﬁcation. While validation of the protocol in this manner does not prove its ability to
accurately verify a location claim, it does constitute a valid security investigation and is
done to ensure that the protocol does not contain any hidden ﬂaws or vulnerabilities that
may leak information or lead to ﬂawed functionality, despite its secure appearance. Even
the simplest of protocols may contain some hidden security issue which leaves it vulnerable
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to attack. For example, at the time of its publication the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key
protocol [67] was considered to be secure. However, in [57] Gavin Lowe proved the protocol
vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle replay attack using interleaving when employed outside
of its originally intended environment. This attack remained undetected for many years,
but with formal veriﬁcation the attack is discovered immediately. After the publication of
Lowe's paper, the formal veriﬁcation of protocols experienced a surge in research, particu-
larly the veriﬁcation of authentiation and electronic commerce protocols. The practice of
formal veriﬁcation has become increasingly common as a method of conﬁrming the secu-
rity of released protocols. Examples of protocols formally veriﬁed after their publication
include the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol suite [10, 12], the Generalized
Pre-Shared Key method of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP-GPSK) [65] and
Kerberos [17, 28].
The formal veriﬁcation process involves the analysis of the protocol's security in order to
ensure that the protocol's intended security properties are achieved and that the protocol is
secure from attacks. There are two main approaches to formal veriﬁcation, model checking
and theorem proving. Formal veriﬁcation through theorem proving and induction is used
to verify systems in which there may be an inﬁnite number of possible states. This is due to
the fact that states are not enumerated and therefore the number of agents and intruders
can be considered to be unbounded. The various possible event sequences that could be
done by an agent are deﬁned based on inductive reasoning using a set of rules. These rules
correspond to all possible actions that could be taken by agents involved, including hostile
agents. Security properties are deﬁned as predicates which must hold over all the traces.
Model checking is used in the veriﬁcation of systems with a ﬁnite number of possible
states. It consists of an exploration of all possible states and transitions between states
contained within the model, based on the powers and knowledge of the agents involved.
This gives a complete check of the system and exposes any potential ﬂaws. The model
checking approach to formal veriﬁcation has previously been used to verify the security
of schemes such as SSL 3.0 [66] and NetBill [45]. We have chosen to employ this method
for the formal veriﬁcation of the SLVPGP, as the protocol's mathematical model is ﬁnite
and can therefore be fully explored. Additionally, during a model checking veriﬁcation,
the model checking tool investigates whether the speciﬁcations of the system are upheld
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throughout. This aspect makes model checking an especially apt tool for the veriﬁcation of
our claimed security properties, as they can be expressed as speciﬁcations on the system.
We employ Casper [58] and the Failures-Divergences Reﬁnement (FDR) [83] tool to
accomplish model checking, using the Casper software to generate a Communicating Se-
quential Processes (CSP) [14] description of the protocol. The CSP description is then
model checked by FDR, where the security speciﬁcations used to model the properties
being checked are conﬁrmed to either be true or false for this system. However, the CSP
model generated can be complex, producing a state space which is intractable to many
computer systems. Therefore, we require some method of simplifying the protocol's model
without losing the correctness of the model. If this is lost, attacks on the protocol could be
missed by FDR while carrying out a model check, nullifying the check's results. The issue
of transforming the protocol to simplify the state space whilst retaining the correctness of
the system is discussed further in section 5.4.
In this chapter, we ﬁrst outline the process through which the protocol is formally
veriﬁed (Section 5.3). In Section 5.4, we discuss the simpliﬁcations performed on the
protocol models. Sections 5.5.3 - 5.5.5 detail the original design for each extension of
the protocol, translated into Casper, before applying and explaning the transformations
employed. In Section 5.7, we outline our investigation into the security of employing
broadcasting as a method of transmitting secure messages. Finally, we summarize the
chapter's contents in Section 5.8.
5.2 The Limits of Formal Analysis
Before outlining the formal analysis process employed to verify the security of the SLVPGP,
we ﬁrst outline the limitations of formal analysis in general. As mentioned in the previous
section, formal veriﬁcation of the location veriﬁcation protocols presented in this work
does not prove that the protocols will accurately verify location claims. The purpose of
formally verifying a protocol is to conﬁrm that at no point during the run of a protocol
will the security speciﬁcations laid down within the system's design be violated. This
provides supporting evidence of the hypothesis that that particular protocol is secure from
any attacks. However, although formal veriﬁcation is a useful tool for probing the security
of a protocol's design, a system can never be proven to be 100% secure [103]. As systems
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do not run within a vacuum, the verdict received on a protocol reﬂects only that within
the system described, there does not seem to be any insecurity related to the included
security speciﬁcations. If formal analysis indicates that the system being veriﬁed is secure,
it indicates that, within the environment described for analysis, this system is secure from
the attacks speciﬁed and investigated, based on all speciﬁed assumptions.
However, if even one of the assumptions the described system is based upon is inaccu-
rate, an assumption is not included in the model or the protocol is used in an environment
diﬀerent to the one modelled, the results of the veriﬁcation are no longer valid (c.f. Lowe's
discovery regarding the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol [57]). For example, when
model checking our protocols, we assume the strength of the cryptography employed to be
complete, i.e. that an intruder cannot crack the code. If the encryption employed on the
protocol was insuﬃcient, the model would not accurately reﬂect the real world deployment
of the protocol and therefore the veriﬁcation results could no longer be applied to the
protocol.
This weakness also extends to the security speciﬁcations employed to model the security
properties being checked for a protocol. If the speciﬁcation is designed poorly and does
not accurately reﬂect the real-world security property, its success or failure in a veriﬁcation
gives no indication of whether that property is upheld by the protocol. Finally, without a
suﬃciently rich threat model describing the knowledge and powers of the intruder process,
the veriﬁcation verdicts received regarding a protocol could not be applied to the real
world protocol, as the intruder was not fully described. We discuss the approach taken to
modelling the intruder and its importance in Section 5.3.3.
5.3 The Model Checking Process
A security protocol is deﬁned as a high level description of the steps taken by those devices
participating, written using abstract protocol notation. In order for this description to be
formally veriﬁed, a model must be created which describes the sequence of steps involved
in the protocol and the environment in which it operates. This formal representation of
the system can then be analysed for vulnerabilities and the intended security properties
of the system veriﬁed. However, as discussed in Section 5.2, this veriﬁcation is contingent
upon the protocol being used within the speciﬁed environment.
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As mentioned in Section 5.1, several languages and tools are employed to formally
verify the protocols. In Section 5.3.1 we introduce the tools employed in model checking -
CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) and FDR (Failures-Divergences Reﬁnement).
Although CSP can be handcrafted, we have opted to employ an automatic generation
tool (Casper) to translate a high level description of the system into the low-level CSP
description required by FDR. The reasoning behind this approach is discussed in Section
5.3.2. Finally, we discuss the role of the intruder within our model in Section 5.3.3, outlining
the assumptions made regarding the capability of this attacker.
5.3.1 What is Model Checking?
As mentioned in Section 5.1, model checking is a method of formally verifying systems
with a ﬁnite number of possible states. When applied to security protocols, it formally
validates the design of a protocol, indicating that the protocol conforms to the speciﬁed
security properties included in its description. We employ CSP and FDR to accomplish
model checking. CSP is a complex notation for describing systems in which messages are
passed between agents (processes) operating in parallel [84], thus making it ideal for the
veriﬁcation of this system. It allows the security of concurrent systems to be examined
fully, and provides the ability to describe all the possible states in which a system may be.
As CSP is such a complex language, we employ a high level modelling language (Casper
[58], discussed in Section 5.3.2) to generate a CSP description of the protocol. The resulting
CSP description is model checked by FDR. In FDR, the included speciﬁcations used to
model the protocol's security properties to be checked are conﬁrmed as either true or false
for this system. In this section, we outline the basic functionality of CSP and how FDR
veriﬁes a supplied CSP model.
CSP
CSP is a mathematical language used to describe the interaction of processes operating
in parallel. These interactions occur in the form of communications between processes,
referred to as events or actions. CSP describes each process in terms of states and events,
with each process beginning in a speciﬁc state with a corresponding set of possible actions.
When a process runs, it selects an event from its set of all possible performable events
for that state, performs it and moves to the next logical state. The continued running of
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a process in this manner produces a trace or speciﬁc sequence of visible communications
that can be performed. For each process there exist multiple traces, as due to the process's
ability to choose an event to perform, there are multiple possible event combinations. By
computing all possible traces produced by a process, a traces model can be built. This
model details all possible ways in which a process can behave, allowing that process's
behaviour to be thoroughly examined for ﬂaws by tools such as FDR.
Where the traces model concept is extended to include the traces of multiple processes
within a system, it creates a model of all possible ways in which an entire system can
behave. However, this type of model is far larger than that of a single process, as where
only a single process is modelled, only a single state must be considered between each
event. When modelling an entire system rather than a single process, the concept of a
state is altered slightly. Unlike a process's state, a system's state is composed of one state
for each component process. Therefore, as with traces, there are many diﬀerent possible
states within the system, as there are multiple possible state combinations. This causes a
dramatic increase in the number of states to be explored (the state-space) when checking
the system.
In order to investigate a protocol's security properties, additional processes are created,
known as speciﬁcation processes. These processes are added to the CSP model of the
protocol. Each speciﬁcation process models one or more security properties (multiple
secrecy properties may modelled in a single secrecy speciﬁcation process). These processes
model what the system is expected to be capable of at speciﬁc points. In order to deﬁne
what the system is capable of, signals (speciﬁcation events) are introduced. A signal
event is a speciﬁcation/control event in CSP, used in the checking of security property
speciﬁcation assertions [88]. Signals are sent on a special channel outside the protocol, and
indicate a particular claim regarding a security property. For example, if the nonce n was
to be kept secret between agents a and b, the signal:
signal.Claim_Secret.a.b.n
would be sent on the signal channel, indicating that at that point, a and b are claiming
that n is a secret shared by them. As it is sent outside the protocol communications
channel, the intruder cannot overhear it and learn any new information. If this claim is
made on the signal channel, the intruder should not be able to leak the value of n, i.e. it
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should not know n's value.
FDR
FDR's functionality is based on the concept of comparing processes and seeking reﬁne-
ment. If one process is a reﬁnement of another, anything permissable to occur in the ﬁrst
process is also allowable in the second process. For example, when given two processes,
Implementation and Speciﬁcation, FDR checks whether Implementation is a reﬁnement of
Speciﬁcation, i.e. whether all the traces in Implementation's traces model are contained
within Speciﬁcation's traces model. If so, Implementation is said to reﬁne Speciﬁcation.
[84]. FDR is also capable of investigating systems regarding vulnerability to deadlock
(known as failures, in which processes refuse to perform some event and cannot progress)
and livelock (known as divergences, in which processes continually perform internal actions
rather than progressing), however these aspects are not employed in our work.
When reﬁnement checking a complete system, FDR employs the concept of reﬁnement
to conﬁrm that the model is a reﬁnement of the CSP speciﬁcation process supplied. It
achieves this through systematically comparing the traces model generated by the system
being checked, based on the processes described, with those of the speciﬁcation process
provided. In the case of modelling security protocols, this speciﬁcation is a process encoding
the security property or properties being investigated, e.g. anonymity. If the security
properties investigated are not upheld over every trace in the traces model of a system,
the model is not a reﬁnement of the speciﬁcation. In this situation, FDR fails the check
and returns an example trace that violates the reﬁnement.
FDR also employs reﬁnement to investigate the security properties of a protocol. When
investigating a protocol's security properties, the CSP model of the protocol is reﬁne
checked against a set of security speciﬁcations (discussed in the previous section) rep-
resenting each property. If the CSP model reﬁnes the security speciﬁcations, the security
properties represented are upheld. This is proven by the fact FDR cannot ﬁnd any traces
in which the intruder is able to violate the rules of the speciﬁcation. However, if FDR re-
turns a counter-example, the security properties are not upheld. An example of this would
be where a secrecy property is being investigated and FDR returned a counter example in
which the intruder could leak the message component being claimed as secret.
FDR's method of reﬁnement checking requires enumerating vast numbers of states and
101
comparing all possible traces within a model. Therefore, the eﬀort required to check a
model depends upon the complexity of the process or processes involved. Due to the
possibility that there are a vast number of states to be explored (the state-space) when
checking a system, verifying a model can be extremely complex and resource-consuming.
In the case of model checking the SLVPGP's extensions to conﬁrm the security properties
speciﬁed in their design, the models generated are extremely complex. For this reason, a
selection of simpliﬁcation techniques have been performed on the systems checked in this
work, in order to reduce the size of the resulting models. These simpliﬁcation techniques
are discussed in Section 5.4.
5.3.2 Modelling a Protocol Using Casper
In order to generate CSP models to be checked by the FDR model checker, we ﬁrst trans-
late each of the protocols from abstract protocol notation into Casper. Casper provides
automatic generation of CSP models based on a high-level Casper description. In this
section, we outline the reasons for employing Casper in this process. We then describe the
way in which a protocol is translated from abstract notation to Casper. Finally, we outline
the modelling of security properties in Casper and how they translate to CSP.
Why Use Casper?
In order to model check a security protocol, it must be translated from its security
notation design to a script representing this design in some modelling language. Casper
has been designed to emulate the form of a high level programming language, simplifying
the process of describing a protocol. Using Casper allows us to automate the production of
the protocol's mathematical model (its CSP description), reducing the liklihood of errors
occuring. When writing in a language such as CSP, the density and complexity of the
code often results in overlooked errors and logic ﬂaws. This leaves the system vulnerable
to undetected security issues, as the model being checked does not accurately represent
the original protocol and the environment in which it operates. Employing a higher level
language such as Casper to generate CSP code allows a clear picture of the system being
modelled to be visualised.
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Modelling in Casper
When modelling a protocol in Casper, both the protocol and the environment in which
it is being formally modelled are described. Details on the environment in which the
protocol is to be run are included because all protocols operate based on some set of as-
sumptions. This information is required in order for the model to be accurate. Within
a Casper script, the model's description is broken into two parts, each dealing with mul-
tiple aspects. The ﬁrst part of the Casper script contains information on the theoretical
system's design - the agents (participants) in the protocol (e.g. the Veriﬁer, Claimant,
etc) and their initial knowledge (#Processes); the sequence of steps to be taken within
the protocol (#Protocol description); the types of any protocol participants deﬁned in
#Processes and message components employed in the protocol (#Free variables); and a
set of speciﬁcations detailing the security properties being investigated (#Speciﬁcation).
In essence, this part of the script describes an abstract model of the system being analysed,
how it should perform and the speciﬁcations regarding its behaviour that it should meet.
It results in a CSP description of the messages to be sent (based on the protocol steps)
and CSP descriptions of the agents involved, describing the order in which they send and
receive those messages.
The second part of the Casper ﬁle deals with the system being investigated in this
analysis, i.e. it deﬁnes a speciﬁc instance of the model described in the ﬁrst part of the
ﬁle, instanciating it with speciﬁc parameters. It contains details on the variables employed
in this instance (#Actual variables) and the agents taking part in this speciﬁc exchange
(#System). Each agent detailed in the second section of the script is modelled in CSP as
a process, parameterised with the variables supplied under the #Active variables heading.
In addition to dealing with the honest participants within the system, this section of the
Casper ﬁle also includes information regarding the intruder and its knowledge (#Intruder
Information). This process represents any intruder within the system being checked. The
speciﬁcation of a system are deemed to be upheld if this process is unable to violate them at
any point during the check, therefore the intruder's design must be very thorough. When
building a CSP model by hand, modelling the intruder process is a very diﬃcult task, as
many diﬀerent possibilities must be included. When translated into CSP by Casper, the
intruder is provided with a deduction system which processes any information it overhears
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based on its own knowledge, in an attempt to learn new data. This system allows the
intruder to deduce all possible information, without requiring a large quantity of complex
code to be written by an investigator. This reinforces the argument for employing a higher
level language to generate the CSP. Higher level languages are simpler to process and work
with, allowing for errors and complexity issues to be discovered and dealt with easily. The
powers of the intruder and its impact on the model's accuracy are discussed further in
Section 5.3.3.
Modelling Security Speciﬁcations
As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the modelling of security properties in CSP is accomplished
through the use of security speciﬁcation processes, built to represent the events allowable
by those properties. These speciﬁcations are represented in Casper by simple speciﬁcations
listed in the #Speciﬁcations section. Casper translates these security speciﬁcations into
speciﬁcation processes during the CSP generation process. When modelling the extensions
of the SLVPGP, we employ two Casper speciﬁcation types: StrongSecret and Agreement.
The deﬁnitions of these speciﬁcation types is sourced from [84].
The Agreement speciﬁcation models authentication in the form of an agreement on
the value of a message component, by a speciﬁed list of participants in the protocol. It is
presented in the form:
• Agreement(A, B, [nA])
where A and B are participants in the protocol and nA is the value being agreed upon.
A successful veriﬁcation of this Agreement speciﬁcation indicates that if B believes it has
successfully completed a protocol run with A, then A has been running the protocol with
B. It also indicates that there is a one to one relationship between the number of runs of
A and the number of runs of B. Finally, it indicates that A and B agree on the value of
nA, i.e. that the value of nA does not change between when it is sent by A and when it is
received by B.
The StrongSecret speciﬁcation is a variant of the Secret speciﬁcation, which models
a requirement of secrecy regarding a speciﬁed value. However, in the Secret speciﬁcation
the Claim_secret signal event (discussed previously in Section 5.3.1) is performed at the
end of the protocol. This leaves the case where a protocol run is started and aborted
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prior to the end of the run unchecked, as the signal event is never performed. Where the
information being classed as secret has signiﬁcance outside of the protocol exchange, this
level of security is insuﬃcient. As this is the case for the protected information in the
SLVPGP extensions, the StrongSecret speciﬁcation is employed to investigate the secrecy
security property.
The StrongSecret speciﬁcation addresses this shortfall through moving the signal event
from the end of the protocol's run to the earliest possible moment, i.e. at the initialisation
point of the protocol for the sender and at the point of receiving the value for the receiver.
This causes the security speciﬁcation generated to conﬁrm that the value remains secret
throughout the protocol, thus conﬁrming the security of the value even for aborted protocol
runs. The StrongSecret speciﬁcation is presented in the form:
• StrongSecret(A, nA, [B])
where A and B are participants in the protocol and nA is the value being kept secret.
A successful veriﬁcation of this StrongSecret speciﬁcation indicates that A is correct in
believing that nA is a secret known only to itself and B. However, if B is an intruder,
the value could be passed to any other device and the protection of the value lost. For
this reason, Casper generates a condition within the CSP speciﬁcation process indicating
that this speciﬁcation is investigating only the case where B is not an intruder. If this
speciﬁcation is upheld, it indicates that if B is not the intruder, the intruder will never
learn the value of nA.
5.3.3 The Role of the Intruder
A crucial aspect of model checking is the inclusion of a speciﬁc process designed to behave
maliciously in order to test the strength of the model's security. This intruder process
represents any malicious entity, either a member of the system or an outsider, which
may attempt to attack the system in any way. When modelling a system in Casper, the
intruder process is automatically generated based on a speciﬁed set of known facts, such
as the identities of the devices it has knowledge of, any public or private keys (or key
access functions), etc. Casper employs the Dolev-Yao [24] intruder approach, a worst-
case scenario in which the intruder is given complete power to tamper with messages sent
within the system, bounded only by the limitations of its own knowledge (both learned and
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previously known) and its cryptographic ability. It can obtain any message transmitted
within the system and has the ability to replay, fake, redirect and alter messages in an
eﬀort to learn protected information and break the security of the system.
However, as the intruder's knowledge is composed only of what it is granted initially and
the information it has learned over the course of an exchange, it cannot use a value without
having ﬁrst overheard it in a communication or already being in possession of it. If the
intruder overhears said value within a message, it can logically make use of it at a later date.
Additionally, the intruder can only decrypt those messages for which it possesses the correct
cryptographic decryption key, and vice versa with regard to encryption. This approach
is superior to employing an intruder process designed only with speciﬁc malicious attacks
and devient approaches, as it is less limited. The intruder process is capable of performing
any action which falls within the stated limitations at any time and can therefore discover
any vulnerability within the described system.
When modelling the SLVPGP in Casper, the intruder process is modelled with the
ability to function as each of the players within the system (excluding the process used to
model the network, introduced in Section 5.5.5.1). Prior to beginning a run of the protocol,
the intruder's knowledge set includes the identity of the Veriﬁer, its own private keys as
well as the public key functions for all involved types. These functions allow the possessor
to retrieve the public key of a device, if they are in possession of its identity, an aspect
of the form of cryptography employed in the real world system. In order to further test
the system's security, multiple other checks were conducted, granting the intruder process
various pieces of additional information. These checks are further discussed in Sections
5.6.1 - 5.6.3.
5.4 Safely Simplifying the CSP Model
As mentioned in Section 5.1, the CSP model based on the SLVPGP is highly complex. Due
to the number of variables included in each message and the large quantity of encryption
employed over the course of a run of the protocol, the state space generated is vast. This
is particularly true in the case of the second and third extensions of the protocol, where
encryption is employed heavily and the number of variables increases drastically. Some
method of reducing the model's complexity is required in order to ascertain the correctness
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of the protocol, as FDR cannot comfortably handle such a complex model. In order to avoid
interfering with the accuracy of the model while reducing its complexity, we have employed
several safe simplifying transformations, found in the work of Schneider & Ryan in [84].
The authors prove that if certain aspects of a protocol's complexity are not needed for the
security of that protocol, the protocol can be analysed with said complexity removed.
The transformations deﬁned by this work posses the property of preserving attacks
on the original protocol, as they satisfy a pair of safe transformation conditions. These
conditions state that for a particular simpliﬁcation f, for every message sequence (trace) tr
that can be generated by P, f(tr) is a trace of P's simpliﬁed version. If tr constitutes an
attack on P, then f(tr) constitutes an attack on the simpliﬁed version. Any information an
intruder could gather or deduce based on the original protocol could also be gathered or
deduced from the transformed protocol. Therefore, transformations meeting the conditions
set out above allow the model's complexity to be decreased without aﬀecting the model's
correctness. Three such transformations are employed in this work to reduce the complexity
of the SLVPGP. These are message splitting, message redirection and coalescing atoms.
5.4.1 Coalescing Atoms
The simplest transformation applied to the protocol is the coalesing of a pair of atoms into
a single atom. In this transformation, a pair of atoms in the protocol is substituted with a
single atom representing both, usually a member of the pair. Consider the following simple
Casper protocol description:
1. A->B: nA
2. B->A: nA, B, nB, nB1
3. A->B: B, nA1
This basic structure shows an entity A sending a nonce to entity B. It then receives back
its own nonce from B, along with two of B's nonces and B's identity. Finally, A replies
with B's identity and its own second nonce. When we apply the coalescing simpliﬁcation
to this protocol, we coalesce nB and nB1 into a single value. This results in the protocol
description being transformed to this:
1. A->B: nA
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2. B->A: nA, B, nB
3. A->B: B, nA1
with nB and nB1 represented solely by nB in the second step.
The transformation process also transforms all traces of the protocol using the same
function (in this case the coalescing of a pair of atoms into a single atom) applied to the
protocol. Therefore any trace found in the original protocol's traces model will also be
produced (in a transformed state, i.e. with the pair of atoms replaced by a single atom)
by the transformed model. This connection between the original and transformed designs
preserves any possible attacks present in the original model.
As the security speciﬁcations employed to model the system's security protocols deal
with the protocol in its original state, the coalescing of these atoms into a single atom
also has a direct eﬀect on any speciﬁcations involving them. In order to investigate the
transformed model's security properties, we amend any speciﬁcations involving a coalesced
pair of atoms to cover only the atom with which the pair is substituted. If the security
of this atom is compromised, either through the leaking of the value or an inability to
authenticate the value, this ﬂaw also applies to the original pair of atoms. Therefore, the
results of the security properties checks on the transformed model can be projected onto
the original model.
5.4.2 Message Splitting
In the second safe simplifying transformation, a single message is split into two separate
messages. This is done to reduce the size of the message space, i.e. the number of diﬀer-
ent possible messages in the model. For every message in the model, there are x possible
diﬀerent combinations of atoms which could make up this message. If a message is com-
posed of a large number of atoms, there is a corresponding very large number of possible
atom combinations. Splitting the message into two separate smaller messages reduces the
number of possible combinations for each of the message halves. However, the resulting
drawback is that the state space size is increased, as the number of messages within the
model increases. For this reason, message splitting is only applied if a) the number of com-
binations signiﬁcantly decreases and b) the decrease is not overpowered by the inclusion
of the second message half and all its possible combinations. We illustrate the message
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splitting transformation using the same simple Casper protocol description used in the
previous section. Initially, the Casper description is as follows:
1. A->B: nA
2. B->A: nA, B, nB, nB1
3. A->B: B, nA1
However, by applying the message splitting transformation to step two of the protocol, the
protocol description is transformed to this:
1. A->B: nA
2. B->A: nA, B
2a. B->A: nB, nB1
3. A->B: B, nA1
thus decreasing the number of possible combinations within step two's message and sim-
plifying the state-space to be checked. Note that when applied, the resulting transformed
protocol contains all elements from the original protocol.
Similar to the coalescing transformation, performing the message splitting transforma-
tion on the protocol does not aﬀect its correctness. Both message splitting and message
redirection (discussed below) are examples of structural transformations - transformations
in which the structure of a message is altered but not the contents of the message itself.
The composition of any message being split within the protocol is unchanged. Therefore, if
a trace tr exists within the original traces model that violates any of the included security
speciﬁcations, there exists a corresponding trace tr′ in the transformed traces model that
also violates that speciﬁcation. If encryption was present in the original message, the same
level of encryption is employed on both message parts. However, unlike in the case of the
coalescing atoms transformation, the employment of message splitting within the protocol
does not require any of the security property checks to be altered. All atoms within the
split messages remain unchanged.
109
5.4.3 Message Redirection
The ﬁnal safe simpliﬁcation employed to reduce the protocol's complexity is message redi-
rection. This transformation replaces two messages with a single message, redirecting a
message which was originally sent via a third party so that it is sent direct. This removes a
third party from the proxy role, as well as decreasing the number of messages in the model's
state space. As no part of the message is renamed or amended by the simpliﬁction, the
signal events produced within the transformed protocol are unchanged from those of the
original. If a transformed model produces the same signal events as the original, it must
still be performing the same critical steps and therefore any possible attacks are preserved.
Consider the following simple Casper protocol description:
1. A->B: A
2. B->C: A
3. C->B: C, nC
4. B->A: C, nC
5. A->B: nA
6. B->C: nA
In this protocol, entity B acts as a proxy, forwarding messages between entities A and C.
This process increases the size of the model greatly. However, if the message redirection
transformation is applied, the model shrinks noticeably, eliminating half the protocol steps:
1. A->C: A
2. C->A: C, nC
3. A->C: nA
As with message splitting, the application of this transformation to the example protocol
does not impact the contents of the messages being transmitted. The only diﬀerence is
that the steps including B are removed. However, B can learn as much about the contents
of the messages as it could while it was involved in the protocol, as the same messages are
sent over the network.
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As mentioned in the previous section, message redirection is an example of a structural
transformation. The alterations are not done through renaming of atoms within a message
but through changing the structure of the message itself. Although this appears to alter
the model to no longer reﬂect the protocol being checked, any attacks or vulnerabilities
present on the protocol's original structure are preserved in a structural transformation as
no signal events are altered. If a trace tr exists in the original which violates any included
security speciﬁcation, there exists a corresponding trace tr' in the transformed model which
violates that same speciﬁcation. Therefore, an intruder can mount the same attack on the
transformed model as the original, as if he can obtain the contents of the original message,
he can also obtain the contents of the redirected message.
It is important to note that structural transformations reﬂect their original model only
if the signal events in the transformed model are in the same place as in the original model,
even if this is not the natural position for them in the transformed model. This ensures
that even in the transformed model, events aﬀecting the security properties being modelled
occur in an order reﬂecting that of the original model.
5.5 Modelling the SLVPGP in Casper
5.5.1 System Assumptions
When designing the Casper models that represent the SLVPGP in the model checking
process, a number of assumptions were made, based on both the original protocol and
its environment. In this section we clearly outline those assumptions, broken into four
categories. They are Encryption, Message Sending, Simpliﬁcations and the Intruder.
Encryption
As with other models of real world protocols, assumptions must be made regarding the
encryption methods employed. We employ the standard assumption regarding encryption,
in that all participants employ a universally known encryption/decryption algorithm. It
is also assumed that both the algorithm and the strength of the keys employed are of
suﬃcient strength that devices that do not possess the correct key cannot correctly encrypt
or decrypt a message. This means that if an entity within the model receives an encrypted
message and does not possess the correct decryption key, it cannot gain access to the
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message contents.
Message Sending
When modelling protocols employing message sending, the security of the medium over
which a message is sent must be considered. In this case, it is assumed that the transmission
medium is open, in that any message sent can be received by any entity within the system
and therefore is not secure without the use of reasonable encryption. It is also assumed
that once a message is transmitted, it cannot be prevented from reaching its destination,
i.e. message jamming, either selective or general, is not taken into consideration.
Simpliﬁcations
As discussed previously, the Casper-generated CSP models of the SLVPGP extensions
are highly vast and complex. As such they are beyond the limitations imposed by hardware
capability at this time. For that reason, the models have been simpliﬁed using the simpli-
ﬁcation approaches discussed in Section 5.4. We assume that the simpliﬁcations employed
are attack preserving, as shown in [49], and that the resulting simpliﬁed models remain
true to the original protocol design.
The Intruder
The modelling of the intruder is a key aspect of any formal veriﬁcation process. If the
intruder does not accurately reﬂect the threats posed by attackers in the real world, the
results of that veriﬁcation are nulliﬁed as they do not capture the reality of the system. As
discussed in Section 5.3.3, the Dolev-Yao intruder model [24] is employed in the SLVPGP
veriﬁcations. We assume that this model accurately represents the real-world malicious
device threats, with all the powers and abilities of the same.
5.5.2 Proof Provider Representation
Before outlining the Casper models of the SLVPGP extensions and the processes employed
in their simpliﬁcation, we ﬁrst discuss the representation of Proof Providers within them.
Within the various models discussed in Sections 5.5.3, 5.5.4 and 5.5.5, the role of the
Proof Provider is represented using only two processes. This limitation essentially reduces
the number of Proof Providers participating in a claim to only two per Claimant. While
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including a larger number of Proof Providers in the Casper model would more accurately
represent the real world situation that will be faced, this is not currently feasible. The
size and complexity of a model employing only two Proof Providers is too unwieldly for
immediate model checking, and requires the use of simpliﬁcation techniques before it can be
successfully checked. Increasing the number of Proof Providers represented would explode
the CSP model's size beyond the limits of the equipment available at the time of writing.
Therefore, the models described in this chapter model only a limited version of the system
and do not rule out the possibility of collusion attack where more than two Proof Providers
are used. Though the fact that the model checks discussed in Section 5.6 succeed provides
a positive indication that the system will remain secure with the addition of more Proof
Providers to the model, it has not yet been proven.
5.5.3 Formally Modelling Extension One
In this section, we outline the process of translating the ﬁrst extension to the SLVPGP
from security notation to a model for use by FDR. This process is accomplished in two
stages: The original design of the protocol is ﬁrst translated into Casper from abstract
protocol notation, with the extension's desired security property modelled as two Casper
authentication speciﬁcations (Section 5.5.3.1). It is then simpliﬁed to reduce its complexity
(Section 5.5.3.2).
5.5.3.1 Modelling Extension One - From Abstract Notation to Casper
Before applying the safe simpliﬁcations outlined in Section 5.4, we ﬁrst translate extension
one's abstract protocol description into Casper. This process requires not only information
regarding the protocol's steps but also details of the environment in which it will run and
the knowledge granted to the various participants. The full Casper script is included in
Appendix A, with the translated protocol description shown below.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}
2. V -> C: {P, Pb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
3. C -> P: {P, C, {nP, n1P}{PKProver(P)}}{SKAgent(C)}
4. C -> Pb: {Pb, C, {nPb, n1Pb}{PKProver(Pb)}}{SKAgent(C)}
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5. P -> C: kP, hP, n2P
6. Pb -> C: kPb, hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> P: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
8. C -> Pb: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)}
9. P -> C: {P, tP, xP, lP, C}{SKProver(P)} % mP
10. Pb -> C: {Pb, tPb, xPb, lPb, C}{SKProver(Pb)} % mPb
11. C -> V: {C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}, {mP % {P, tP, xP, lP, C}{SKProver(P)},
mPb % {Pb, tPb, xPb, lPb, C}{SKProver(Pb)}}{SKAgent(C)}
12. V -> C: {dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
The role of the Proof Provider has been represented using two processes (P and Pb),
behaving identically, in order to model the inclusion of multiple Proof Providers in a single
exchange (Section 5.5.2). The role of the Claimant is represented by the process C, with the
process V representing the Veriﬁer. Encryption of a message using public key cryptography
is done using a particular function to retrieve the key to be employed. The function is
supplied with a particular identity and returns that process's key. The encryption function
is paired with a second function, which provides the inverse, i.e. signing, key. There
is a function pair for each process type, as each requires a diﬀerent identity parameter.
The encryption functions are noted PKAgent() (resp. SKAgent() to retrieve the signature
key), PKProver() (resp. SKProver()) and PKVeriﬁer() (resp. SKVeriﬁer()), where Agent,
Prover and Veriﬁer are the process types of the key owners. Finally, the % notation
allows participants to accept a message without having knowledge of its composition, thus
allowing the forwarding of an encrypted message without possession of the appropriate key
to decrypt or recreate it. The intruder process is given the ability to participate within
the system as any of these process types, thus allowing it to behave as any of the above
processes.
In order to verify the security properties believed to be upheld by the protocol, out-
lined in Section 4.4.1 of Chapter 4, a set of Casper security speciﬁcations are employed.
These speciﬁcations provide FDR with a set of conditions which must remain true for
every possible state in the generated state space, i.e. the model being checked must be
a reﬁnement of these speciﬁcations. If this is not the case, the check fails and the model
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is deemed ﬂawed. Details regarding Casper's interpretation of the speciﬁcations employed
are outlined in Section 5.3.2.
The aim of the ﬁrst SLVPGP extension is to provide authentication between users, i.e.
that a value given by a device cannot be manipulated between its initial transmission and
its arrival at its ﬁnal destination. This is modelled in Casper as a set of agreements; those
between the Veriﬁer and each Proof Provider regarding the value of their proof atom and
a single agreement between the Claimant and the Veriﬁer regarding the value of its ﬁnal
verdict. These agreements conﬁrm that the value transmitted during an exchange cannot
change between its transmission from the source device (either a Proof Provider or the
Veriﬁer) and its receipt by the destination device (either the Veriﬁer or the Claimant). If
the value could be undetectably tampered with between its initial sending and ﬁnal receipt,
this speciﬁcation will not receive a pass in a model check.
• Agreement(P, V, [xP])
• Agreement(P, V, [lP])
• Agreement(Pb, V, [xPb])
• Agreement(P, V, [lPb])
• Agreement(V, C, [dV])
More general authentication is provided by the use of digital signatures on messages being
exchanged between participants. The presence of a digital signature on a message prevents
any intruder from successfully replacing it with a false message or tampering with its con-
tents, without the appropriate key. Authentication is implicitly modelled in this manner,
rather than explicitly as a Casper speciﬁcation. We assume that the cryptographic scheme
and key sizes being employed are of reasonable strength, and therefore a key cannot be
discovered without the aid of that key's owner. As one of the basic assumptions of this
work is the use of tamper-resistant units for the protection of cryptographic material, the
owner of a key is prevented from directly divulging his keys to other participants. The use
of alternative approaches by the key's owner, e.g. chosen plaintext analysis, may lead to
the breaking of its keys, but this is a common issue in the area of cryptography.
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5.5.3.2 Simplifying the SLVPGP's First Extension
With the protocol translated from abstract protocol notation into Casper, the complexity
of the model may now be reduced using some basic simpliﬁcations. These simpliﬁcations
merely remove some of the more complex aspects which have no bearing on the security
properties being checked. Each of the simpliﬁcations carried out are outlined below, with
the resulting alterations illustrated by updated Casper model descriptions.
The coalescing transformation
The ﬁrst simpliﬁcation applied to extension one of the SLVPGP is the coalescing of
atoms into a single atom. In this case, three transformations are performed - the location
variable xP (resp. xPb) and the latency variable lP (resp. lPb) are combined into a single
proof value, proof (resp. proofB). The nonces nP (resp. nPb) and n1P (resp. n1Pb) are
combined into nP. Finally, the values kP (resp. kPb) and hP (resp. hPb) are combined
into hP. This reduces the complexity of the protocol steps through decreasing the number
of variables, while retaining the correctness of the model.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}
2. V -> C: {P, Pb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
3. C -> P: {P, C, {nP}{PKProver(P)}}{SKAgent(C)}
4. C -> Pb: {Pb, C, {nPb}{PKProver(Pb)}}{SKAgent(C)}
5. P -> C: hP, n2P
6. Pb -> C: hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> P: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
8. C -> Pb: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)}
9. P -> C: {P, tP, proof, C}{SKProver(P)} % mP
10. Pb -> C: {Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)} % mPb
11. C -> V: {C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}, {mP % {P, tP, proof, C}{SKProver(P)},
mPb % {Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)}}{SKAgent(C)}
12. V -> C: {dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
116
Unlike the transformation outlined by Ryan and Schneider, when transforming the location
and latency atoms, the pair is not replaced with the ﬁrst atom within the pair. Instead, it
is replaced with a single combination atom. This combination atom is merely a renaming
of the atom employed in Ryan and Schneider's simpliﬁcation and is used for clarity. The
security of the transformation holds as it meets the condition that the removed atom can
be deduced based upon the replacement and the intruder's initial knowledge. The security
speciﬁcations are altered to use the combination atom as a representation of the pair. If
the intruder discovers the value of proof (resp. proofB), it has knowledge of both elements
within that pair. This statement is also true for the coalesced nonce pairs, which follow
the method outlined by Ryan and Schneider and are replaced with an element of the pair.
Message splitting
Although extension one's design has been greatly simpliﬁed, the ﬁnal step remains an
issue. Due to the Claimant forwarding on complete messages from its Proof Providers,
the number of possible variable combinations causes the model to retain an unacceptable
level of complexity. Therefore, message splitting is employed in an eﬀort to reduce the
complexity of the step.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}
2. V -> C: {P, Pb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
3. C -> P: {P, C, {nP}{PKProver(P)}}{SKAgent(C)}
4. C -> Pb: {Pb, C, {nPb}{PKProver(Pb)}}{SKAgent(C)}
5. P -> C: hP, n2P
6. Pb -> C: hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> P: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
8. C -> Pb: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)}
9. P -> C: {P, tP, proof, C}{SKProver(P)} % mP
10. Pb -> C: {Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)} % mPb
11. C -> V: {C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}
11(a). C -> V: {mP % {P, tP, proof, C}{SKProver(P)}}{SKAgent(C)}
11(b). C -> V: {mPb % {Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)}}{SKAgent(C)}
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12. V -> C: {dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
Rather than the Claimant transmitting all proof messages received by its Proof Providers
in a single message, the design is restructured to allow each message to be forwarded
individually. Although this increases the total number of messages produced within the
model, the combined complexity of each individual message is vastly less than that of a
single message composed of the concatenation of all proofs.
5.5.4 Formally Modelling Extension Two
In this section, we outline the process of translating the second extension to the SLVPGP
from security notation to a model for use by FDR. This process is accomplished in two
stages: The original design of the protocol is ﬁrst translated from abstract protocol notation
into Casper, with the extension's desired security properties modelled as Casper security
speciﬁcations (Section 5.5.4.1). The Casper translation is then simpliﬁed to reduce its
complexity (Section 5.5.4.2).
5.5.4.1 Modelling Extension Two - From Abstract Notation to Casper
As with the conversion of extension one from abstract protocol notation to a format suitable
for model checking, the protocol description is translated into Casper prior to simpliﬁcation.
The Casper description of the second extension is more complex than that of the ﬁrst
extension, due to the inclusion of encryption in this version. The full Casper model of this
extension is shown in Appendix A, with the protocol description shown below.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
2. V -> C: {{P, Pb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. C -> P: {{P, C, nP, n1P}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKProver(P)}
4. C -> Pb: {{Pb, C, nPb, n1Pb}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKProver(Pb)}
5. P -> C: kP, hP, n2P
6. Pb -> C: kPb, hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> P: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
8. C -> Pb: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)}
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9. P -> C: {{P, tP, xP, lP, C}{SKProver(P)} % mP}{PKAgent(C)}
10. Pb -> C: {{Pb, tPb, xPb, lPb, C}{SKProver(Pb)} % mPb}{PKAgent(C)}
11. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}, {{mP % {P, tP, xP, lP, C}
{SKProver(P)}, mPb % {Pb, tPb, xPb, lPb, C}{SKProver(Pb)}}
{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
12. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
Due to the increased number of security properties claimed by this extension, outlined
in Section 4.4.2 of Chapter 4, the number of included speciﬁcations increases from those
employed in extension one's script. A second security speciﬁcation type is employed -
StrongSecret - which allows Casper to verify the support for anonymity and conﬁdentiality
within the protocol. The failure of this security speciﬁcation indicates that the supposedly
secured value is leaked to the intruder at some point during a protocol run. We employ
the StrongSecret speciﬁcation rather than the Secret speciﬁcation as the level of security
being tested by the condition is much higher. If an intruder learns a value prior to the end
of the protocol's run and interrupts the run, the ﬂaw will be detected. This is particularly
useful in the case of the properties modelled here as the values being protected are not
only generated for use in a speciﬁc run and then discarded, but are pieces of long term
information regarding the protocol's participants. Details regarding Casper's interpretation
of the speciﬁcations employed in this model are outlined in Section 5.3.2.
The aim of the second extension to the protocol is to provide authentication, external
anonymity and external conﬁdentiality to the participants within the exchange being pro-
tected. These conditions build upon the authentication provided within the ﬁrst protocol
extension.
• Agreement(P, V, [proof])
• Agreement(Pb, V, [proofB])
• Agreement(V, C, [dV])
External anonymity is deﬁned as a guarantee that the identities of all devices participating
in the exchange are unknown to any external entities, i.e. those not participating in the
exchange. This condition is modelled through specifying that these identities are secrets
known only to devices participating in the exchange.
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However, upon modelling these conditions, it was found that this is too general a
guarantee. Although both the Claimant and the Veriﬁer have knowledge of the identities
of all devices participating in the exchange, the Proof Providers involved have no knowledge
of any identities other than those of the Claimant and Veriﬁer. Therefore the conditions
modelled are as follows:
• StrongSecret(C, C, [V, P, Pb])
• StrongSecret(P, P, [V, C])
• StrongSecret(Pb, Pb, [V, C])
External conﬁdentiality is deﬁned as a guarantee that the location information regard-
ing a device must remain secret from any devices external to the exchange. Similar to
the modelling of external anonymity, this condition is modelled in Casper as a secret in
which the location information is known only to the listed device within the exchange. As
discovered with modelling external anonymity, this is too general a guarantee. The use
of encryption on protocol messages prevents any devices other than those to whom the
message is encrypted for from learning the contents. Therefore, the Claimant and Veriﬁer
know all location information passed within the system. However, the Proof Providers
involved have knowledge only of their own location information and not those of any other
Proof Providers involved. This is modelled as follows:
• StrongSecret(C, xC, [V])
• StrongSecret(P, proof, [V, C])
• StrongSecret(Pb, proofB, [V, C])
5.5.4.2 Simplifying the SLVPGP's Second Extension
In order to reduce the complexity of the second extension's model and therefore decrease the
size of the resulting state space, two basic simpliﬁcations are applied. These simpliﬁcations
do not infringe on the completeness of the protocol. They merely remove some of the more
complex aspects which have no bearing on the security properties being checked. The
simpliﬁcations carried out on this extension are outlined below, with alterations to the
protocol illustrated by updated Casper descriptions.
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The coalescing transformation
The ﬁrst simpliﬁcation applied to extension two of the SLVPGP is the coalescing of
atoms into a single atom. Three transformations are performed: The location variable xP
(resp. xPb) and the latency variable lP (resp. lPb) are combined into a single proof value,
proof (resp. proofB). The nonces nP (resp. nPb) and n1P (resp. n1Pb) are combined into
nP. Finally, the values kP (resp. kPb) and hP (resp. hPb) are combined into hP.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
2. V -> C: {{P, Pb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. C -> P: {{P, C, nP}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKProver(P)}
4. C -> Pb: {{Pb, C, nPb}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKProver(Pb)}
5. P -> C: hP, n2P
6. Pb -> C: hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> P: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
8. C -> Pb: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)}
9. P -> C: {{P, tP, proof , C}{SKProver(P)} % mP}{PKAgent(C)}
10. Pb -> C: {{Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)} % mPb}{PKAgent(C)}
11. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}, {{mP % {P, tP, proof, C}
{SKProver(P)}, mPb % {Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)}}
{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
12. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
Message splitting
With the application of the coalescing transformation, the complexity of extension two's
design is slightly reduced. However, as discussed previously in relation to extension one,
the complexity of the Claimant's message forwarding the gathered proofs to the Veriﬁer
is a crucial issue. In order to address this issue, we employ a structural transformation to
the problematic step, dissecting it into multiple individual messages and sending these in
place of a single concatenated message.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
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2. V -> C: {{P, Pb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. C -> P: {{P, C, nP}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKProver(P)}
4. C -> Pb: {{Pb, C, nPb}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKProver(Pb)}
5. P -> C: hP, n2P
6. Pb -> C: hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> P: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
8. C -> Pb: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)}
9. P -> C: {{P, tP, proof, C}{SKProver(P)} % mP}{PKAgent(C)}
10. Pb -> C: {{Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)} % mPb}{PKAgent(C)}
11. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
11(a). C -> V: {{mP % {P, tP, proof, C}{SKProver(P)}}{SKAgent(C)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
11(b). C -> V: {{mPb % {Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)}}{SKAgent(C)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
12. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
As in the case of extension one, the Claimant sends a message containing its own in-
formation before proceeding to send each of the proof messages gathered to the Veriﬁer
seperately. Although this message splitting does alter the structure of the protocol, it does
not alter its functionality. As the order of the messages being sent is preserved, the signals
generated by the model remain in their original order and no values within the messages
are altered in any way. Therefore, the traces produced remain faithful to those of the
original model and the simpliﬁcation does not remove any possible attacks.
5.5.5 Formally Modelling Extension Three
In this section, we outline the process of translating the third extension to the SLVPGP
from security notation to a model for use by FDR. This process is accomplished in two
stages; the original design of the protocol is ﬁrst translated from abstract protocol notation
into Casper, with the extension's desired security properties modelled as Casper security
speciﬁcations (Section 5.5.5.1). It is then simpliﬁed to reduce its complexity (Section
5.5.5.2). However, where the earlier protocol extensions could be directly translated into
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Casper, the third extension to the protocol requires an additional alteration, due to its
reliance on broadcasting to support anonymity.
5.5.5.1 Modelling Extension Three - From Abstract Notation to Casper
As with the conversion of the previous extensions, the protocol description is translated
into Casper prior to simpliﬁcation. The Casper description of the third extension is the
most complex of the three, due to the inability of the participants to see the contents of the
encrypted messages they receive. This inability is a by-product of retaining anonymity and
conﬁdentiality, as encryption is heavily employed to protect the private data of all devices
involved. In this section, we model the third extension in Casper and detail the security
speciﬁcations included in this description, used to model the extension's claimed security
properties. We then discuss the need for an additional adaptation to the protocol's design
in order to create a fully functional Casper model - the addition of an Oracle.
Modelling extension three in Casper
The full Casper model of this extension is shown in Appendix A, with the protocol
description shown below.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
2. V -> C: {{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)} % mP,
{{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)} % mPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)},
{{nP, n1P, kCP, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. C -> P: mP % {{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)},
{C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP
4. C -> Pb: mPb % {{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)},
{C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb
5. P -> C: kP, hP, n2P
6. Pb -> C: kPb, hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> P: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN
8. C -> Pb: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN
9. P -> C: h(kCP), {nP, {{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1), tP, xP, lP,
mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPV}{kCP}
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10. Pb -> C: h(kCPb), {nPb, {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1), tPb, xPb,
lPb, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}{SKProver(Pb)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPbV}{kCPb}
11. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}, {mPV % ({{P, mCPN1 % {n2P}
{SKAgent(C)}, tP, xP, lP, mCP1 % {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)}), mPbV %, ({{Pb, mCPbN1 % {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}, tPb, xPb, lPb,
mCPb1 % {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}}{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)})}{SKAgent(C)}
12. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
However, while the previous extensions to the protocol could be directly translated fol-
lowing the simpliﬁcation process, the increased level of anonymity provided by the third
extension requires that the design undergo a special adaptation prior to its translation into
Casper notation. This is due to Casper's requirement that a device know the identity of
any message's recipient. Therefore, the Casper description shown above will not function.
In order to address this issue, we must include an additional device to model the underly-
ing network over which the system communicates. The addition of this Oracle process is
discussed in the next section.
Addressing the issue of broadcasting - the introduction of an Oracle
In practice, the Claimant is capable of broadcasting messages to the area surrounding it,
removing the need for knowledge of the identities of the devices receiving them. However,
this functionality is not modelled directly in Casper. An agent must have knowledge of the
identity of its intended message recipient in order to communicate with them. In order to
address this issue, a new device is added to the exchange, which models an Oracle or all-
knowing entity. This Oracle process receives the message to be sent to be speciﬁc devices
in the area and has knowledge of the identities of these devices.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
2. V -> C: {{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)} % mP, {{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}
{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)} % mPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}, {{nP, n1P, kCP, nPb, n1Pb,
kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. C -> O: mP % ({{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)} % mP1),
{C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP
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3(a). O -> P: mP1 % {{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)},
mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)
4. C -> O: mPb % ({Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)} % mPb1),
{C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb
4(a). O -> Pb: mPb1 % {{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)},
mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)
5. P -> O: kP, hP, n2P
5(a). O -> C: kP, hP, n2P
6. Pb -> O: kPb, hPb, n2Pb
6(a). O -> C: kPb, hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> O: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN
7(a). O -> P: h1P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1)
8. C -> O: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN
8(a). O -> Pb: h1Pb, mCPbN % ({n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1)
9 P -> O: h(kCP) % mCPh, {nP, {{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1), tP,
xP, lP, mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPV}{kCP} % mCPk
9(a). O -> C: mCPh % h(kCP), mCPk % {nP, mPV % ({{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
% mCPN1), tP, xP, lP, mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPV1)}{kCP}
10. Pb -> O: h(kCPb) % mCPbh, {nPb, {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1),
tPb, xPb, lPb, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}{SKProver(Pb)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPbV}{kCPb} % mCPbk
10(a). O -> C: mCPbh % h(kCP), mCPbk % {nPb, mPbV % {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}
{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1), tPb, xPb, lPb, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}
{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPbV1}{kCPb}
11. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}, {mPV1 % ({{P, mCPN1 %
{n2P}{SKAgent(C)}, tP, xP, lP, mCP1 % {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)}), mPbV1 % ({{Pb, mCPbN1 % {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}, tPb, xPb,
lPb, mCPb1 % {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}}{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)})}{SKAgent(C)}
12. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
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However, although a new process has been introduced to the model, the underlying system
being modelled remains the same. The Oracle process is an artefact of employing the
Casper language, but does not impact the security of the system being modelled. This is
because the Oracle process does not alter or create messages within the system, but merely
acts as a forwarder. In essence, the Oracle process represents the real world technology to
which a device sends its message for broadcasting. It receives a message and transmits it
to a ﬁnal destination, without performing any action upon the message.
In the Casper model of this extension, the Oracle receives a message from one device
and transmits the message to the correct recipient. Whilst this does increase the com-
plexity of the model to be checked, due to the creation of a new agent and the addition
of another process, it allows the condition of anonymity to be met. Additionally, as no
alteration is performed to the message, no extra security is added to the content and no
new information is made available to the intruder or any other device, the model's integrity
remains intact. Therefore, as with extensions one and two, the veriﬁcation results for this
model are representative of the underlying protocol extension upon which it is based.
Modelling the security speciﬁcations for extension three
The aim of the ﬁnal SLVPGP extension is to extend the security properties of conﬁden-
tiality and anonymity to a complete level, while retaining the property of authentication.
The security properties of extension three are discussed in Section 4.4.3 of Chapter 4, with
details regarding Casper's interpretation of the speciﬁcations employed in this model out-
lined in Section 5.3.2. As in the ﬁrst extension of the protocol, authentication of proof
content is achieved through the need for the Veriﬁer and each Proof Provider to agree
on the values for the corresponding proof, while authentication of the Veriﬁer's verdict is
conﬁrmed through a similar agreement between the Veriﬁer and the Claimant.
• Agreement(P, V, [proof])
• Agreement(Pb, V, [proofB])
• Agreement(V, C, [dV])
The third extension introduces another process into the protocol, the Oracle, in order to
model the functionality of broadcasting a message to an unknown recipient. This allows
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devices to pass messages without knowing the intended recipient's identity, thus preserving
anonymity. While the previous extension provided external anonymity, this ﬁnal extension
provides an even greater level of security. The level of anonymity provided is now complete,
rather than external. The StrongSecret speciﬁcation is again employed to model this
condition. However, this time the only devices with knowledge regarding the data being
kept secret are the Oracle, the Veriﬁer and the device to which the data pertains. This
diﬀers from the anonymity speciﬁcations employed in extension two of the protocol, where
the Claimant also had knowledge of the identities of all devices involved.
• StrongSecret(C, C, [O, V])
• StrongSecret(P, P, [O, V])
• StrongSecret(Pb, Pb, [O, V])
Similar to the increase in security regarding anonymity, the third SLVPGP extension in-
creases the security property regarding location information from external conﬁdentiality
to complete conﬁdentiality. This is also modelled using the StrongSecret speciﬁcation.
• StrongSecret(C, xC, [V])
• StrongSecret(P, proof, [V])
• StrongSecret(Pb, proofB, [V])
In this case, the only devices allowed to be in possession of information regarding location
are the Veriﬁer (the all-knowing entity within the system) and the device to whom the
location information pertains.
5.5.5.2 Simplifying the SLVPGP's Third Extension
The SLVPGP is at its most complex after the application of the third security extension,
particularly with the inclusion of an Oracle to facilitate the modelling of broadcasting. The
model representing this version of the protocol generates an extensive state space to be
checked by FDR. In order to reduce this state space to a more manageable size, a number
of simpliﬁcations are applied. As with those mentioned previously, these simpliﬁcations
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do not infringe on the correctness of the protocol. We outline below each of the simpli-
ﬁcations carried out on the protocol, illustrating the alterations to the protocol with the
corresponding Casper descriptions.
The coalescing transformation
The ﬁrst simpliﬁcation applied to ﬁnal extension of the SLVPGP is the coalescing of
atoms into a single atom. The location variable xP (resp. xPb) and the latency variable lP
(resp. lPb) are combined into a single proof value, proof (resp. proofB). Finally, the values
kP (resp. kPb) and hP (resp. hPb) are combined into hP. Notably, we do not combine
the nonces nP (resp. nPb) and n1P (resp. n1Pb) into nP, as nP (resp. nPb) also appears
alone within the protocol.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
2. V -> C: {{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)} % mP,
{{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)} % mPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)},
{{nP, n1P, kCP, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. C -> O: mP % ({{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)} % mP1),
{C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP
3a. O -> P: mP1 % {{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)},
mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)
4. C -> Pb: mPb % ({Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)} % mPb1),
{C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb
4a. O -> Pb: mPb1 % {{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)},
mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)
5. P -> O: hP, n2P
5a. O -> C: hP, n2P
6. Pb -> O: hPb, n2Pb
6a. O -> C: hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> O: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN
7a. O -> P: h1P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1)
8. C -> O: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN
8a. O -> Pb: h1Pb, mCPbN % ({n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1)
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9. P -> O: h(kCP) % mCPh, {nP, {{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1), tP, proof ,
mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPV}
{kCP} % mCPk
9a. O -> C: mCPh % h(kCP), mCPk % {nP, mPV % ({{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
% mCPN1), tP, proof , mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPV1)}{kCP}
10. Pb -> O: h(kCPb) % mCPbh, {nPb, {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1),
tPb, proofB, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}{SKProver(Pb)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPbV}{kCPb} % mCPbk
10a. O -> C: mCPbh % h(kCP), mCPbk % {nPb, mPbV % {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}
{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1), tPb, proofB, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}
{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPbV1}{kCPb}
11. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}, {mPV1 % ({{P, mCPN1 %
{n2P}{SKAgent(C)}, tP, proof , mCP1 % {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)}), mPbV1 % ({{Pb, mCPbN1 % {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}, tPb,
proofB, mCPb1 %{C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}}{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)})}{SKAgent(C)}
12. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
Message splitting (A)
In order to facilitate the employment of the redirection transformation on the structure
of the modelled protocol, the messages being redirected must ﬁrst be broken into their
individual components. These include the initialisation messages sent to the Claimant for
the Proof Providers and the additional information sent by the Claimant to each Proof
Provider when forwarding these messages.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
2. V -> C: {{nP, n1P, kCP, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. V -> C: {{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)} % mP}
{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
4. V -> C: {{{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)}
% mPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
5. C -> O: mP % ({{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)} % mP1),
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5a. O -> P: mP1 % {{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)}
6. C -> O: {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP
6a. O -> P: mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)
7. C -> Pb: mPb % ({Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)} % mPb1)
7a. O -> Pb: mPb1 % {{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)}
8. C -> O: {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb
8a. O -> Pb: mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)
9. P -> O: hP, n2P
9a. O -> C: hP, n2P
10. Pb -> O: hPb, n2Pb
10a. O -> C: hPb, n2Pb
11. C -> O: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN
11a. O -> P: h1P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1)
12. C -> O: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN
12a. O -> Pb: h1Pb, mCPbN % ({n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1)
13. P -> O: h(kCP) % mCPh, {nP, {{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1), tP, proof,
mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPV}
{kCP} % mCPk
13a. O -> C: mCPh % h(kCP), mCPk % {nP, mPV % ({{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
% mCPN1), tP, proof, mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPV1)}{kCP}
14. Pb -> O: h(kCPb) % mCPbh, {nPb, {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1),
tPb, proofB, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}{SKProver(Pb)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPbV}{kCPb} % mCPbk
14a. O -> C: mCPbh % h(kCP), mCPbk % {nPb, mPbV % {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}
{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1), tPb, proofB, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}
{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPbV1}{kCPb}
15. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}, {mPV1 % ({{P, mCPN1 %
{n2P}{SKAgent(C)}, tP, proof, mCP1 % {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)}), mPbV1 % ({{Pb, mCPbN1 % {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}, tPb,
proofB, mCPb1 %{C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}}{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)})}{SKAgent(C)}
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16. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
Message splitting in this manner clearly distinguishes the diﬀerent message components
and their end destinations, allowing for an easier understanding of the process behind the
protocol's simpliﬁcation. As with all other message splitting transformations described
within this work, the order of the messages is preserved and the values within the messages
are not altered. This ensures the traces of the transformed protocol remain faithful to the
protocol's original model and any possible attacks on said model are also applicable to the
transformed version.
Redirection of the Proof Provider identity messages
The next simpliﬁcation applied is the redirection of the proof messages from the Proof
Providers. In the original design, the initialisation message for each Proof Provider is
conveyed to that Proof Provider via the Claimant. This is seen more clearly after the
application of message splitting, shown above. The Claimant acts as a transparent relay,
passing on the message without altering it in any way. It does not provide any additional
security, nor does its removal impact the security being checked. For this reason, employing
a redirection simpliﬁcation does not alter the security of the protocol, but merely reduces
the model's complexity. In addition to this, message redirection is an attack-preserving
simpliﬁcation, as outlined in Section 5.4.3.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
2. V -> C: {{nP, n1P, kCP, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. V -> P: {{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)}}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
4. V -> Pb: {{{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)}}
{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
5. C -> O: {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP
5a. O -> P: mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)
6. C -> Pb: {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb
6a. O -> Pb: mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)
7. P -> O: hP, n2P
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7a. O -> C: hP, n2P
8. Pb -> O: hPb, n2Pb
8a. O -> C: hPb, n2Pb
9. C -> O: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN
9a. O -> P: h1P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1)
10. C -> O: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN
10a. O -> Pb: h1Pb, mCPbN % ({n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1)
11. P -> O: h(kCP) % mCPh, {nP, {{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1), tP, proof,
mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
% mPV}{kCP} % mCPk
11a. O -> C: mCPh % h(kCP), mCPk % {nP, mPV % ({{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
% mCPN1), tP, proof, mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPV1)}{kCP}
12. Pb -> O: h(kCPb) % mCPbh, {nPb, {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1),
tPb,
proofB, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
% mPbV}{kCPb} % mCPbk
12a. O -> C: mCPbh % h(kCP), mCPbk % {nPb, mPbV % {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}
{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1), tPb, proofB, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}
{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPbV1}{kCPb}
13. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}, {mPV1 % ({{P, mCPN1 % {n2P}
{SKAgent(C)},tP, proof, mCP1 % {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}{SKProver(P)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}),
mPbV1 % ({{Pb, mCPbN1 % {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}, tPb,
proofB, mCPb1 % {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}}{SKProver(Pb)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)})}{SKAgent(C)}
14. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
The signals produced by the transformed model shown above remain in the same order as
those produced by the original model's design The values contained within the messages
are committed to at the same point during the exchange, therefore the transformed model
meets the requirements for a valid redirection transformation as deﬁned by Ryan and
Schneider. Any attacks present on the original design will be preserved in the transformed
model and the results of any speciﬁcation check completed on the transformed model can
be projected onto the original.
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Message splitting (B)
Although the application of the above simpliﬁcations does greatly reduce the complexity
of the protocol to be modelled, the message in which the Claimant's gathered proofs are
forwarded to the Veriﬁer remains an issue. In order to address the level of complexity within
this message, we again employ the message splitting transformation. In this instance, the
the Claimant's proof forwarding message is dissected into several individual messages and
these are sent in place of a single concatenated message.
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
2. V -> C: {{nP, n1P, kCP, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. V -> P: {{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(P)}}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
4. V -> Pb: {{{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)}}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}
5. C -> O: {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP
5a. O -> P: mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)
6. C -> Pb: {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb
6a. O -> Pb: mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)
7. P -> O: hP, n2P
7a. O -> C: hP, n2P
8. Pb -> O: hPb, n2Pb
8a. O -> C: hPb, n2Pb
9. C -> O: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN
9a. O -> P: h1P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1)
10. C -> O: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN
10a. O -> Pb: h1Pb, mCPbN % ({n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1)
11. P -> O: h(kCP) % mCPh, {nP, {{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1), tP,
proof, mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
% mPV}{kCP} % mCPk
11a. O -> C: mCPh % h(kCP), mCPk % {nP, mPV % ({{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
% mCPN1), tP, proof, mCP % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPV1)}{kCP}
12. Pb -> O: h(kCPb) % mCPbh, {nPb, {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1),
tPb, proofB, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
% mPbV}{kCPb} % mCPbk
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12a. O -> C: mCPbh % h(kCP), mCPbk % {nPb, mPbV % {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2P}
{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1), tPb, proofB, mCPb % ({C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mCPb1)}
{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)} % mPbV1}{kCPb}
13. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}
13a. C -> V: {mPV1 % ({{P, mCPN1 % {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}, tP, proof,
mCP1 % {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)})}{SKAgent(C)}
13b. C -> V: {mPbV1 % ({{Pb, mCPbN1 % {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}, tPb, proofB,
mCPb1 % {C}{PKVeriﬁer(V)}}{SKProver(Pb)}}
{PKVeriﬁer(V)})}{SKAgent(C)}
14. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVeriﬁer(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
This transformation could be taken a step further by also splitting out the Claimant's
encrypted identity, contained within each proof. However, it was discovered that rather
than simplifying the design, employing this level of splitting increases the protocol's com-
plexity, resulting in an overly complex design and a state space explosion. This is because
the complexity cost in creating an extra message with that level of encryption and digital
signing is far greater than including it within the original message. Upon removing this
additional split in the message, the generated state space becomes tractable and the model
check can be completed.
5.6 Results of Model Checking
After the protocol designs have been simpliﬁed to a reduced level of complexity and trans-
lated into Casper notation, the resulting descriptions are compiled and CSP scripts de-
scribing each design are generated. These CSP scripts can then be fed to the FDR model
checker and their security speciﬁcations validated or failed. We have also created seven
alternate models for each extension which, in addition to the knowledge already possessed,
grant the intruder knowledge of at least one participating device's private cryptographic
key. These models allow us to investigate the impact of the compromising of keys on the
protocol's security. The models created include: Known C, where the Claimant's keys are
compromised; Known P/Pb, where a Proof Provider's keys are compromised; Known
CP/CPB/CPPB, where both the Claimant's keys and either one or both of the Proof
Providers keys are compromised; and ﬁnally Known PPb, where the keys of all Proof
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Known Agreement(Proof) Agreement(ProofB) Agreement(DV )
None
√ √ √
C
√ √ √
CP Fail
√ √
CPb
√
Fail
√
CPPb Fail Fail
√
P Fail
√ √
Pb
√
Fail
√
PPb Fail Fail
√
Table 5.1: Veriﬁcation Results for Extension One of the SLVPGP
Providers involved are compromised. While we do not envision that these cryptographic
keys can be compromised in this manner, due to the system's requirement that all keys be
stored within a tamper-resistant unit, we wished to investigate the impact of such an event
occurring on the security of the system. We do not model a scenario where the Veriﬁer's
keys are compromised, as the Veriﬁer is a trusted device, and should that set of keys be
compromised, the system would cease to be viable.
It should be stated that each of the uncompromised extension models received success-
ful verdicts, indicating that the protocols do not contain security vulnerabilities in their
described environments. The only model checking failures were those models in which keys
were compromised, with not all of these failing and no check failing on all speciﬁcations.
5.6.1 Results for Extension One
As mentioned previously, the SLVPGP's ﬁrst extension is the least secure, providing
only the minimum security: a single security property (authentication), which is split into
three security speciﬁcations; one investigating the security of the Veriﬁer's verdict and
one for each Proof Provider modelled. These Agreement speciﬁcations check that the
transmitted value of proof, proofB and DV cannot be manipulated during the course of the
protocol exchange. As shown in Table 5.1, the veriﬁcation results received on the verdict
speciﬁcation is successful for all compromised keys. This is due to the value being digitally
signed using the Veriﬁer's private key, a key unknown to all devices other than the Veriﬁer.
As discussed previously, we do not model the compromising of the Veriﬁer's keys, as the
Veriﬁer is a trusted entity.
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Known A(proof) A(proofB) A(DV ) SS(C) SS(P) SS(Pb) SS(XC) SS(proof) SS(proofB)
None
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
C
√ √ √
Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail
CP Fail
√ √
Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail
CPb
√
Fail
√
Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail
CPPb Fail Fail
√
Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail
P
√ √ √
Fail Fail
√ √ √ √
Pb
√ √ √
Fail
√
Fail
√ √ √
PPb
√ √ √
Fail Fail Fail
√ √ √
Table 5.2: Veriﬁcation Results for Extension Two of the SLVPGP
The veriﬁcation results received on both Proof Provider speciﬁcations by the uncom-
promised and Known C models are successful. This indicates that the compromising of a
Claimant's keys does not impact the extension's support of the authentication property.
These results are expected, as within this extension, the Claimant is not involved in pro-
tecting the proofs gathered. However, the results received by the remaining six models
reﬂect an obvious insecurity within the extension. These results illustrate that any com-
promise of a Proof Provider's key leads to that Proof Provider's proof being left vulnerable
to tampering. This is because the only protection applied to this value is the digital sig-
nature of the Proof Provider. This vulnerability is addressed in extensions two and three
through the inclusion of encryption.
5.6.2 Results for Extension Two
Building on the ﬁrst extension's security property of authentication, extension two increases
the number of security properties supported to include anonymity and conﬁdentiality of
location. These properties are modelled using the StrongSecret (SS) security speciﬁcation.
The number of speciﬁcations is increased to include a StrongSecret speciﬁcation for each
of the values being protected, i.e. the identities of each of the participants, the Claimant's
location and the proof values of both Proof Providers modelled. These speciﬁcations check
that the values being protected are not leaked at any point during the exchange, which
would allow an intruder to gain knowledge of them.
As shown in Table 5.2, the veriﬁcation results for the uncompromised model of the
extension are all successful. Additionally, as in the veriﬁcation results for extension one,
authentication on the value of the Veriﬁer's ﬁnal verdict is supported in all situations.
However, when investigating the security of all other speciﬁcations, the compromising of
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Known A(proof) A(proofB) A(DV ) SS(C) SS(P) SS(Pb) SS(XC) SS(proof) SS(proofB)
None
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
C
√ √ √
Fail
√ √
Fail
√ √
CP
√ √ √
Fail Fail
√
Fail
√ √
CPb
√ √ √
Fail
√
Fail Fail
√ √
CPPb
√ √ √
Fail Fail Fail Fail
√ √
P
√ √ √ √
Fail
√ √ √ √
Pb
√ √ √ √ √
Fail
√ √ √
PPb
√ √ √ √
Fail Fail
√ √ √
Table 5.3: Veriﬁcation Results for Extension Three of the SLVPGP
the Claimant's keys has an enormous impact. Where the Claimant's keys alone are compro-
mised, all anonymity speciﬁcations fail, along with all conﬁdentiality speciﬁcations. This is
an expected outcome, as the Claimant is used within this extension of the protocol as a hub,
through which all messages pass and with all messages encrypted for the Claimant. This
provides any device in possession of the Claimant's keys with the values all supposedly pro-
tected information. Authentication, unlike anonymity and conﬁdentiality, is still believed
to be supported, with the authentication results for both Proof Provider values receiving
positive results in addition to those received by the Veriﬁer's verdict speciﬁcations.
However, due to the presence of digital signatures on the proof values from each Proof
Provider, though an intruder may gain knowledge of their values, but it cannot amend
them. This is because it does not possess the Proof Provider's keys to forge a new signature.
Where a Proof Provider's key is compromised, either alone or in conjunction with the
Claimant's, the compromised Proof Provider's agreement speciﬁcation no longer passes
the check. Similarly, the anonymity property is no longer supported, as the identities of
the Claimant and any compromised Proof Provider are leaked. However, unlike where the
Claimant's key is compromised, the compromising of only a Proof Provider's key does not
cause support for the conﬁdentiality property to be lost, as the values protected to give
conﬁdentiality are never encrypted for those keys.
5.6.3 Results for Extension Three
The third extension to the protocol upgrades the level of anonymity and conﬁdentiality
being tested from external to complete through amending the security speciﬁcations em-
ployed in extension two's veriﬁcation. In the amended StrongSecret (SS) speciﬁcations, the
number of devices allowed knowledge of the values being protected is greatly reduced to
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include only the participant the value concerns, the Veriﬁer and in the case of anonymity
StrongSecret speciﬁcations, the Oracle. However, similar to the previous two extensions,
authentication is modelled as three Agreement speciﬁcations, one concerning the Verdict
supplied by the Veriﬁer and one for each of the proofs transmitted within the model.
The improvement in veriﬁcation results for this extension compared to those of the
previous extensions demonstrates the increased level of security employed. As shown in
Table 5.3, the veriﬁcation results for the uncompromised model are again all successful.
There is a vast decrease in the number of fails received where the keys of the Claimant
are compromised in comparison to the veriﬁcation results for the second extension, with
only the Claimant's identity and location consistantly vulnerable in this situation. This
leakage occurs when the Veriﬁer sends its veriﬁcation message to the Claimant. The only
other vulnerable information within the protocol is the identity of a compromised Proof
Provider. This vulnerability is due to the identity's presence within the only message
containing sensitive information encrypted using a key other than the Veriﬁer's.
5.7 Verifying the Security of Broadcasting Messages
In practice, the third extension to the SLVPGP makes use of broadcasting to protect
the anonymity of the participants. However, one concern when using this approach is
the possibility that supplying devices other than the intended recipient with a message
inadvertantly causes a security breach within a protocol. In order to conﬁrm that this is
not the case, we designed a trivial system in which broadcasting is used. The system was
then model checked to verify its secrecy and authentication properties. The results of this
process support the hypothesis that when messages are encrypted using uncompromised
keys, their integrity is unaﬀected by broadcasting
5.7.1 System Description
1. S →A: {MB}K+B , {MC}K+C
2. A →B {MB}K+B
3. A →C: {MC}K+C
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The basic design of the example system is composed of a Server device (S), which wishes
to send a message to two devices, Bob and Celine. However, the Server has no method of
sending the message directly to these devices. Bob and Celine are in the vicinity of a third
device (Alice), which is in contact with the Server. In order to transmit the messages to Bob
and Celine, the Server employs Alice as a proxy. However, Alice cannot know the identity
of the devices she forwards the messages to. Therefore she must broadcast the messages
to all devices in the vicinity. Broadcasting in a wireless network is deﬁned as transmitting
a single message to all devices within transmission range of the source device, without
requiring knowledge of the addresses or identities of the recipients. It is accomplished
through the use of the standard MAC broadcast address, FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF.
5.7.2 Casper Notation
In Casper, the act of broadcasting cannot be directly modelled, as each message must
have a speciﬁc recipient and this recipient must be known to the sending agent (removing
the ability to retain anonymity). Therefore another process known as the Oracle (O) is
introduced. This alters the system's description to:
1. S →A: {MB}K+B , {MC}K+C
2. A →O: {MB}K+B
3. O→B: {MB}K+B
4. A →O: {MC}K+C
5. O→C: {MC}K+C
The primary function of the Oracle is to act as third party proxy, allowing Alice to transmit
S's messages to Bob and Celine. The Oracle is modelled as a special type within the
system, outside the control of any adversary and without impact on the system as a whole.
Therefore, this adjustment does not impact the model checking results on the system. The
casper translation of the protocol's security notation is shown below, with the complete
script shown in Section A.2 of Appendix A.
1. -> S: mB, mC
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2. S -> A: {mB}{PK(B)} % nMb, {mC}{PK(C)} % nMc
3. A -> O: nMb % ({mB}{PK(B)} % nMb1)
4. O -> B: nMb1 % {mB}{PK(B)}
5. A -> O: nMc % ({mC}{PK(C)} % nMc1)
6. O -> C: nMc1 % {mC}{PK(C)}
In the Casper model, the proxied messages are sent only to the intended destinations, with
the intruder also receiving a copy of all messages. The intruder can therefore represent
any device within range of Alice when she broadcasts the message being forwarded. If
the intruder can successfully break any of the security conditions being checked, then
broadcasting can be regarded as an insecure approach in this situation.
Security speciﬁcations
In order to conﬁrm that a message cannot be undetectably interfered with by any intruder
once sent by the Server device, an agreement speciﬁcation is employed. This speciﬁcation
checks that the message committed to by the Server is the same message received by the
intended recipient (either B or C) at the end of the protocol's run. If an intruder can
undetectably insert their own value for this message, the system's security is ﬂawed.
• Agreement(S, B, [mB])
• Agreement(S, C, [mC])
The system described above conforms to the agreement speciﬁcations. Therefore, broad-
casting messages over an open network does not aﬀect the authentication aspect of the
messages assuming the messages are properly secured, i.e. that a message is digitally
signed by its creator.
The second aspect of a message's security is that its contents remain secret. Broadcast-
ing messages allows for all devices within range of the sender to receive a copy. Therefore
it is vital that this secrecy is maintained even when the message is received by many de-
vices and not just the intended recipient. In order to conﬁrm that a message's secrecy is
not aﬀected by the act of broadcasting, secrecy speciﬁcations are employed for each of the
messages investigated.
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• Secret(S, mB, [B])
• Secret(S, mC, [C])
These speciﬁcations check that the value of the message in question is not leaked at any
point during the protocol's run. If an intruder can obtain the value of the message, the
property of secrecy does not hold and the protocol is ﬂawed.
This system conforms to these speciﬁcations, as messages are encrypted to protect their
contents. Therefore, the veriﬁcation results suggest that broadcasting messages over an
open network does not aﬀect the secrecy of their contents. This is based on the assumption
that the messages are properly secured.
5.7.3 Modelling Colluding and Compromised Agents
In the previous section, the implications of employing broadcasting within a system were
outlined and its limitations discovered. However, those limitations are only proven to apply
where an intruder has knowledge only of its own keys - i.e. no devices are compromised - and
where no devices involved are colluding. In order to investigate the eﬀects of compromised
and colluding devices, multiple versions of the system described in Section 5.7.1 have been
modelled. In each version, the intruder process' knowledge is amended. Each amendment
represents either the compromising of a device or the collusion of a number of devices.
The intruder's knowledge deﬁned within the Casper script is altered to include information
regarding the keys of one or more devices. The altered intruder knowledge deﬁnitions are
shown in Section A.2.2 of Appendix A.
In the case of modelling a single compromised device, the intruder process is given
knowledge of the public and private keys of this device. In addition to this, if the compro-
mised device being modelled is a message end-recipient, i.e. a device receiving one of the
messages being transmitted (e.g. devices B or C), the security speciﬁcation regarding the
secrecy of that device's message is removed. This is to allow the system to be fully checked
for security ﬂaws, rather than failing its model check on a speciﬁcation that is intuitively
known to fail. With this speciﬁcation removed, the model check is successful, proving that
the system's integrity remains intact for messages secured with unknown keys. However,
if the speciﬁcation is re-inserted, the check fails as the secrecy of this message is no longer
provided through encryption.
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This approach is also employed in the modelling of colluding devices. We consider
two collusion scenarios for modelling, where device A colludes with end-recipient device B
(collusion AB) and where device A colludes with end-recipient device C (collusion AC). We
do not investigate the impact of devices B and C colluding as the secrecy of both messages
being transmitted would immediately be compromised in this scenario. Therefore, any
checks on the secrecy of those messages would fail.
Similar to the checks performed on the compromise of a single device, the various checks
on the colluding device combinations are all successful where the model does not include
a speciﬁcation regarding the message intended for the end-recipient involved. When a
speciﬁcation of this nature is included, the check fails due to an obvious ﬂaw in the security
of the system, i.e. that the intruder can gain access to messages encrypted for access using
the end-recipient's secret key. As this situation is designed to model the collusion of an end-
recipient and the intruder, an unsuccessful check is the expected outcome. FDR's returning
of positive verdicts on the remaining checks supports the hypothesis that broadcasting a
message does not impair the security of the message or the system. However, the receipt
of negative verdicts on those checks where keys have been compromised shows that this
hypothesis only holds assuming that the message being transmitted is secured with un-
compromised encryption.
5.8 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the approach used to formally verify the Secure Location
Veriﬁcation Proof Gathering Protocol through model checking. We have outlined the
steps involved in readying the protocol for veriﬁcation, from reducing the complexity of
the protocol using safe simplifying transformations to translating the simpliﬁed design into
Casper notation. The veriﬁcation of the CSP models generated from these Casper notations
indicates the absence of ﬂaws with the security properties claimed for each extension within
the systems described. This supports our conclusion that the SLVPGP is secure and
provides these security properties.
In order to further analyse the system's security, we have carried out additional veriﬁ-
cations where the integrity of various keys has been compromised. This analysis indicates
that the impact of compromising a key's integrity is at a minimum in the ﬁnal extension,
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due to the layering of encryption and digital signatures. This extension was also the only
version of the SLVPGP not to receive a fail on either agreement during the compromised-
key analysis, indicating that the described system is not vulnerable to proof tampering.
The analysis also indicates the vulnerability of the middle extension to manipulation if
the integrity of the Claimant's key pair is compromised, due to the use of the Claimant
as a central entity in that extension's design. However, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4,
the storing of cryptographic keys in tamper-resistant modules prevents their sharing and
compromise. Additionally, we have analysed the security of broadcasting sensitive mes-
sages over a network, designing a trivial system employing broadcasting and investigating
its weaknesses through model checking. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that broad-
casting as a technique does not impact the security of a sensitive message, assuming the
message is adequately encrypted.
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Chapter 6
The Veriﬁcation System
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have discussed the technology upon which this system is based,
from the method by which a verdict is determined (Chapter 3) to the protocol employed
to protect the determination and gathering processes and their security (Chapters 4 and
5). In this chapter, we discuss the method by which these verdicts are employed in order
to arrive at a ﬁnal decision on the possibility of a Claimant's location claim.
In order for a veriﬁcation system to function without implicit trust in those devices
providing proof, a method of extracting a verdict must be found which relies purely on
evidence from random devices. Through this approach, the Veriﬁer may reach an overall
verdict regarding a claim through placing its trust in the voice of the majority within a
randomly selected group of devices. While individual devices may lie, the probability that
the majority of a group would all make the decision to lie about a speciﬁc claim is low,
and decreases as the size of the group employed increases.
In addition to the veriﬁcation of claims, the Veriﬁer has the additional task of computing
up to date trustworthiness values regarding each of the devices registered within the system.
We have designed an approach that employs existing reputation techniques to calculate
the trustworthiness or believability of a device based on its prior actions within the system.
This is done through recording of each device's behaviour when involved with a claim, using
binary notation to indicate positive or negative behaviour. Armed with this information,
the Veriﬁer can calculate the probability of a device behaving honestly during the current
claim, thus providing the system with an idea of the relative trustworthiness of a device
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at any time.
The Veriﬁer has three main areas of responsibility; the reputation system, the provision
of Proof Providers and ﬁnally the veriﬁcation of claims. The reputation system deals with
the calculation of a device's trustworthiness, based on previous events within the system.
This trustworthiness may be employed as a factor when dealing with the provision of Proof
Providers, a process that begins with gathering a pool of volunteers. These volunteers are
examined and the most suitable are selected for use in the proof gathering protocol. The
protocol's resulting proofs are then employed by the Veriﬁer in the veriﬁcation of claims.
In this chapter, we discuss related work in the area of reputation computation (Section
6.2) and outline the reputation system and its facets (Section 6.3). We then discuss two
approaches to the gathering of volunteers for use as Proof Proviers (Section 6.4) before
comparing several diﬀerent criteria considered for use when selecting which volunteers to
use as Proof Providers (Section 6.5). In Section 6.6 we outline the process of verifying a
location claim based on the evidence provided. We then discuss the possibility of extracting
a more speciﬁc location for inclusion in the Veriﬁer's verdict message if a positive verdict
is awarded, based on the evidence available regarding the claim (Section 6.8). Finally, we
summarize the chapter's contents and discuss open questions in Section 6.9.
6.2 Related Work
Many reputation computation engines have been proposed to solve the problem of diﬀer-
enciating between those devices that usually behave honestly and those that tend towards
dishonest behaviour. A number of detailed surveys, such as [51] and [60] have been pub-
lished, discussing these engines and the methods by which trustworthiness and reputation
are calculated. The reputation system employed in this work is based on Josang and Is-
mail's beta reputation system [50], in which a form of probability density function (PDF)
is employed to calculate the probability of a device behaving honestly based on its past be-
haviour. The strength of this approach lies in its employment of statistics and probabilities
based upon prior actions, grounding the end result in factual events.
In [15], the authors upgrade their CONFIDANT [16] protocol to include a Bayesian-
based reputation system, thus removing its exclusive reliance upon negative ratings. The
Buchegger-LeBoudec reputation system contains the concepts of both trust and reputation,
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with reputation evaluating how well a node participates in the CONFIDENT system and
trust evaluating how honest the information published by that node is. The approach
taken to reputation is particularly advantageous as greater weight is allocated to ﬁrst-
hand experience than that of published reputation records. Similar to the case of the beta
reputation system, this reputation system also includes a method of fading, allowing less
weight to be given to those events observed further into the past, a technique which we
have also employed (see Section 6.3.4).
In CORE [63], the system employs reputation values regarding nodes to detect and
prevent selﬁsh behaviour, thus ensuring cooperation within the mobile ad-hoc network
(MANET). In this system, reputation is derived through summations of observed be-
haviour, combined with reported reputation values, in a weighted calculation. The con-
cept of reputation is split into several variants; subjective, calculated based on ﬁrst-hand
observations; indirect, where the positive observations of others are reported (thus pre-
venting negative attacks on other nodes); and ﬁnally functional, which is a combination
of subjective and indirect reputations based on a node's performance of a speciﬁc func-
tion. Within this system, the concept of fading is ﬂipped, with greater weight given to
those events further in the past and less weight to those that have recently occurred. The
authors reason that this reduces the inﬂuence of sudden strange behaviour. However, we
believe this to be an indication of the current trustworthiness of the device. Also, while
this system does prevent negative attacks on a node, it does not rule out the possibility of
a positive attack, where nodes are talked up. This form of attack increases the diﬃculty
of detecting malicious nodes.
Conversely to CORE, Aberer and Despotovic [3] have proposed a distributed reputation-
based trust management scheme employing P-Grids [2], in which only negative information
is spread. In their approach, the information shared regarding a participant (p) takes the
form of a complaint, which is used to calculate the probability that p will cheat again in
the future. Unlike previously mentioned systems, this approach takes into account both
the complaints made against p and the complaints made by p to extract a reputation value.
The ﬁnal reputation is derived as the product of the number of complaints made about p
and the number of complaints p makes about other devices.
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6.3 The Reputation System
Within the scope of the Veriﬁer's processes, we employ a reputation system composed
of pre-existing techniques to represent the concept of trustworthiness in a device based
on past actions. These past actions are recorded to form an event history, tracking a
device's behaviour over time. By recording the sequence of events in this manner, a
history for each device in the system is produced, giving the Veriﬁer an indication of
how it is likely to behave during a veriﬁcation. These event histories form the basis of
trust calculation and are discussed in Section 6.3.2. The reputation system employed in
this work is based on statistical theory, utilising an existing form of probability calculation
to extract trustworthiness levels for a device from its recorded past behaviour. We discuss
this further in Section 6.3.3. In order to ensure the weighting system awards greater weight
to recent activity, a fading factor has been included in the system. In addition to this, the
ability to fade during quieter periods of activity has also been included, to allow device
trustworthiness to decay not only with interactions between a device and the system, but
also over time, independant of activity. This process is discussed in Section 6.3.4.
6.3.1 What is Trust?
The notion of trust has been well explored in many academic arenas, including economics
[62, 8], sociology [34, 21] and, more recently, computing. This move within computing
circles stems from the development of decentralised and Peer to Peer (P2P) systems [71,
68, 91, 9], in which nodes require a method of distinguishing other participants which are
more reliable, in order to facilitate their own needs. Numerous trust management and
reputation schemes have been developed to solve this problem, such as [40, 15, 100, 3, 52].
In these schemes, the concepts of trust and reputation have been discussed in depth,
resulting in several slight variations on their deﬁnitions within the ﬁeld. In this section,
we deﬁne what trust and reputation mean within this work and how it is employed to
facilitate the system's needs.
Within this work, we refer to the procedure through which we calculate a device's
trustworthiness as the reputation system. Traditionally, reputation and trustworthiness
are considered distinct concepts, with one stemming from the public perception of an
agent/entity based on second-hand experiences and the other based upon direct interac-
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tion [51]. However, this work mixes both of these concepts when calculating a device's
trustworthiness. A device's trustworthiness is calculated based on direct interaction be-
tween that device and the Veriﬁer, but the outcome of this interaction is based upon
calculating a concensus from the second-hand evidence provided. For this reason, we have
merged the two concepts, rendering the terms interchangeable. However, for continuity's
sake, we use trustworthiness/trust value to refer to the trustworthiness of a device, and
use reputation only when referring to the calculation system. The concept of trust is also
extended to apply to relations between malicious devices. We assume that if one device
is willing to collude with another, they are friendly devices and share a mutual level of
trust. This allows them to cooperate in their attempts to deceive the Veriﬁer and location
veriﬁcation system.
When the Veriﬁer selects Proof Providers, it may wish to employ only those that
are likely to behave in an honest fashion. In order to facilitate this, we designate each
participating device with a measure of trustworthiness, based upon its prior actions within
the system. The notion of trustworthiness here represents the level of credibility a device
has earned, given its behaviour in the past. It is a measure of how much the system trusts
a device to perform its role honestly. This follows Gambetta's deﬁnition of trust, which
states trust to be: a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent
assesses that another agent ... will perform a particular action [34]. The more a device
shows itself as an entity to be believed in, the greater its trustworthiness value grows. We
have designed the reputation system to calculate the appropriate level of trustworthiness
to allocate to a device, based on these past actions. The shadow of the future [7] provided
by each device's history allows the Veriﬁer to calculate its trust value, a procedure which
is discussed further in Section 6.3.3.
However, a device's behaviour may diﬀer depending upon the role played in an interac-
tion. When acting as a Claimant, a device may behave perfectly, as it wishes to proﬁt from
the situation. However, when the same device acts as a Proof Provider, it may behave
maliciously as it receives no beneﬁts from the interaction and therefore has no obvious
incentive not to. The reverse is also possible, where a device behaves honestly as a Proof
Provider and only acts maliciously when it requires a false location proved by the sys-
tem. Therefore, we have designed our system to include the concept of multi-faceted trust,
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Algorithm 1 Building Event Histories
Device D joins location veriﬁcation system, EC ←<>and EPP ←<>
while D_in_System do
if D_makes_claim then
if verdict == positive then
EC ←< 1 > ∧EC
elseif verdict == negative then
EC ←< 0 > ∧EC
elseif verdict == unsure then
EC ← EC
if D_is_ProofProvider then
if verdict == unsure then
EPP ← EPP
elseif evidence_given == positive then
if verdict == positive then
EPP ←< 1 > ∧EPP
elseif verdict == negative then
EPP ←< 0 > ∧EPP
elseif evidence_given == negative then
if verdict == positive then
EPP ←< 0 > ∧EPP
elseif verdict == negative then
EPP ←< 1 > ∧EPP
where each device in the system possesses two trustworthiness values, one representing its
behaviour as a Claimant and the other its behaviour as a Proof Provider. This concept of
multi-faceted trust is seen in many other works, including [40] and [100].
The division of trustworthiness values in this manner allows the diﬀerent trust facets
to be employed at diﬀerent points within the location veriﬁcation engine. A device's Proof
Provider trustworthiness may be taken into account during the Proof Provider selection
process, in order to select only the most trustworthy volunteers from the volunteer pool.
It may also be employed during the veriﬁcation process, depending on the method of
veriﬁcation utilised. This calculation process is dealt with in Section 6.6.3. Currently a
device's Claimant trustworthiness is not employed in the veriﬁcation process. However, by
recording the trust values for both aspects, a device's Claimant behaviour may be factored
into other areas at a later date.
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6.3.2 Tracking Behaviour - Event Histories
As discussed in Section 6.3.1, a device's trustworthiness is split into two facets within this
system; trust based on behaviour as a Proof Provider and trust based on behaviour as a
Claimant. Therefore, each device involved in the system has associated with it a pair of
event histories, one reﬂecting prior Claimant behaviour and one for its behaviour as a Proof
Provider. These event histories are each composed of a sequence of 0s and 1s, reﬂecting
the actions of a device over time. They are used to calculate the trustworthiness of the
device when playing a speciﬁc role.
When the Veriﬁer reaches a verdict on the possibility of a location claim, it records
the outcome in the appropriate event history of each device involved. If the device is
determined to have behaved honestly, i.e if a Proof Provider's vote mirrors the verdict
issued by the Veriﬁer or if a Claimant's claim is veriﬁed, then the event history entry is
set as 1, otherwise it is set as 0. The Veriﬁer will update the event history of the device
with this entry if the result is deemed to be in the sure portion of the possibility scale.
However, where the overall result of the claim falls in the unsure portion of the scale, the
Veriﬁer refrains from updating the event history, as the outcome of the process is not clear.
(See Section 6.6.4 for an explanation of the unsure portion of the possibility scale.) The
process of building event histories is described formally in algorithm 1.
An example of the event history building algorithm is as follows: Device D joins the
system with a pair of empty event histories (as it has not yet behaved either positively or
negatively in any role within the system). D makes a location claim, for which it receives
a possible verdict. This verdict impacts D's Claimant event history, causing it to be
updated with a 1, representing a recorded event of honest behaviour. D then plays the
role of Proof Provider in another device's location claim, giving that device a negative
piece of evidence. However, the Veriﬁer provides that Claimant with a possible verdict,
thus causing D's Proof Provider event history to be updated with a 0, indicating an event
of dishonest behaviour. D again makes a location claim to prove its own location, but
this time incurs an unsure verdict. In this situation, the Claimant event history is not
updated, as the verdict is neither a 0 or a 1. D proceeds to behave as a Proof Provider
for two more claims. In the ﬁrst, D provides positive evidence for the Claimant, who
receives a possible verdict from the Veriﬁer. This causes D's Proof Provider history to
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be updated with a 1, representing its honest behaviour. In the second, D again provides
positive evidence, but this time the Claimant in question receives an unsure verdict. Due
to the overall verdict in this claim being neither 1 nor 0, D's Proof Provider history is
not updated. D then takes the role of a Proof Provider and provides negative evidence
regarding the presence of the Claimant. The Claimant receives a negative verdict from
the Veriﬁer and D's Proof Provider event history is updated with a 1. Finally, D makes a
location claim of its own and receives a not possible verdict, causing its Claimant event
history to be updated with a 0. At this end of this period within the system, D's event
histories stand as:
• Claimant event history (EC): <0, 1>
• Proof Provider event history (EPP ): <1, 1, 0>
Note that although D participated in a total of seven claims, three as a Claimant and
four as a Proof Provider, only ﬁve entries are found in its event histories. This is because
unsure verdicts do not impact the event histories of devices participating in claims where
they are awarded.
As all devices have an empty pair of event histories associated with them when they
join the system due to their lack of past behaviour, it is initially diﬃcult to distinguish
which devices can be trusted and which have a tendancy to behave badly. For this reason,
one area of possible interest for future work is that of bootstrapping, or building up, a
device's event histories, without needing to participate in location claims. This issue is
under consideration and is discussed in further detail in Section 6.3.5.
6.3.3 Trust Calculation
The core of any reputation system is its approach to trust calculation. There are a great
many of these approaches to choose from. They range from summations/averaging, a
principle employed by eBay [81], to discrete trust models in which the trustworthiness of
a device is given in verbal statements, rather than on a numeric scale [51]. An example of
this is found in the Abdul-Rahman and Hailes model [1], where a device's trustworthiness
can be ranked from Very Trustworthy to Very Untrustworthy. We have chosen a reputation
system employing a Bayesian approach to trust calculation. This approach has been chosen
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based on its statistical nature, as the Bayesian method works on the basis of computing the
trustworthiness of a device through the updating of a beta Probability Density Function
(PDF) [29], an approach which also forms the basis of Josang and Ismail's reputation
system [50]. As mentioned earlier, we believe the basis of trust lies in the actions which
occurred previously, with these actions indicating how a device is likely to behave - a belief
which is ﬁrmly based in statistical theory. The beta PDF calculates the probability density
of events with a binary outcome, making it a perfect candidate for use within this system.
Trust can be represented in two ways, either by the result of a probability expecta-
tion value of the beta PDF [51] or by a pair of numbers, (α, β), representing the beta
PDF parameter tuple. Within this system, α represents the number of honest behaviour
observations for a speciﬁc device, while β represents the number of dishonest behaviour
observations. The parameter tuple is used to calculate the beta PDF, f(p|α, β), which can
be expressed using the gamma function Γ as :
f(p|α, β) = Γ(α+β)Γ(α)Γ(β)pα−1(1− p)β−1, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, α > 0, β > 0,
with the restriction that the probability variable p 6= 0 if α < 1 and p 6= 1 if β < 1.
However, the beta PDF merely represents distributions of binary events (i.e. a positive or
negative event). Instead, we employ the probability expectation calculation to calculate
the probability of a device behaving honestly during the next encounter, as a value lying
in the range of 0 and 1. Where h is the number of observed honest behaviours and d is
the number of dishonest, the probability expectation formula is as follows:
E(P ) = αα+β where α = h+ 1 and β = d+ 1, where h, d ≥ 0.
Consider a situation where a Proof Provider has behaved honestly once, and has no
dishonest behaviour, the trustworthiness value for the next encounter will be
E(P ) = 22+1 = 0.666667, as α = 1 + 1 and β = 0 + 1
while if it behaves dishonestly once, with no honest behaviour, the trustworthiness
value will be
E(P ) = 11+2 = 0.333334, as α = 0 + 1 and β = 1 + 1
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Within the reputation system, h and d are calculated using a device's event histories,
with h equalling the number of positive entries and d equalling the number of negative.
Using the example event histories generated for device D in algorithm 1, the probability
expectation value for D acting as a Claimant is calculated as follows: D's Claimant event
history is {0, 1}, with 0 representing a negative event and 1 a positive. As D's Claimant
event history contains one positive event, α equals 1 + 1, the number of positive events
in the event history plus the possibility of the next event being positive. As D's Claimant
history also contains one negative event, β is also equal to 1 + 1. Therefore:
E(P ) = 1+1(1+1)+((1+1)) =
2
4 =
1
2
giving D a Claimant probability expectation, or trustworthiness, value of 0.5.
6.3.4 Reputation Fading
The principle of reputation fading is based on the theory that as events recede further into
the past, their importance to the calculation of trustworthiness levels of a device decreases.
This theory stems from the assumption that older events may no longer accurately represent
how a device is likely to behave in the next exchange. The most recent events in a device's
event history give the best idea of how it is likely to behave during its next encounter.
Therefore, more weight is given to these events than to those further in the past. This
approach also allows a device to redeem itself over time, as its bad behaviour, intentional
or accidental, decays in importance in the calculation of its trustworthiness.
In a standard Bayesian system, this notion of device fading is not present. Bayesian
systems give equal weight to all entries in a device's history, thereby removing the need to
retain the order in which those entries occurred. In order to achieve fading within our own
system while utilitising this method, we employ the approach used by Buchegger and Le
Boudec [15] and Josang and Ismail [50]. In this approach, each entry in the computation
of h and d is multiplied by a weight, or fading factor (u), based on its position in the
computation sequence, thus discounting older entries in a device's event history. Using
this approach, where 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 and Sn, Sn−1, ...S1 is the event history of a device, the
calculation of h and d becomes
h = (Sn) + (Sn−1)u + (Sn−2)u2 + ... + (S1)un−1
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d = (1 - Sn) + (1 - Sn−1)u + (1 - Sn−2)u2 + ... + (1 - S1)un−1
Note the use of (1 - Sn) in d's calculation sequence. As the values to be included in the
d sequence are 0s, the event history values cannot be inserted in the same way as for 1s.
1 - Sn removes the 1 events and retains the 0s, allowing for the accurate calculation of
d. As evidenced above, the addition of a new event to the event history fades those already
within the sequence. Also, in this approach, when calculating a value, the occurence of
events of the opposite kind (i.e. where a negative event occured within the timeline during
the calculation of h) is accounted for, allowing events to be faded in the order of their
occurence.
However, when computing the values of h and d in this manner, the complete event
histories of every device must be retained forever. This is impractical, both in terms of
storage and when computing the trustworthiness of a device. These issues can be avoided
through re-deﬁning the computation formula for h and d to:
h = h ∗ u + Sn
d = d ∗ u + (1 - Sn)
where 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 and Sn is the entry being added to the sequence. This approach
removes the need to retain the complete sequence of events, as each event is now multiplied
by u the appropriate number of times without being explicitly recomputed at each iteration.
The new values of h and d can then be used to calculate the trustworthiness of a device
using the probability expectation formula shown in Section 6.3.3.
Rather than employing the fading factor suggested in [15] (u = 1m , where m = the order
of magnitude of the number of entries in the sequence), we have followed the example set
by Josang and Ismail and leave u as a customisable variable to be set at implementation.
This allows the level of fading implemented to be set based on the requirements of the
system in which it is being employed, increasing its ﬂexability. However, when selecting a
fading factor, it should be noted that where u = 1, the fading factor has no impact, as it
multiplies every value by 1, while where u = 0, only the newest entry to the sequence is
valued, with the rest set to 0.
In addition to the fading approach discussed above, we also include a simple method
to fade events over time. Two methods have been considered to address this issue - time-
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dependent fading and the employment of a cut oﬀ value. Where a cut oﬀ value is employed,
if the ﬁnal value in the h or d calculation falls below a certain threshold, (for example -
the ﬁnal value becomes so small that it does not have much impact on the end result of
the calculation) then it is removed from the event history completely. However, fading in
this manner is ﬂawed in two ways - the value of the ﬁnal entry in the sequence must fall
below a speciﬁed threshold and the method described above does not provide for fading
without system interaction. Both of these ﬂaws stem from the same requirement: a device
must achieve above a certain level of activity before its behaviour is subject to fading.
In order for a device's event history to be eligible for fading, the ﬁnal entry in the
sequence must fall below a set threshold. This is achieved through the sequence ﬁlling
with a certain number of additional entries, pushing the ﬁnal entry back far enough to
reduce its value to less than the threshold. However, in order for this to occur, a device
must participate in enough claims and receive enough behaviour entries in their history to
cause the ﬁnal entry to fall below the threshold. If a device seldom participates in claims,
its event history would not ﬁll with enough entries to cause any fading to occur, allowing for
its behaviour to remain untouched. Conversely, devices with a high level of participation
within the system would incur heavy fading as their event history would ﬁll to the required
level repeatedly. This imbalance reduces the accuracy of the ﬁnal value generated from
the event history, fading active devices too harshly while ignoring the behaviour of those
more passive devices.
In addition to a lack of fading of the behaviour of less active devices, the above approach
also allows no provision for the fading of behaviour without any system interaction. A
device may interact with the system many times over a short time frame, building up its
event history, before withdrawing from active involvement. Using the above method of
fading, during this idle period of time a device's event history would remain untouched,
despite the passage of time, as no new entries would be added to the history to cause the
value of the ﬁnal entry to decrease. Therefore, though a device's nature may have altered
over time, the history accrued previously remains intact and unaﬀected.
Rather than compromising between participation levels and fading impact, we have
chosen to employ a time-dependent fading mechanism suggested in [15], in which we let
d = u ∗ d and h = u ∗ h at the end of every y period of time. This mimics the decay of h
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and d's old values where a new entry is added, without the addition of a new entry to the
sequence. Through fading based on the passing of time, rather than on history entries or
falling below a certain value, fading can occur without devices entering into exchanges, a
situation which may easily occur. Also, fading is guaranteed to be equally enacted over all
devices involved with the system, whether they play an active role or are mostly dormant.
6.3.5 Initialisation of the Reputation System
An outstanding issue when discussing the reputation system is that of the its initialisation
and the initialisation of any new devices when they join the system. As mentioned in
Section 6.3.2, all devices join the system with a blank pair of event histories. This causes
a problem, as all devices appear equal and distinguishing trustworthy devices from those
which have a malicious tendancy is impossible. When performing our own veriﬁcation
simulations (discussed fully in Section 6.7), it was discovered that attempting any ap-
proach employing a device's trustworthiness does not provide accurate results without ﬁrst
evolving the trustworthiness of that device to a reasonable level. For this reason, it would
be preferrable to provide some method of bootstrapping trustworthiness to increase the
speed at which a device's trustworthiness values become deﬁned. This bootstrapping con-
cept was also used by Srinivasan, Teitelbaum andWu in their Distributed Reputation-based
Beason Trust System (DRBTS) [90]. At present, no bootstrapping approach is employed
within our location veriﬁcation system. However, future work in this area may provide a
solution to the bootstrapping problem without resorting to infrastructure reliance.
As the system currently stands, there exists no trusted infrastructure. This environment
makes bootstrapping trustworthness values diﬃcult, as there are no reliable units available
to judge the trustworthiness of the participating devices. However, if some completely
trusted known entities, such as roadside units (RSUs), were to be introduced to the system,
some methods of bootstrapping both Claimant and Proof Provider trust values would
become feasible. One such possible method of bootstrapping Claimant trust values is for
a Claimant, who is unknowingly in the vicinity of an RSU, to make a location claim.
The Veriﬁer, noting that the Claimant is in the area of an RSU, includes the RSU in the
claim's pool of Proof Providers. If the Claimant receives a positive verdict from the RSU,
it, along with all Proof Providers which agreed with the RSU, receives a positive mark
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in the relevant behaviour history, no matter what the outcome of the veriﬁcation process.
This approach to bootstrapping is also suggested in [1].
In order to prevent abuse, any method of bootstrapping employed within the system
should not be advertised as such to participating devices. An approach such as the one
described in the paragraph above meets this requirement, as the Claimant is unaware of its
possible trust gain through the inclusion of a roadside unit in the pool of Proof Providers.
If a device was aware that the exchange it was participating in was not a regular claim,
its behaviour for that exchange would not be representative of its true nature, making the
results possibly deceptive. A malicious device could not only undo any damage to its trust
value but could earn a high trust value through repeatedly engaging in bootstrapping. An
example of an unsuitable approach would be the broadcasting of bootstrapping beacons
by RSUs, calling for devices in the area to distance bound with them and receive a positive
mark in their behaviour history upon successful completion of the exchange.
However, bootstrapping in this form requires additional equipment and removes one
of the system's main advantages: its non-reliance upon infrastructure. Therefore, while
it would allow the reputation system's calibration process to become faster and more
accurate, it would be preferable to employ an alternative initialisation approach.
6.4 Gathering Proof Provider Volunteers
The main concern when selecting devices is to ensure protection against tampering with
the location veriﬁcation process, as if devices are chosen poorly, the system is left vulner-
able to collusion attacks. If collusion is possble, then the proofs supplied could easily be
fabricated and not accurately represent the real world situation. The Claimant could be in
a completely diﬀerent location to where it has claimed, yet based on the proofs gathered
from collaborating friendly Proof Providers, the Veriﬁer would be unable to detect the
deception.
The information the system receives during a device's active participation is not suf-
ﬁcient for tracking devices. This is because the last known sighting of a device is not
necessarily where it is currently located, nor does it indicate where the device is likely
to currently be located. Additionally, storing non-essential information after the system's
functionality has been completed leaves the privacy and security of those devices involved
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vulnerable if the central database was to be compromised. Therefore, as the system does
not have access to information of this nature, we require devices in the area to volunteer
to act as Proof Providers, based on the receipt of a request message. In order to prevent
tampering and collaboration, we have devised two diﬀerent approaches to locating volun-
teers, detailed below. Once volunteers have been located, the Veriﬁer then selects the most
suitable from the candidate pool based on a set of speciﬁc criteria. This selection process
and the criteria employed are further discussed in Section 6.5.
6.4.1 Claimant-based Volunteer Gathering
In order for a Veriﬁer to pass judgement on the possibility of a location claim, it ﬁrst
requires volunteer devices from which it can select the Proof Providers to be employed.
In the Claimant-based volunteer gathering approach, these volunteers are provided to
the Veriﬁer by the Claimant at the time of initiating the claim. The Claimant gathers
volunteers from its pool of neighbouring devices through issuing a volunteer request and
forwarding the responses to the Veriﬁer. This process is shown below, using abstract
protocol notation deﬁned at the beginning of this work, with X's digital signature key
noted as K−X and its public key noted as K
+
X .
1. C→ D : FV ol,NC
2. Di →C : NC ,
{|Di, TDi , LocDi , RDi |}K−Di

K+V
3. C→V : mesg1, {|
{{
|D1, TD1 , LocD1 , RD1 |
}
K−D1
}
K+V
, ..,{|DN, TDN , LocDN , RDN |}K−D
N

K+V
|}K−C
The Claimant broadcasts a message to all devices D within its range, containing a request
ﬂag (FV ol) and an identifying nonce (NC , a random integer). The request ﬂag informs the
recipient that a device in the area (whose identity remains unknown) is seeking volunteers
to function as Proof Providers in its location claim, while the nonce allows the Claimant to
match any messages it receives to the request. Those devices which wish to participate as a
Proof Provider (Di) then respond to the Claimant's request with a message containing the
identifying nonce received in the Claimant's message and a second message to be forwarded
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on to the Veriﬁer. This second message is digitally signed with the volunteer's private key
and encrypted with the Veriﬁer's public key, thus protecting the message's contents from
eavesdropping devices and preserving the anonymity and conﬁdentiality of the volunteer.
The message contains the device's identity (Di), transmission range (RDi), a timestamp
(TDi) and the device's current location (LocDi).
Once the Claimant has received response messages from the N volunteering devices,
it initiates its location claim with the Veriﬁer using an amended version of mesg1 of the
SLVPGP extension being employed. The Claimant digitally signs the volunteer responses
to prevent undetectable alteration in transit and appends this to mesg1 of the SLVPGP.
The nonce portion of the response message is not included in this forwarding process, as
this is not required by the Veriﬁer, and the inclusion of a timestamp prevents the Claimant
from including older response messages in the volunteer pool without detection.
6.4.2 Veriﬁer-based Volunteer Gathering
An alternative approach to Claimant-based gathering is shown below, where the Veriﬁer
is employed in the role of volunteer gatherer. Unlike in Claimant-based gathering, when a
Claimant wishes to make a location claim, it is not required to secure a pool of volunteers
before initiating the process. Instead, the Claimant initialises the location veriﬁcation
process with an unaltered mesg1 from the SLVPGP, as shown in Chapter 4. When the
Veriﬁer receives the Claimant's initialisation message, it creates a volunteer request message
composed of a request ﬂag and an identifying nonce (the same volunteer request message
sent by the Claimant in Section 6.4.1) and sends it to the area of the location claimed
by the Claimant using geographical routing [61]. This approach to routing ensures that
the message can be routed to a speciﬁc area, rather than a speciﬁc recipient, allowing the
Veriﬁer to reach multiple devices in a speciﬁc area with the same message.
1. V→ D : FV ol,NV
2. Di →V:
{|NV ,Di, TDi , LocDi , RDi |}K−Di

K+V
When a device in the vicinity of the claimed location receives the volunteer request message
and wishes to volunteer, it creates and digitally signs a reply, encrypted using the Veriﬁer's
public key, containing the identifying nonce, a timestamp and its identity and current
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location. It transmits this message back to the Veriﬁer, who then selects Proof Providers
from the pool of volunteers and continues with mesg2 of the SLVPGP as normal.
6.4.3 Claimant vs Veriﬁer - Which Method is Best?
The process of location veriﬁcation is a sensitive one. As devices are not trusted, the
process must prevent as much abuse as possible through its design, denying the ability
to tamper with information once it has been sent and preventing deception by malicious
devices. This prevention through design must begin with the selection of Proof Providers,
otherwise however secure the location proving protocol may be, colluding devices may
circumnavigate the security measures and deceive the system. Therefore, the selection of
Proof Providers must not be left open to abuse.
Claimant-based volunteer gathering is far more timely than Veriﬁer-based, as it is
performed locally, rather than a request being routed over some distance before volunteers
can begin responding. It is also performed prior to the initialisation of the claim, reducing
the amount of time required to complete the claim. This is of signiﬁcant advantage when
dealing with mobile nodes as depending on their nature, devices can move location with
great speed (e.g. devices in VANETs). However, this is a double-edged issue, as if a
Claimant recruits volunteers in advance of the claim's initiation, those volunteers may not
still be in the area when the proof gathering process begins.
Although Claimant-based volunteer gathering is faster than Veriﬁer-based, it is ex-
tremely vunerable to Claimant abuse, as it cannot be guaranteed that the Claimant has
followed the volunteer gathering protocol and broadcast a request message to all devices
in the surrounding area. This vulnerability leaves the Claimant free to do several things to
inﬂuence the request's outcome: it can behave honestly and broadcast the request; it can
send the request message only to devices in its area that it knows will collaborate with it;
and ﬁnally, it can send the request message only to devices in a diﬀerent area (in which
it claims to be) which it knows will collaborate with it. This ﬁnal choice of action would
render the location proving system powerless to detect cheating, and would result in false
positive verdicts on location claims. A cheating Proof Provider could ignore the distance
bounding aspect of the protocol and fabricate proof to be sent to the Veriﬁer. This would
result in the Veriﬁer being deceived into returning a falsely positive verdict, with no way
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of detecting the fraud due to a lack of dissenting devices. Therefore, the Claimant-based
approach to volunteer gathering is not considered suitable for use. Although the Veriﬁer-
based approach is slower due to the distance the request message and its responses must
travel, in addition to being vulnerable to lying volunteers claiming to be located in the
correct area (as in theory, any device that receives the request at some point along the
request's route to the location could claim to be located in the correct area and fraudu-
lently volunteer), it is outside the control of the Claimant and is therefore a more secure
and suitable solution.
6.5 Selecting the Proof Providers
There can be many devices in the area of the Claimant at the time of a location veriﬁcation,
and so many devices volunteering to act as Proof Providers. Once a pool of volunteers
has been established for each claim, Proof Providers can then be selected. However, this
process must be designed to minimise the eﬀect of manipulation on a claim's eventual
outcome. A malicious Claimant will attempt to manipulate the process in any way it
can, including the selection of locations near which only friendly devices lie. It may also
attempt to select a location in which the surrounding key locations for minimal range
overlap are occupied by friendly devices, or even one near only friendly devices with high
levels of trust (in the event that trust levels are leaked from the Veriﬁer's system). In
addition to this, a minimum level of Proof Provider participation must be known. This
is done to prevent situations where the word of malicious devices can overwhelm that of
honest participants with ease. In this section we ﬁrst discuss the minimum number of
Proof Providers that should be required for a claim to occur. We then outline a variety of
possible Proof Provider selection criteria considered and the possible vulnerabilities they
possess. Each of these approaches have been employed within the veriﬁcation simulations
discussed in Section 6.7 and their eﬀectiveness is compared there.
6.5.1 Minimum Proof Provider Requirements
As this location veriﬁcation system is designed for use with mobile nodes rather than an
infrastructure with ﬁxed deployment levels, the environment in which a Claimant makes
a claim can vary extensively in population level. It may be within the vicinity of many
161
# Proof
Providers
Honest
positive
Honest
negative
Honest
incon-
clusive
Lying
positive
Lying
negative
Lying
incon-
clusive
4 86.77% 3.04% 10.19% 4.23% 85.71% 10.06%
5 95.55% 0.19% 4.26% 4.08% 87.30% 8.62%
6 96.54% 0.15% 3.31% 3.21% 83.97% 12.83%
7 97.89% 0.15% 1.96% 2.48% 90.99% 6.52%
8 99.56% 0% 0.34% 1.78% 89.91% 8.31%
Table 6.1: Comparing Minimum Proof Provider Requirements
other devices or only a handful of devices scattered over a wide area. The aim of this
system is to verify location claims based upon evidence gathered from neighbouring devices.
However, this process relies on a majority ruling to provide a ﬁnal verdict. If the Claimant
is operating within a sparsely populated area, it may have only a small group of Proof
Providers available for use. This reduces the number of positive verdicts required to reach
a majority, raising the issue of minimum Proof Provider requirements - at what point does
the system deem there to be too few within a group to extract a reliable verdict from the
majority?
With the threat of malicious devices ever-present, a limit is required to distinguish
between acceptable and unacceptable levels of participation, in order to prevent malicious
colluders from inﬂuencing the overall verdict with only a minimal number. While the odds
of gaining a single willing colluder in a random area are reasonable, the odds of gathering
several willing colluders decrease as the number of colluders needed increases. By including
a requirement detailing the minimum number of Proof Providers allowed for a claim to
proceed, the system forces a Claimant to have colluders numbering at least 60% of that
value (rounded to the nearest whole number) in order to successfully manipulate a claim
through to a positive veriﬁcation. For example, where a minimum of two Proof Providers
are required for a claim, a single piece of positive evidence may be all that is required in
order to achieve positive veriﬁcation. Where a minimum of three are required, that number
increases to two pieces. Both of these values are extremely low, and therefore neither
minimum is considered suﬃcient for use. Using simulations similar to those described in
Section 6.7, we investigated the accuracy of minimum Proof Provider requirements from
four up to eight in the veriﬁcation of honest claims and the detection of false claims.
The results of these simulations are shown in Table 6.1. Based on these simulations,
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it is recommended that a minimum of ﬁve Proof Providers or higher be employed. This
value has shown to be suﬃcient to provide an acceptable rate of veriﬁcation of honest
claims (95.55%) and detection of false claims (87.30%), with only 4.08% veriﬁcation of
false claims. Requiring higher than ﬁve Proof Providers as a minimum may remove the
ability of many devices to verify their location due to a low number of available volunteers
in their area.
However, while ﬁve Proof Providers is recommended for a high level of performance,
employing a minimum of four Proof Providers has also proven to have reasonable rates
of veriﬁcation and detection. If the system is employed using a minimum of four Proof
Providers, then it should be noted that the actual value computed using the upper threshold
(Sections 6.6.3 and 6.6.4) is equal to that computed using the lower threshold. This means
that the same value is required to achieve both an unsure and a possible verdict. In
order to address this, the upper threshold employed for values of four or lower is increased
to 70%, thus requiring an additional piece of positive evidence to prove a claim's validity.
6.5.2 All Available Volunteers
The simplest approach to selecting Proof Providers is to employ every device within the
volunteer pool for that claim. This approach does not limit the number of Proof Providers
involved in the claim, thus increasing the amount of possible evidence to be employed
in the claim's eventual calculation. This beneﬁts the Veriﬁer as it provides redundancy
in numbers, reducing the risk of a claim failing due to the non-participation of selected
Proof Providers. The greater the number of Proof Providers employed within a claim,
the less impact the non-participation of one. In addition to this, if all volunteers are
employed in a claim there is no real method that a malicious Claimant can attempt to
manipulate. The only real manipulation that it can attempt is to select a location in
which a large number of friendly devices are located. This approach would be employed
by most malicious Claimants, no matter what the situation (unless attempting to prove
a speciﬁc location and not any location other than its own). If the malicious Claimant
possesses the location of all devices within the system, the manipulation may be extended
as it can then attempt to select a location near only those devices which are friendly to
it. However, the possibility of this occurring is extremely unlikely. A Claimant is likely to
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possess the locations of those devices it is friendly with, but it would be infeasible for a
Claimant to possess the location of all devices within the system.
One potentially problematic disadvantage to employing an all-volunteers approach
to Proof Provider selection is the risk that the number of volunteers which respond to a
claim's volunteer request is unreasonable, due to the Claimant being in a densely pop-
ulated area. The larger the list of Proof Providers employed within a claim, the more
the SLVPGP overhead costs are adversely aﬀected. With transmission and computation
overheads related to the number of Proof Providers participating, an overly large number
of Proof Providers would increase the load on both the Claimant's equipment and its local
network to an unreasonable level. As yet, no work has been done to calculate the maxi-
mum viable number of Proof Providers to be employed for any one claim. This issue is not
pressing at this time, with the number of volunteers for a claim not envisioned to be overly
high. However with the increased adoption of mobile technology in devices, the number
of volunteers is expected to grow. A study of the impact of Proof Provider participation
levels on SLVPGP overhead costs would allow a reasonable limit to be calculated.
6.5.3 Most Trustworthy Volunteers
Where the number of Proof Providers employed must be limited, we have considered a
number of possible selection criteria for use to decide which volunteers are to be included.
The ﬁrst of these is to select based on a volunteer's trustworthiness level. If the selection of
Proof Providers is based upon how trustworthy they are, then intuitively the evidence sup-
plied for use will be the most trustworthy evidence possible. This increases the likelihood
of the Veriﬁer accurately assessing the claim and producing a correct verdict.
However, this intuitive belief is incorrect on a number of levels. A device may generally
behave in a trustworthy manner, supplying accurate evidence to the best of its knowledge.
However this does not rule out the possibility of said device being friendly with the
Claimant and willing to behave maliciously in this instance. Nor does it rule out the
possibility of the opposite situation occurring, where the device in question has some form
of grudge against the Claimant (assuming in this case that the device has knowledge of
the Claimant's identity). Finally, if it gains access to the device trust values, a malicious
Claimant may attempt to manipulate the selection process through claiming a location
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where the group of most trusted local devices is primarily composed of friendly devices.
While the possibility of any device gaining access to the Veriﬁer's list of trust values is
slim, as this requires the Veriﬁer to be compromised, we believe that the possibility of this
attack should be noted.
6.5.4 Most Geographically Suited Volunteers
A second form of criteria considered factors the location of the volunteers into the Proof
Provider selection process. Location-based selection allows the Veriﬁer to select those
volunteers located such that the intersection of their transmission areas is the smallest area
possible, maximising the information extracted through triangulation and thus providing a
much more accurate end location for the Claimant. This concept was previously discussed
in Chapter 3.
However, this approach is also vulnerable to attack by a malicious Claimant. Similar
to the trust-based approach, location-based selection is done based on targeting a speciﬁc
attribute and is therefore predictable. This leaves the process vulnerable to manipulation.
A malicious Claimant could target a speciﬁc location for a claim, knowing the location of its
friends in the area and the size of their resulting area of intersection. The Claimant could
further include its friends in the deception of the Veriﬁer through having them falsify their
locations within the volunteer response, adjusting them slightly to increase the likelihood of
selection. Although this attack does capitalise on a vulnerability in the selection approach,
it does not guarantee that the Claimant's friends will be selected. Unless the Claimant
possesses knowledge of the location of all devices, it cannot defend against the possibility
that other, non-friendly, devices may be in more suitable positions, which would render
the Claimant's attempted manipulations ineﬀectual.
6.5.5 Randomly Selected Volunteers
The ﬁnal approach to Proof Providers selection considered in this work is the random se-
lection of volunteers from the pool, rather than attempting to employ a targeted approach.
This approach has one main disadvantage in that it loses any possible advantages gained
through targeting certain attributes and strengths of the volunteers. However, the advan-
tage of employing this selection method over targeted methods is clear. Random selection
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has a similar advantage to that of employing all volunteers - a malicious Claimant cannot
manipulate the selection process any further than the selection of a location in proximity
to a number of friendly devices.
6.6 Veriﬁcation of Location Claims
The Veriﬁer's principle task is to assess the possibility of a device's location claim, based
on information gathered from Proof Providers. However, a single proof merely contain that
device's location and a verdict regarding the visibility of the Claimant (a binary result).
This does not provide the Veriﬁer with much detail to base its assessment upon. For
this reason, the Veriﬁer requires some method of extracting a ﬁnal verdict based on the
combined value of the proofs supplied. We outline two extraction approaches for use here.
The ﬁrst employs a simple summation, extracting a ﬁnal verdict based on the majority view
of the claim. The second employs the trustworthiness of those Proof Providers providing
supporting (positive) evidence regarding the claim.
The veriﬁcation process runs as follows: the Veriﬁer receives the proofs and checks
them to conﬁrm their applicability to the claim in question (Section 6.6.1). After this,
it evaluates each verdict provided (Section 6.6.2) and calculates the overall value of the
claim, before comparing this value to the already computed possibility scale (Section 6.6.3).
Finally, having made its decision on the possibility of the claim, the Veriﬁer then updates
the event sequences of all devices involved in the computation to reﬂect the events of the
veriﬁcation.
In order to minimise the amount of information retained on devices, particularly re-
garding their interactions with others, the veriﬁcation process does not employ details from
previous claims, other than those ﬁltered into the reputation system. Though the knowl-
edge that a device may previously have participated in multiple false claims with another
device may aid in the identifying of colluding partnerships, possessing this knowledge would
require the retention of large quantities of information on every device. This situation may
cause privacy concerns with participants and would represent a danger to the privacy of
every device within the system should the information's security be compromised.
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6.6.1 Pre-Veriﬁcation - Validating the Proofs
Before the Veriﬁer attempts to determine a claim's verdict, the proofs supplied must ﬁrst
be validated. This process ensures that the Claimant cannot pass oﬀ invalid proofs, such
as those referring to other devices or those from an older exchange, without detection. If
the Claimant is discovered to have attempted this, the claim is rejected and a negative
entry is added to the Claimant's event history.
To check a proof's validity, the Veriﬁer ﬁrst decrypts the message and checks its in-
tegrity, to ensure that no tampering has occurred, by checking the digital signature. It then
checks that the Claimant identity contained within the proof matches that of the Claimant
in question. Once this has been conﬁrmed, it then checks the timestamp, to ensure that it
does refer to this exchange and has not been reused from an older veriﬁcation attempt.
Finally, the Veriﬁer checks the identity of the Proof Provider that created the proof to
conﬁrm that the Proof Provider is a member of the group selected by the Veriﬁer during
the device selection stage. Without this check, a Claimant could again cheat the system,
through ignoring the supplied list of Proof Providers and simply gathering proofs from
colluding devices.
6.6.2 Evaluating a Verdict
After the proof gathering process has been concluded and pre-veriﬁcation has been com-
pleted, the overall possibility of the claim is calculated by summing up the values of the
verdicts received. The value of a verdict depends upon the veriﬁcation approach in use.
If the Veriﬁer is employing the Summation approach, the verdicts are valued as 1 for a
positive and 0 for a negative. If the Veriﬁer is employing the Trustworthiness approach,
the verdicts are valued at 0 for a negative and the trustworthiness of the proof's provider
for a positive. If a Proof Provider with a trustworthiness of 0.85 supplies a positive verdict,
that verdict is worth 0.85. However, if the same Proof Provider supplies a negative verdict,
it is worth 0.
Both approaches to veriﬁcation value negative verdicts at 0. Employing this form of
valuation places emphasis on positive verdicts, while removing the negative values from
the computation. This approach is taken due to the fact that a negative verdict may be
one of three types: (i) a true negative situation, (ii) an accidental false negative or (iii) a
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malicious negative. These situations are also discussed in Chapter 3.
(i) Where a negative verdict represents a true negative situation, it is caused by the
Claimant not being present in the area, or not within distance bounding range of that Proof
Provider. It is an accurate reﬂection of the situation, indicating that either the Claimant is
lying or mistaken in its location. If a true negative was the only possible negative verdict,
they would not need to be removed from the calculation of a claim's possibility. However,
this is not the case, with two additional types of negative existing.
(ii) In an accidental negative situation, the Proof Provider supplies a negative verdict
despite the fact that the Claimant is in the area of the Proof Provider and within rea-
sonable distance bounding range. This is due to either malfunctioning/underperforming
equipment, or performance issues on the local network. If negative verdicts were included
in the calculation of a claim's possibility, a Claimant could be unfairly punished for the
failure of equipment or network issues, as accidental negatives are not distinguishable from
true or malicious negatives.
(iii) The ﬁnal possible type of negative verdict, a malicious negative, is caused by
a Proof Provider knowingly supplying false evidence against a Claimant. In this case,
the Proof Provider is attempting to reduce the chances of the Claimant's location claim
being veriﬁed. It performs distance bounding and participates in the Claimant's exchange
honestly so as not to arouse suspicion. However, despite calculating that the Claimant is
in the vicinity, it supplies evidence to the contrary of this. As with accidental negatives,
there is no method of distinguishing malicious from true negatives. As its inclusion would
again unfairly punish the Claimant, this reinforces the case for the removal of all negative
verdicts.
The reasoning behind the removal of negative verdicts from the possibility calculation
may seem as though it also applies to positive verdicts, thus rendering the entire approach
moot. This is not the case, as mistaken or accidental positive verdicts are not possible.
Therefore, a Claimant cannot accidentally beneﬁt due to ﬂawed equipment or issues with
the communication medium. This is also the case for malicious (or colluding) false positives,
giving the system a slight skew towards the cause of the Claimant. The trustworthiness
approach to veriﬁcation seeks to address this this bias, reducing the value of evidence
supplied by those that are known to provide false information to reduce the gain received
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by a Claimant by its inclusion.
6.6.3 The Possibility Scale
In order to reach a ﬁnal verdict regarding the overall possibility of a claim within the
veriﬁcation system, we employ a measuring standard known as the possibility scale. This
scale allows for all claims to be compared to an equal scale, despite diﬀerences between
the number of Proof Providers participating. The scale has a minimum of 0, with the
maximum re-computed for each claim at the Proof Provider selection stage, based on the
number of devices involved in the claim. The scale is split into three bands based on set
percentage thresholds (discussed further in Section 6.6.4), each of which reﬂects a diﬀerent
level of trust in the claim and earns an equivalent overall verdict (possible/unsure/not
possible).
After the evidence-containing verdicts have received valuation, the overall value of the
claim is extracted. This is done by summing together the verdicts. The overall value
is then compared to the claim's possibility scale in order to reach a ﬁnal verdict. The
maximum value on the scale can be calculated in one of two ways, (i) based on the number
of devices participating (summation approach) or (ii) based on the trustworthiness values
of the Proof Providers (trustworthiness approach).
(i) Where the calculation of the possibility scale is done based solely on the number of
devices involved in the claim, the scale is calculated as follows: when the Veriﬁer selects
the devices for use as Proof Providers from the volunteer pool, it computes the maximum
possible value of the claim through summing the number of devices involved (as each piece
of evidence has a maximum possible value of 1 for a positive verdict and a minimum value
of 0 for a negative). This is done as follows:
Maximum value = #ProofProviders_Employed
(ii) Where the possibility scale is based on the trustworthiness values of those Proof
Providers that have provided supporting evidence, the maximum value on the scale is
calculated after the evidence-containing verdicts have been received. The calculation adds
the number of positive verdicts received and employs this as the maximum value on the
scale, as follows:
Maximum value = #Positive_Proofs
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Algorithm 2 Setting the Thresholds
set lower threshold:
lower_threshold = (maximum_possible_value * 0.4)
set upper threshold:
if minimum_Proof_Providers > 4 then
upper_threshold = (maximum_possible_value * 0.6)
else
upper_threshold = (maximum_possible_value * 0.7)
if using summation approach then
lower_threshold = lower_threshold rounded to nearest whole number
upper_threshold = upper_threshold rounded to nearest whole number
By including the trustworthiness of the Proof Providers involved in the claim within
the scale's calculation, the credibility of the devices involved has a direct impact on the
outcome of the claim. If the positive proofs are provided by very trustworthy devices, they
will be of higher value than those provided by less trustworthy devices. Therefore, even
if a large group of untrustworthy devices attempts to collude to provide proof of a claim,
their trustworthiness will prevent the claim from receiving a positive verdict.
6.6.4 Verdict Calculation Thresholds
Just as there are degrees of trustworthiness in a device, there are also degrees of trust-
worthiness, or possibility, in a claim. A claim may be possible, not have enough proof to
be convincingly possible, or it may be inconclusive. These inconclusive claims lie in the
grey area of not outrightly convincingly possible but also not quite at the other end of
the possibility scale. Therefore, rather than using only a single threshold distinguishing
between a possible and not convincing verdict, we employ two thresholds. This divides
the possibility scale into three distinct bands. The thresholds have been set at 40% and
60% of the initially possible trustworthiness respectively. If the summation approach to is
employed, the resulting threshold values are rounded to the nearest whole number.
The threshold percentages were arrived at through completing an initial series of veriﬁ-
cation simulations, using a minimum of ﬁve Proof Providers. In these simulations, various
percentage values were employed as thresholds to examine their suitability and accuracy.
It was discovered that this combination of values (40% & 60%) was the most suitable for
distinguishing between lying and honest claims, with the smallest amount of false posi-
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Algorithm 3 Computing a Verdict - Summation Approach
claim_value = Σ (positive_evidence)
if claim_value ≥ upper_threshold then
overall_verdict = possible
elseif claim_value ≥ lower_threshold then
overall_verdict = unsure
else
overall_verdict = not possible
tives/negatives. These thresholds have been employed within the veriﬁcation simulations
discussed in Section 6.7, and have shown to be reasonable limits for claims with more
than four Proof Providers, based upon empirical data collected from simulations. In cases
where four or fewer Proof Providers have been employed for a claim, the upper threshold is
increased to 70%. This prevents a situation where the same number of positive verdicts are
required to meet both thresholds, an issue observed in early simulations. The computation
of these thresholds is described in algorithm 2.
A separate calculation is undertaken to validate each claim, as the number of Proof
Providers included may diﬀer between claims. If this was not the case, the required value
to achieve a possible verdict for one set of Proof Providers may be unattainable for another
due to an insuﬃcient number of Proof Providers, thus leaving the claim unveriﬁable. How-
ever, the approaches described here recompute the scale for each claim and operate using
ﬁxed percentages as thresholds, rather than ﬁxed values. Therefore they are completely
adaptable to any device combination which may occur, while remaining consistant with
previous evaluations.
6.6.5 Computing the Verdict
Once the maximum value on the possibility scale has been computed and the verdict
thresholds have been set, the Veriﬁer completes the veriﬁcation process by extracting a
ﬁnal verdict on the possibility of the claim being examined. This extraction is done in one
of two ways, depending upon the veriﬁcation approach in use.
The extraction process for summation-based veriﬁcation is described in algorithm 3.
If a value lies within the ﬁrst band, between the starting value and ﬁrst threshold, it is
deemed not to be possible based on the proof supplied. In this case, a not possible
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Algorithm 4 Computing a verdict - Trustworthiness Approach
claim_value = Σ (positive_evidence_values)
if #Positive_Proofs >= 3 then
if claim_value ≥ upper_threshold then
overall_verdict = possible
elseif claim_value ≥ lower_threshold then
overall_verdict = unsure
else
overall_verdict = not possible
else
overall _verdict = unsure
verdict is returned. If a value is within the second band, lying between the ﬁrst and second
thresholds, the claim is deemed to be inconclusive based on the proof supplied and a verdict
of unsure is returned. Finally, if a claim's overall value is found to be between the second
threshold and the maximum value, then the claim is deemed to be possible and a verdict
of possible is returned.
The extraction process for trust-based veriﬁcation is described in algorithm 4. This
process is similar to that of summation based, with two basic diﬀerences. The ﬁrst is the
method by which the claim's value is computed. In this approach the value of the claim
is the sum of all evidence values for that claim. As discussed in Section , when employing
trustworthiness-based veriﬁcation the value of a verdict is calculated:
trust_of_supplier ∗ x
where x is either 0 or 1. If the verdict is positive, x = 1 and if the verdict is negative,
x = 0. Therefore, the summation of all evidence values for a claim becomes
Σ (positive_evidence_values)
The second diﬀerence between summation-based and trust-based verdict computation
is the introduction of a condition requiring a minimum number of positive proofs to have
been received for a claim. This prevents a claim from being veriﬁed on the strength of a
single proof, even if that proof is from an extremely trustworthy Proof Provider. If this
requirement is not met, the claim receives an unsure verdict, thus preventing the parties
involved from being punished without cause.
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With the claim's value calculated and the minimum number of positive proofs met,
trust-based verdict computation continues in the same manner as summation based. The
claim's value is compared to the upper threshold and if it is found to be greater than or
equal to this value, it receives a possible verdict. If it is less than the upper threshold, it
is compared to the lower threshold. If the claim's value falls between the two thresholds,
it receives a verdict of unsure. However, if the claim's value is below that of the lower
threshold, a verdict of not possible is returned.
After the ﬁnal possibility verdict has been reached, the event histories of the devices
involved in the claim are updated, based upon the claim's received verdict. If the ﬁnal
result is either possible or not possible, the event histories of the Claimant and those
Proof Providers which responded are updated. An update of 0 indicates that they did not
agree with the calculated verdict, with 1 indicating that they were in accord. However, in
the case of an unsure verdict, the event histories of the devices involved are not updated
as the results of the claim were inconclusive and are neither positive nor negative, therefore
cannot be represented by either of the two possible options. This process is described in
algorithm 1.
The nature of the veriﬁcation process and its connection to the reputation system in
this manner leaves the system open to abuse, whereby colluding devices can attempt to
reduce the trust in others through consciously returning the opposite verdict. The simplest
example of this is where a group of Proof Providers seeks to harm the trustworthiness of
their Claimant through all providing a negative verdict, even if the Claimant has proven
itself to be within range. If the majority of the Proof Providers participating in the claim
provide a negative verdict, the claim will result in an unsure verdict at best, rendering the
eﬀorts of the Claimant wasted. This attack can be guarded against through cautious and
unpredictable Proof Provider selection processes (Section 6.5) but cannot be completely
prevented, particularly in the case of Proof Providers attacking a Claimant. This is because
the Proof Providers are all focused on a single device, and are aware that the Claimant
is (usually) seeking a positive response from them. However, without knowing that the
other Proof Providers involved are also acting maliciously in this manner, a malicious
Proof Provider risks its own trustworthiness rating. If Proof Providers remain unaware of
their counterparts within the protocol (such as in extensions two (Section 4.4.2) and three
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(Section 4.4.3) of the SLVPGP), they cannot guarantee that their malicious attempt will
be supported by others and may not want to risk their own trust level.
6.7 Veriﬁcation Simulations
In order to conﬁrm the eﬀectiveness of the described veriﬁcation system and the diﬀerent
approaches that may be employed, we have performed multiple system simulations. These
simulations test the performance of the diﬀerent approaches in increasingly hostile environ-
ments, in addition to testing the eﬀectiveness and resistance to manipulation of the four
considered criteria for Proof Provider selection, outlined in Section 6.5. In this section, we
describe the system (Section 6.7.1) before outlining the simulations themselves (Section
6.7.2) and analysing their results (Section 6.7.3).
6.7.1 Veriﬁcation Simulation System Outline
The simulations outlined here have been implemented in Java and employ no existing
simulation software. Devices are created from an XML ﬁle and modelled as threads, with
each device spawning a single Claimant thread and creating Proof Providers as required
by the Veriﬁer. An algorithmic description of the Veriﬁer's functionality is provided in
algorithm 5, with descriptions of the Claimant and Proof Provider agents provided in
algorithms 6 and 7. The Claimant threads live for the duration of the simulation run and
randomly attempt to have a location veriﬁed. A single Veriﬁer thread also runs for the
duration of the simulation, dealing with veriﬁcation requests and keeping a count of the
number of claims initiated. Once the required number of claims have been completed, the
Veriﬁer sends a terminate command to each device and waits for their conﬁrmation. It
then writes the updated device information to the XML ﬁle and completes its run. It is
assumed that connectivity is bi-directional, i.e that if device A can see device B, then B
can also see device A. It is also assumed that if a device is in the area of the location being
claimed, then that device will automatically volunteer to act as a Proof Provider.
In order to ensure that the devices are representative of real world entities and do
not follow a pre-programmed pattern, an element of choice has been included in their
design. Claimants have the ability to decide to lie regarding a location claim, while Proof
Providers have a choice of three options in their approach to providing evidence regarding
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Algorithm 5 Description of Simulated Veriﬁer Behaviour
while veriﬁcation_count <= total_to_be_performed
if contacted_by_Claimant then
check ProofProvider_availability
count devices in region of location provided by Claimant
if(num_devices < minimum_ProofProviders_Required) then
reject claim request
else
select ProofProviders [selection algorithms available in Appendix M] and set thresholds
if veriﬁcation_approach is summation-based then
maximum_value = number of ProofProviders
else
maximum_value = number of positive proofs
lowerThreshold = maximum_value * 40%
if number of ProofProviders > 4 then
upperThreshold = maximum_value * 60%
else
upperThreshold = maximum_value * 70%
if veriﬁcation_approach is summation-based then
upperThreshold = upperThreshold rounded to nearest whole number
lowerThreshold = lowerThreshold rounded to nearest whole number
supply ProofProvider list to Claimant
receive Proofs and calculate verdict
if veriﬁcation_approach is summation-based then
claim_value = total_evidence_values
else
for evidence in Proofs
claim_value = claim_value + (evidence_value*trust_of_supplier)
if veriﬁcation_approach is trust-based and maximum_value < 3 then
verdict = unsure
elseif claim_value >= upperThreshold then
verdict = possible
elseif claim_value >= lowerThreshold then
verdict = unsure
else
verdict = not possible
return verdict and update event histories of devices involved
if verdict == possible then
claimant_history_value == 1
elseif verdict == not possible then
claimant_history_value == 0
for all ProofProviders in claim
if verdict == ProofProvider_verdict then
ProofProvider_history_value == 1
elseif verdict != ProofProvider_verdict and verdict != unsure then
ProofProvider_history_value == 0
increment veriﬁcation_count
for all devices in world
issue terminate command
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Algorithm 6 Description of Simulated Claimant Behaviour
while not terminated by Veriﬁer
initiate claim
if trusted_selection employed then
recompute inﬂuence map
set location to be provided
generate random behaviour_decision value
if behaviour_decision > internal_honesty then
set location to optimal location computed by inﬂuence map
else
set location to current location
provide location to Veriﬁer
if location is within range of suﬃcient Proof Providers then
for all supplied Proof Providers in list
request proof
supply proofs to Veriﬁer
receive verdict from Veriﬁer
else if not enough Proof Providers then
decrement value for location in inﬂuence map
sleep for randomly generated quantity of time
a claim. Once queried for a verdict, a Proof Provider can choose to either answer honestly,
lie or remain unresponsive (i.e. give no verdict). This ability is modelled using random
number generation. Each device possesses two internal_honesty measures, one for use as
a Claimant and one for use as a Proof Provider. These values, set between 0 and 100, are
not related to the trustworthiness values computed by the Veriﬁer within the system. They
represent a device's innate nature and not its pattern of previous behaviour. They dictate
the odds that a device will behave trustworthily in a particular role, although a device may
defy the odds and produce a pattern of behaviour in opposition to its internal_honesty
value.
Before a device acts, either by making a location claim as a Claimant or by providing
a verdict as a Proof Provider, it generates a random number between 0 and 100, known
as its behaviour_decision. If this number is less than or equal to its internal_honesty
for that role, the device proceeds honestly. However, if the behaviour_decision is greater
than the device's internal_honesty, the device proceeds dishonestly. In the case of the
Claimant role, the device in question makes a fraudulent location claim. In the case of the
Proof Provider role, the device will lie about its verdict. Lying in this situation does not
automatically guarantee a favourable response for the Claimant. This approach is also em-
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ployed to dictate a device's responsiveness. A device possesses an internal_responsiveness
value for use in the Proof Provider role. If a Proof Provider generates a random number
(its responsiveness_decision value) greater than the internal_responsiveness value, it will
refuse to provide a verdict for that Claimant, subject to some exceptions caused by the
existance of friendships.
All devices with an internal_honesty value below a specﬁed dishonest threshold (i.e.
those that are considered to possess a truly malicious nature and are not simply opportunis-
tic) possess a list of friends. This list is comprised of those devices that have previously
been lied in favour of or have lied to beneﬁt that device. It is assumed that friendship is bi-
directional, if device A considers device B a friend, then device B also considers device A a
friend. These friendships are used to dictate exceptions to normal behaviour. If a Claimant
is considered a friend of a Proof Provider, it will receive a positive verdict, regardless of a
Proof Provider's behaviour and responsiveness decisions. It is assumed that devices have
access to all information regarding their friends, including personal information such as
their identity and current location.
As discussed in Section 6.5, four diﬀerent criteria have been considered within this
work for use to select Proof Providers from the pool of available volunteers. These are: all
available volunteers, the most trustworthy of volunteers, the most geographically suited of
volunteers and ﬁnally, random selection. The algorithms employed by the Veriﬁer to ﬁlter
Proof Provider selection based on each of these can be found in Section B.1 of Appendix B.
Upon initiation of the simulation system, the Veriﬁer thread is given a parameter indicating
which of these criteria is to be employed in its selection of Proof Providers. This parameter
is also passed to all devices, modelling the worst case scenario in which malicious agents
within the system possess privileged information regarding the functionality of the Veriﬁer
and exploit this information to their advantage. The Claimant employs this information
within an inﬂuence map [92], which is designed to calculate the optimal location for use
within the world when lying regarding its location. For each algorithm employed by the
Veriﬁer to select Proof Providers from the available volunteers, the Claimant's inﬂuence
map possesses a counter-approach which attempts to calculate the location within range
of the fewest number of non-friend devices, based on that selection criteria. These counter-
algorithms are shown in Section B.2 of Appendix B. As there is no real method of defending
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Algorithm 7 Description of Simulated Proof Provider Behaviour
when ProofProvider requested by Veriﬁer
if verdict requested by Claimant then
generates random behaviour_decision value
generates random responsiveness_decision value
if internal_honesty <= dishonest_threshold and Claimant == friend then
verdict = positive
elseif responsiveness_decision <= internal_responsiveness then
set verdict = negative
if Claimant_x_coordinate == within range and Claimant_y_coordinate == within range then
verdict = positive
if behaviour_decision > internal_honesty then
invert verdict
if internal_honesty <= dishonest_threshold and Claimant is dishonest and verdict ==
positive then
save Claimant as friend
else
set as unresponsive, give no verdict
provide verdict
against the Veriﬁer's random selection approach, the inﬂuence map employs the same
counter-algorithm to defend against random selection as it does to defend against the
employment of all available volunteers.
The Veriﬁer thread has been equipped to simulate both trust-based and summation-
based veriﬁcation approaches. Upon initiation of the simulation system, the Veriﬁer thread
is given a parameter indicating which approach is to be employed in the veriﬁcation process.
The algorithm outlining the Veriﬁer's functionality (algorithm 5) shows the way in which
this parameter is employed to diﬀerenciate between veriﬁcation approaches.
6.7.2 Veriﬁcation Simulation Outlines
In this section, we outline the speciﬁcations employed within the simulations. The XML
ﬁles employed within the simulations each contain a total of 200 devices, made up of x
trustworthy devices and y untrustworthy devices. These 200 devices exist within a
100x100 grid. Where a device is classed as trustworthy, its internal_honesty values are
set between 95 and 100. Where a device is classed as untrustworthy, its internal_honesty
values are set between 0 and 20. For simplicity's sake, the same value was used as the
Claimant internal_honesty and Proof Provider internal_honesty. All devices are allocated
an internal_responsiveness value of between 90 and 100. A naming scheme based on the
number of honest and dishonest devices within the XML ﬁle has been employed. The
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200_0 190_10 180_20 160_40 150_50 140_60 120_80 100_100
Honest veriﬁed 100.00 99.35 98.41 89.37 85.63 77.97 69.66 49.61
Honest failed 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.28 3.19 1.38 13.18
Honest inconclusive 0.00 0.65 1.36 10.63 14.08 18.84 28.97 37.21
Lying veriﬁed 0.00 1.47 1.67 1.68 4.79 8.97 9.48 30.86
Lying failed 100.00 96.95 96.67 82.35 69.86 52.56 45.97 25.93
Lying inconclusive 0.00 1.58 1.67 15.97 25.34 38.46 44.55 43.21
Table 6.2: Performance Comparison of Summation-based Veriﬁcation Across Increasingly
Hostile Environments Using a Minimum of Five Proof Providers
number of honest devices appears ﬁrst, followed by an underscore and ﬁnally the number
of dishonest devices, e.g. 180_20, indicating 180 trustworthy devices and 20 untrustworthy
devices.
We have employed eight diﬀerent XML ﬁles in these simulations, each of which is com-
posed of a diﬀerent percentage of trustworthy devices. These range from 50% trustworthy
to 100% trustworthy. The devices within these ﬁles have been pre-trained in order to
bootstrap their reputations, thus providing the Veriﬁer with an indication of their trust-
worthiness. For each XML ﬁle, we have carried out eight simulation runs, the total number
of diﬀerent parameter combinations. A run's parameters are composed of the minimum
number of Proof Providers required to have a claim veriﬁed (set at ﬁve), the veriﬁcation
approach to be employed by the Veriﬁer and the selection method to be employed by the
Veriﬁer and Claimants. Where applicable, the maximum number of Proof Providers em-
ployed has been set at seven. Each simulation run terminates after 500 veriﬁcations have
been completed.
6.7.3 Veriﬁcation Simulation Results
In order to analyse the simulation results using diﬀerent criteria, this section has been
broken into two subsections; the overall functionality of the veriﬁcation approaches outlined
and the method of Proof Provider selection employed.
Overall system functionality
The graph shown in Figure 6.1 depicts the percentage of honest claims made that
received a possible result (shown by the graph's top line) within each of the XML environ-
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Figure 6.1: Performance Comparison of Summation-based Veriﬁcation Across Increasingly
Hostile Environments, Using a Minimum of Five Proof Providers
200_0 190_10 180_20 160_40 150_50 140_60 120_80 100_100
Honest veriﬁed 100.00 99.35 98.41 89.37 85.63 77.97 69.66 49.61
Lying veriﬁed 0.00 1.47 1.67 1.68 4.79 8.97 9.48 30.86
Table 6.3: Comparison of Veriﬁcation Rates Across Increasingly Hostile Environments
ments, when employing summation-based veriﬁcation using a minimum of ﬁve Proof
Providers. The remaining lines within the graphs indicate the percentage of false (lying)
claims that received a possible (veriﬁed), unsure (inconclusive) or not possible (failed)
result. The numbers used to generate Figure 6.1 are shown in Table 6.2. As expected,
the number of honest veriﬁcations trends downwards as the number of honest devices (i.e.
those with a trustworthiness level of greater than 95) within the environment decreases,
as does the number of failed false claims. However, despite this downward trend in the
number of failed false claims, the number of veriﬁcations received for false claims does not
greatly increase as the level of dishonest devices increases within the environment, with
the exception of the most dishonest environment, 100_100. Instead, there is a marked in-
crease in the number of inconclusive verdicts given. This indicates that the upper threshold
employed to conﬁrm the veracity of a claim is set at a suﬃcient level to protect against
inaccurate positive verdicts in marginally to moderately hostile environments. The ﬁgures
shown in Table 6.2 further demonstrate this trait. The number of lying claims veriﬁed
remains below 10% in every environment bar the most hostile, 100_100.
When examining the numbers generated by the most hostile environment, 100_100, the
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200_0 190_10 180_20 160_40 150_50 140_60 120_80 100_100
Honest veriﬁed 98.38 96.65 94.25 93.27 81.09 72.28 70.14 30.48
Honest failed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.37
Honest inconclusive 1.62 3.35 5.75 6.73 18.91 27.72 29.86 68.15
Lying veriﬁed 0.00 1.17 2.82 0.00 0.87 6.02 5.00 28.23
Lying failed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.76 9.38 0.96
Lying inconclusive 100.00 98.83 97.18 100.00 99.13 90.23 85.63 70.81
Table 6.4: Performance Comparison of Trust-based Veriﬁcation Across Increasingly Hostile
Environments Using a Minimum of Five Proof Providers
results for veriﬁcation of honest claims are unsurprisingly low at 49.61%. This indicates the
need for a higher percentage of honest devices to be present in the environment in order for
veriﬁcation to correctly function. Additionally, the percentage of false claims that received
a positive verdict is 30.86%, giving a high possibility that a false claim would be undetected.
This ﬁgure is dramatically reduced when the environment's ratio of honest to dishonest
devices moves from 100:100 to 120:80. The results generated by simulations employing
this environment show a false positive percentage of 9.48%. Similarly, the percentage of
honest claims veriﬁed increases from 49.61% to 69.66%. This improvement is charted in
Table 6.3, which compare the percentage of total honest and false claims veriﬁed. The
ﬁgures shown in this table indicate that once the level of honest devices present within
an environment rises to 75%, the system's performance reaches a reasonable level, with
85.63% of all honest claims veriﬁed and 4.79% of all false claims veriﬁed.
Overall, the results generated from simulation of a summation-based approach to ver-
iﬁcation demonstrate a high level of system performance, even in situations with high
percentages of dishonest devices. This proves that the designed approach can both verify
an honest claim and detect a false claim. The system successfully veriﬁes honest claims
up to 100% of the time, depending on the percentage of honest devices within the envi-
ronment. In the case of false claims, the system provides either a rejection or inconclusive
result between 69.14% (in an environment where 50% of the devices are highly malicious)
and 100% of the time.
The graph shown in Figure 6.2 depicts the percentage of honest claims veriﬁed when
assessed using trust-based veriﬁcation. As with the investigation of summation-based
veriﬁcation, the claims employ a minimum of ﬁve Proof Providers. The remaining lines
within the graphs indicate the percentage of false (lying) claims that received a possi-
181
Figure 6.2: Performance Comparison of Trust-based Veriﬁcation Across Increasingly Hos-
tile Environments, Using a Minimum of Five Proof Providers
Approach 200_0 190_10 180_20 160_40 150_50 140_60 120_80 100_100
Summation-based 100 96.95 96.67 82.35 69.86 52.56 45.97 25.93
Trust-based 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.76 9.38 0.96
Table 6.5: Comparing Failure Rates of Lying Clams Between Veriﬁcation Approaches
ble (veriﬁed), unsure (inconclusive) or not possible (failed) result. The numbers used to
generate this graph are shown in Table 6.4.
As with summation-based veriﬁcation, the number of honest veriﬁcations trends down-
wards as the number of honest devices within the environment decreases. Figure 6.1 shows
a relatively smooth descent, but the trend seen in Figure 6.2 is more dramatic. The initial
ﬁgures for trust-based veriﬁcation are relatively similar. However, the number of honest
claims veriﬁed quickly drops below those of summation-based, dropping as low as 30.48%
for the 100_100 environment (almost 20% below summation-based's minimum). Mean-
while, the number of failed false claims remains below 10% in all environments, with an
average of 1.76%. Table 6.5 provides further illustration of this, comparing the failure
detection rate within each environment. This table clearly demonstrates that summation-
based veriﬁcation is more suited to the detection of false claims, with an average detection
rate of 71.29%. Trust-based veriﬁcation achieves only a fraction of this, with an average
of 1.76% claims outrightly rejected.
However, despite the low number of detected false claims, trust-based veriﬁcation is
more adept at preventing the veriﬁcation of false claims. While summation-based veriﬁca-
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200_0 190_10 180_20 160_40 150_50 140_60 120_80 100_100
Honest veriﬁed 98.38 96.65 94.25 93.27 81.09 72.28 70.14 30.48
Lying veriﬁed 0.00 1.17 2.82 0.00 0.87 6.02 5.00 28.23
Table 6.6: Comparison of Veriﬁcation Rates Using Trust-based Veriﬁcation, Across In-
creasingly Hostile Environments
tion incurred a average false veriﬁcation rate of 7.37% across all environments, trust-based
veriﬁcation incurred an average of only 5.51%. The ﬁgures shown in Table 6.6 compare the
number of honest veriﬁcations against the number of lying claims veriﬁed for trust-based
veriﬁcation. The number of lying claims veriﬁed remains below 6.5% in every environment
bar the most hostile, 100_100.
When examining the numbers generated by the most hostile environment, 100_100,
the results for veriﬁcation of honest claims are again low at 30.48%. This supports the
hypothesis that a higher percentage of honest devices is needed within the environment
in order for veriﬁcation to correctly function. As with summation-based veriﬁcation, the
percentage of false claims that received a positive verdict is high, at 28.23%. However,
the reduction when moving from 100_100 to 120_80 is far more dramatic than that of
summation-based, with a false positive percentage of only 5%. Similarly, the percentage of
honest veriﬁcations increases from 30.48% to 70.14%, a far greater increase than that seen
in the summation-based results. This improvement is charted in Table 6.6, which indicates
that once the level of honest devices present rises to 75%, veriﬁcation performance reaches
a reasonable level, with 81.09% of all honest claims veriﬁed and 0.87% of all false claims
veriﬁed.
The results of these simulations assessing the performance of trust-based veriﬁcation
indicate that while the approach performs admirably when verifying honest claims (veri-
fying an average of 79.57% of all honest claims), it does not possess the ability to clearly
identify a false claim. While the number of false claims veriﬁed is lower then that achieved
by summation-based veriﬁcation, there is an extremely high number of inconclusive results,
reaching 100% of the attempted false claims (within the 200_0 environment). However,
the accuracy of the system is designed to increase over time, with more information be-
coming available regarding the trustworthiness of the Proof Providers involved. Therefore,
further simulation time would be beneﬁcial in order to study the eﬀectiveness of trust-based
veriﬁcation on a more long term scale.
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Figure 6.3: Selection Method Comparison Within the 160_40 Environment
All Available Most Trustworthy Most Suitable Location Randomly Selected
Lying veriﬁed 1% 4.05% 19.82% 4.78%
Lying failed 73% 86.49% 67.57% 72.11%
Lying inconclusive 26% 9.46% 12.61% 23.11%
Table 6.7: Selection Method Comparison Within the 160_40 Environment - Lying Claims
Method of Proof Provider selection
As mentioned in Section 6.5, the issue of Proof Provider selection is a delicate matter,
as it is at this point in the veriﬁcation process that the Claimant has the most potential
for inﬂuence. We introduced four possible Proof Provider selection methods in Section
6.5; all available options, most trustworthy devices, most suitable location and randomly
selected. For each of these methods, we discussed the possible exploitations a malicious
Claimant could possibly employ in order to manipulate them into selecting Proof Providers
of their choosing. In this section, we analyse the diﬀerences in performance demonstrated
in simulation results. We discuss these diﬀerences within the scope of a single environment:
160_40, the 100x100 world containing 160 trustworthy devices and 40 untrustworthy de-
vices. For the sake of clarity, we discuss only results computed using the summation-based
veriﬁcation approach, as this has demonstrated a higher level of accuracy.
The graph shown in Figure 6.3 display the results of all lying (false) claims, broken into
the number of positive, negative and inconclusive results received using each method of
selection, as a percentage of the overall number of lying claims. The ﬁgures corresponding
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All Trustworthiness Geographic Random
Honest veriﬁed 91.52% 95.32% 92.29% 91.00%
Honest failed 0.50% 0.23% 0.51% 1.22%
Honest inconclusive 7.98% 4.45% 7.20% 7.79%
Table 6.8: Selection Method Comparison Within the 160_40 Environment - Honest Claims
to this graph are shown in Table 6.7. In this set of simulations, a minimum of ﬁve Proof
Providers was required in order for veriﬁcation to occur. While it was expected that the
two uncontrollable methods, random and all, would be the most successful at detecting
false claims, this is not the case. Instead, it was discovered that trustworthiness performs
the most accurately, at a rate of 86.49%. Though a malicious Claimant may attempt
to inﬂuence the selection process through selecting a location near devices with a lower
trustworthiness than the friendly devices also in that area, it would require the majority of
the devices selected to be friendly. Otherwise, the reliability of the honest devices selected
will outweigh the impact of any malicious friendly devices. As the devices involved in this
situation have been bootstrapped to a point where a reliable trustworthiness level has been
established, selection based on this factor appears highly accurate, even in a 20% hostile
environment. It should also be noted that using trustworthiness as the selection method
for Proof Providers results in the highest veriﬁcation rate and lowest inconclusive rate for
honest claims (Table 6.8), making it the most accurate approach within this environment.
Though selection based on trustworthiness proved to be far more reliable than ﬁrst
believed, this is not the case for geographic selection. As expected, the selection method
most vulnerable to manipulation is selection based on this criterion. The results gathered
within the 160_40 environment show that geographic selection has the highest rate of
false claims veriﬁed (19.82%). Geographic selection also resulted in the second lowest
number of inconclusive verdicts (12.61%) for lying claims, less than half the number where
all volunteers were employed (26%). The majority of geographically selected false claims
were rejected, at 67.57%. However, this is the lowest number of failures received any of
the selection methods, reinforcing the hypothesis that geographic selection is the most
vulnerable to manipulation.
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6.8 From Veriﬁcation to Localization
Though a device's general location claim can be veriﬁed, the accuracy of the claim is
unknown. If a Claimant proves itself to be at a claimed location, it Claimant may be
located anywhere in the vicinity of that location. Without including a reﬁnement process
after a positive veriﬁcation, the location contained within the Veriﬁer's ﬁnal message to
the Claimant ties that Claimant only to the last location provided (XC). The location
at which the Claimant must have been while completing the evidence gathering process
is never calculated. In order to address this issue and improve the functionality of the
system, it is important to investigate the actual location of the Claimant and provide this
location within the Veriﬁer's proof message, rather than that dictated by the Claimant.
This is done through multilateration, using those Proof Providers that provided supporting
evidence as starting points.
6.8.1 Finding the Location
Multilateration is the overlapping of device transmission ranges in order to extract a small
area of intersection. The process of multilateration employs parameter pairs, comprised
of the location of each device being used in the process and that device's transmission
range. The information contained within these parameter pairs is collected during the
normal progression of the SLVPGP and volunteer gathering process. The device location
information is provided within the ﬁnal proof messages of the Proof Providers and the
range information is included within the volunteer response messages.
The information contained within the parameter pairs is employed as follows: the
location provided for a device becomes the centre of a circle, with the transmission range
providing the circle's radius. With these two pieces of information, an area corresponding
to the transmission capability of each included device is found. Through overlapping these
areas, the area of intersection is discovered. In order to be within range of all included
devices to earn the received positive evidence, the Claimant must have been located within
this area of intersection during the evidence gathering stage. Therefore, by discovering the
area of intersection of the supporting Proof Providers, a more accurate location for the
Claimant is found.
However, while this approach is appropriate for devices with a low level of motion in a
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short space of time, such as devices carried by pedestrians, it does not extend to those that
travel large distances in a short time. For example, within a VANET, a device may travel
over 30 metres in a single second. This means that the location at which it distance bounded
with one Proof Provider may be quite diﬀerent from that at which it distance bounded
with a second. While the transmission range of an IEEE 802.11 device may theoretically
reach 180 metres (IEEE 802.11n), this does not guarantee an overlap between locations.
As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 4, no ﬁeld work has been done to conﬁrm the ability
of this location veriﬁcation system to function in VANET environments, with mobility
remaining a critical question mark over its applicability in the area. Therefore, further
work is required to investigate the system's suitability for highly mobile devices and to
adequately address the issue of overlapping locations.
6.8.2 Improving Location Accuracy
Although the area in which the Claimant may be located is improved through the multi-
lateration process, some steps exist which can further increase the accuracy of this area. In
situations where only a limited number of Proof Providers may be used, the eﬀectiveness of
the multilateration process may be improved through employing the geographic criterion
when selecting Proof Providers for use in a claim (Section 6.5.4). By selecting devices
with a very small area of intersection, a more precise location may be found. Where an
over-abundance of Proof Providers is not a danger, selecting all volunteers for use (Section
6.5.2) provides the best level of accuracy, as it gives the largest number of locations and
transmission areas possible for that claim, and thus, the smallest possible region of overlap
in which the Claimant could be located.
6.9 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the location veriﬁcation engine, which takes the Proof
Provider verdicts supplied by the SLVPGP and extracts a possibility value for the lo-
cation claim being veriﬁed. We have presented two methods of veriﬁcation, neither of
which require trusted infrastructure to instill trust in the evidence gathered for use in a
claim. Instead, the evidence is judged based upon either the number of concurring devices
or the trust placed in those devices.
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In order to provide a method of gauging the trustworthiness of a device, we outlined
a combination of existing techniques employed to create a reputation system. With the
functionality of the reputation system established, we proceeded to discuss the remaining
responsibilities of the location veriﬁcation engine, namely the provision of Proof Providers
and the calculation of a claim's possibility. We put forth two basic approaches to the
gathering of volunteers for use as Proof Providers, Claimant-based and Veriﬁer-based, but
concluded that a Veriﬁer-based approach should be employed to reduce the likelihood of
collusion attacks. We then discussed a number of possible selection criteria to select Proof
Providers from the volunteer pool.
We proceeded to outline the two processes by which the Veriﬁer can extract a possibility
value for a given location claim, based on its supplied evidence. We discussed the concept
of the possibility scale, along with the use of ﬂexible thresholds instead of ﬁxed grading
values. We demonstrated the performance and accuracy of both veriﬁcation approaches
through performing java simulations. These simulations show that trust-based veriﬁcation
has potential but may require a high level of training to be truly eﬀective, while summation-
based veriﬁcation performs at reasonably high levels of detection with up to 25% of the
devices within the environment internally malicious (i.e. biased to behave maliciously in
at least 80% of their interactions). We also investigated a number of diﬀerent criteria
for use in Proof Provider selection. We discovered that although selection based on the
trustworthiness of a device is predictable, it is also the most adept at detecting false location
claims. We then closed the chapter with a brief proposal of how location accuracy can be
improved within the system.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Review
With the growth of mobile technology into an aﬀordable and accessible market, localization
has become increasingly important to extract the maximum information about a user's
situation. Within this area, location veriﬁcation is increasingly appealing, in order to
ensure an accurate reﬂection of the user's situation. However, a common weakness in both
localization and location veriﬁcation systems is reliance upon the presence of infrastructure
in order to locate a device.
In this thesis we have presented the design for a novel location veriﬁcation system that
does not require the use of infrastructure or implicitly trusted devices. This work extends
previously existing location veriﬁcation approaches and incorporates work from previously
unincluded research ﬁelds into the area of location veriﬁcation to remove this reliance.
We have addressed this weakness through employing an ad-hoc approach to the problem,
enlisting neighbouring devices to provide supporting evidence of a speciﬁc device's presence
in a claimed area. The research in this thesis has:
• established that the time required to complete a direct (unampliﬁed) message ex-
change over an IEE802.11 network greatly diﬀers from that required to complete a
proxied exchange.
• proposed a new metric to take advantage of this distinction, allowing for the detection
of proxy attacks in distance bounding.
• developed a pair of algorithms to compute the bounds for this metric on the ﬂy,
189
allowing the bounds to reﬂect the state of the network at the current time.
• developed a set of secure protocols (the SLVPGP hierarchy) for use to protect the
process of gathering evidence supporting a device's location claim.
• compared the incurred costs of these protocols against the gain in security when
moving from one level to another.
• veriﬁed the security claims of the SLVPGP hierarchy through model checking using
a combination of Casper and the FDR model checker.
• established a method of gathering neighbouring devices to act as Proof Providers for
a speciﬁc claim.
• discussed the beneﬁts and drawbacks of a number of selection criteria for use when
choosing Proof Providers from a pool of gathered volunteer devices.
• developed a method of verifying location claims using one of two weighting systems,
one of which includes the concept of a device's behaviour within the system creating
a reputation for that device.
• established the accuracy of the veriﬁcation method through multiple system simula-
tions.
We have enhanced the reliability of the evidence provided by a device through the devel-
opment of a novel metric for use with distance bounding. This metric allows a device to
distinguish between (unampliﬁed) direct and proxied communication in an IEEE 802.11
network, an advance that is made use of in the evidence gathering stage of location ver-
iﬁcation within this work. The ability of the metric to distinguish between direct and
proxied exchanges limits the possible distance between the evidence gathering device and
claiming device to a single (unampliﬁed) network hop range. We investigated the concept
of a window of acceptance in time, within which a direct communcation could be completed
while excluding any proxied communications. This was extended through the proposal of
a pair of protocols to compute the window of acceptance for a particular area in real time,
allowing the window to remain relevant despite network issues or heavy population.
Distance bounding using the binary metric has been employed to establish a verdict
regarding the presence of a device in a particular area, according to a neighbouring de-
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vice. As mentioned previously, by using the binary metric in this step, the proximity of
a Claimant to its evidence (proof) provider is limited to only a single hop range, where
the range is not ampliﬁed by specialist equipment. Anything above this is detected by
the metric and ﬂagged as a proxied exchange, essentially preventing undetectable proxy
attacks. We have presented an approach to gathers this proximity evidence from multi-
ple pre-selected devices in a Claimant's area. In order to protect the evidence gathering
process, we have developed the Secure Location Veriﬁcation Proof Gathering Protocol
(SLVPGP). This protocol has been designed to protect the evidence supplied and any par-
ticipants in the location veriﬁcation process, i.e. the claiming device and any neighbouring
devices supplying evidence. We developed this protocol in three layers, each with an in-
creased level of security. Through designing the protocol in this manner, we have provided
an increased level of ﬂexibility regarding security properties and overhead costs. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst location veriﬁcation protocol designed in such a manner.
By developing such a protocol to protect the evidence gathering process, the integrity
of the evidence provided is protected, as tampering can be detected and the compromised
evidence discarded. Additionally, by protecting the conﬁdential information pertaining to
participants in the protocol, it is more diﬃcult to identify who is participanting. Malicious
participants are prevented from tying the identity of other participants to their unique
hardware identiﬁers (MAC addresses) through the use of changing pseudonyms, while the
SLVPGP protects against external observers. Though local observers could deduce that
a device is making a location claim based on traﬃc and message content analysis, they
are not privy to the oﬃcial identity of the participants. Similarly, non-local devices that
receive forwarded protocol messages are unable to distinguish who the sender and receiver
are, or where they are located. Unless they are capable of tying a device's unique hardware
identiﬁer (MAC address) to a system identity, they cannot employ the information gathered
without being present to analyse the situation adequately. For example, if a remote device
(i.e. a device not local to the Claimant) was to discover that devices A and B were
functioning as Proof Providers, it could not extract the area in which the Claimant is
located as they cannot tie identities A and B to speciﬁc devices.
Using formal analysis techniques, we then investigated the security of each of the
SLVPGP extensions. This analysis allowed us to investigate the possibility of vulnera-
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bilities in the design of the protocols and remedy them before they could be discovered
and exploited. The results of this formal analysis indicate that the security properties
stated for each protocol layer are upheld, where the protocol is employed within the speci-
ﬁed environment. Additionally, we formally analysed the security of broadcasting messages
over an open network. This analysis supports the assumption that broadcasting a message
is secure, provided the message contents are adequately protected.
The protection aﬀorded to the evidence gathering process by the protocol presented
in this work is based upon a fundamental assumption that a claiming device is unable
to select the devices from which it gathers evidence. If this were possible, the Claimant
would be capable of completely circumventing the security measures built into the protocol
by controlling the evidence being supplied at the source, rather than through detectable
tampering. Additionally, honest volunteers would be vulnerable to targeting for an attack
on their reputation. If a malicious device wished to decrease the reputation of a speciﬁc
device it knew to be willing to act as a Proof Provider, it could manipulate the selection
process in some manner to ensure said device was selected as a Proof Provider for a
claim. The malicious device could then work with a group of friendly devices (also selected
as Proof Providers) to intentionally decrease the honest participant's reputation, thus
damaging its credibility within the system. The assumption that it is not possible for a
device to select those devices from which it collects evidence protects against manipulation
through denying the Claimant the ability to employ only devices willing to collude against
the system as Proof Providers. We have discussed a number of vulnerabilities to this form
of manipulation in the SLVPGP's initialisation process. These include the gathering of
volunteers for a claim and the selection criterion employed in the Proof Provider selection
process. Though the possibility of Proof Providers knowingly supplying false evidence
cannot be fully prevented, by addressing these vulnerabilities, the integrity of the evidence
provided within the SLVPGP is further protected, as are the reputations of those devices
participating in a claim.
We have presented a pair of protocols describing two approaches to volunteer gather-
ing: Claimant-based and Veriﬁer-based. We discussed the vulnerabilities inherent in the
inclusion of the Claimant in this process. Based on this discussion, we have advocated
the use of Veriﬁer-based gathering to limit the ability of the Claimant to manipute the
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process. By opting to employ this approach to volunteer gathering, the underlying system
assumption regarding the Claimant's inability to select Proof Providers is reinforced.
We discussed four possible approaches to the selection of Proof Providers from a pool of
volunteer devices: employing all available, selecting the most trustworthy, selecting those
with the smallest overlap of overlap and ﬁnally, selecting Proof Providers at random. The
selection criterion employed when choosing Proof Providers from a list of available volun-
teers has a great impact on the vulnerability of the veriﬁcation process to manipulation.
We demonstrated through simulation that due to the Claimant's inability to manipulate
the selection process, the employment of all devices is most advantageous, followed by the
use of random selection.
Finally, we have developed two verdict extraction methods based on the combining of
evidence gathered from the selected Proof Providers using the SLVPGP. These methods,
summation-based and trust-based, allow the location veriﬁcation system to extract a ﬁnal
verdict regarding the veracity of a device's location claim. Percentage-based thresholds
and a three-part scale have been employed to allow for the provision of three diﬀerent
verdict classiﬁcations: possible, unsure and not possible. We utilized these verdicts as
inputs into a reputation system, allowing for the computation of a device's trustworthiness
based on previous behaviour within the system. The accuracy of both judgement ap-
proaches presented has been demonstrated through simulations within increasingly hostile
environments.
7.2 Future Work and Open Issues
The main goal of this research has been to produce a novel approach to location veriﬁcation
that does not rely on a pre-existing infrastructure of devices. This goal has become of
signiﬁcant interest in the area of location veriﬁcation, with recent research turning towards
ad-hoc systems in an eﬀort to move away from infrastructure dependance. While the work
presented in this dissertation is comprehensive, there remain a number of avenues for future
research.
As we outlined brieﬂy in Chapter 6, there is a possibility that the number of volunteers
available for a claim may prove to be too large to utilize the employ all available selection
approach. With the ever-increasing popularity of mobile networking devices, there may
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simply be too many devices in a single area to allow for distance bounding at a reasonable
speed. We intend to investigate the impact the number of Proof Providers has on the
accuracy of a verdict, in order to ascertain a reasonable limit on the number to be employed
on any one claim. This investigation will be an extension of the experiments described in
Section 6.5.1 of Chapter 6. While those experiments established the minimum number of
Proof Providers required to produce a reliable veriﬁcation, continuing these experiments
will investigate the point at which increasing the number of Proof Providers involved in a
claim does not increase the accuracy of the veriﬁcation.
This issue also ties into the impact of a heavily populated network on the accuracy
of distance bounding, an issue mentioned in Chapter 3. We intend to emulate distance
bounding in a more densely populated network, to investigate the accuracy of the binary
metric in this situation. This will be achieved initially through the deployment of multiple
other active devices within the testing network when conducting emulations, and extended
to include emulations of multiple devices attempting location veriﬁcation simultaneously
on the same network. Additionally, we intend to establish the accuracy of the binary
metric where a more aggressive proxy attack is launched. At present, the applicability
of the binary metric has been proven where a proxy attack is comprised of an additional
IEEE 802.11 network hop in each direction. In a more aggressive proxy attack, however,
these additional hops may not incur such high time costs due to the equipment employed.
While this form of proxy attack is not currently as common as the simpler proxy we have
discussed, we believe that its existance should be addressed, ideally through emulations
including higher speed equipment using high-speed connections. We also intend to establish
the ability of the binary metric to detect the diﬀerence between direct exchanges and
ampliﬁed direct exchanges, as this has not yet been addressed. This will ideally be done
through emulations similar to those presented in Chapter 3. Should these investigations
lead to the discovery that the binary metric is not as accurate when ampliﬁcation equipment
is involved, the existance of a cut oﬀ point will be investigated. By establishing a cut oﬀ
point, the acceptable area outside the normal transmission range is limited and a new,
larger acceptance area is established. This issue was not previously investigated due to a
lack of equipment, a problem which also prevented the investigation of other issues over
the course of this project.
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A lack of available equipment has also prevented the system from being ﬁeld tested
on a functional VANET, in order to establish its ability to accurately verify claims in this
environment. Though the system was initially designed for VANETs, the high mobility
rate of nodes within these networks means that connectivity between devices may not be
sustained long enough to complete evidence gathering. Therefore it is unknown whether
VANETs are a suitable environment in which to deploy the system. Future investigations
will deploy the system in a working VANET at various speeds and node densities to
investigate its functionality.
The approach to veriﬁcation described in this work relies on a central entity in order
to verify a location claim. While this design does provide a high level of security and
functionality, it is also structurally problematic. The Veriﬁer represents a single point of
failure within the design. If the Veriﬁer is unavailable or overloaded, no veriﬁcations can
occur. This issue can be addressed through the implementation of a hierarchy of Veriﬁers,
each managing a speciﬁc catchment area. However, reliance upon a device not local to
the claim is not ideal. Future work on this issue would seek an alternative approach to
this design, allowing for an untrusted local device to provide appropriate veriﬁcation of a
claim.
As discussed in Chapter 6, the initialisation of the veriﬁcation system's reputation
engine remains an open issue. Currently there exists no method of distinguishing honest
devices from dishonest devices at the point of initialisation. When a reputation engine is
initialised, all participants appear equal, providing any dishonest devices with an advantage
over the system. While bootstrapping approaches have been proposed in order to address
this, they are less than ideal where trusted devices are not desired or available as part of
the system. Research is ongoing in the area and while no solution has been discovered yet,
work is continuing in an attempt to address the issue.
One ﬁnal open issue is the extraction of a Claimant's speciﬁc location at the time of
proving its claim, where the Claimant has a high level of mobility, e.g. within a VANET.
The method we have discussed in Chapter 6 is suited to a low mobility situation, such
as a pedestrian's handheld device. However, where a device can travel large distances in
short spaces of time, the location at which it contacts one Proof Provider for distance
bounding may diﬀer greatly from its location when it contacts a second. This means
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that simple multilateration cannot be relied upon to extract an accurate location. Fu-
ture work to remedy this issue would result in an increased level of accuracy within the
location veriﬁcation system, enabling the veriﬁcation and provision of a device's speciﬁc
location and not merely the area within which it is currently located. The most logical
adaptation of this work to achieve a solution to this issue would be the employment of
simultaneous multilateration, such as that employed in the work of Capkun et al [95, 94].
The SLVPGP's current approach to proximity establishment would need to be altered in
order to allow the same response to answer the distance bounding request of all Proof
Providers involved, rather than each Proof Provider individually distance bounding with
the Claimant. Through employing an adaptaton of this approach, proximity to all Proof
Providers would be established simultaneously, removing the issue of movement between
interactions.
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Appendix A
Model Checking Casper Scripts
A.1 SLVPGP Casper scripts
A.1.1 Extension one casper script
#Free variables
C : Agent
V : Verifier
P, Pb : Prover
SKAgent : Agent -> SecretKey
PKAgent : Agent -> PublicKey
SKProver : Prover -> ProverSecretKey
PKProver : Prover -> ProverPublicKey
SKVerifier : Verifier -> VerifierSecretKey
PKVerifier : Verifier -> VerifierPublicKey
nP, nPb, n2P, n2Pb : Nonce
hP, hPb, h1P, h1Pb : Hashed
xC : Location
tC, tP, tPb, tV : TimeStamp
proof, proofB : Proofs
dV : Verdict
InverseKeys = (PKAgent, SKAgent), (SKProver, PKProver),
(PKVerifier, SKVerifier)
#Processes
I
Verifier(V, P, Pb, dV) knows PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, SKVerifier(V)
Claimant(C, V, nP, nPb, h1P, h1Pb) knows PKAgent, PKProver,
PKVerifier, SKAgent(C)
ProofProvider(P, V, hP, n2P, proof) knows PKProver, PKAgent,
PKVerifier, SKProver(P)
ProofProviderB(Pb, V, hPb, n2Pb, proofB) knows PKProver, PKAgent,
PKVerifier, SKProver(Pb)
#Protocol description
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}
2. V -> C: {P, Pb}{SKVerifier(V)}
3. C -> P: {P, C, {nP}{PKProver(P)}}{SKAgent(C)}
4. C -> Pb: {Pb, C, {nPb}{PKProver(Pb)}}{SKAgent(C)}
5. P -> C: hP, n2P
6. Pb -> C: hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> P: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
8. C -> Pb: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)}
9. P -> C: {P, tP, proof, C}{SKProver(P)} % mP
10. Pb -> C: {Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)} % mPb
11. C -> V: {C, xC, tC}{SKAgent(C)}
11a. C -> V: mP % {P, tP, proof, C}{SKProver(P)}
11b. C -> V: mPb % {Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)}
12. V -> C: {dV, C, xC, tV}{SKVerifier(V)}
#Functions
symbolic PKAgent, SKAgent
symbolic PKVerifier, SKVerifier
symbolic SKProver, PKProver
#Specification
Agreement(P, V, [proof])
Agreement(Pb, V, [proofB]) -- V and PP must agree on the proof value
Agreement(V, C, [dV]) -- V & C must agree on the final value of V's verdict
II
#Actual variables
Claim, Eve : Agent
Verif, Eve : Verifier
ProofP, ProofPb, Eve : Prover
NP, NPb, N2P, N2Pb: Nonce
HP, HPb, H1P, H1Pb : Hashed
XC : Location
DV : Verdict
Proof, ProofB : Proofs
TimeStamp = 0 .. 0
MaxRunTime = 0
#System
Verifier(Verif, ProofP, ProofPb, DV)
Claimant(Claim, Verif, NP, NPb, H1P, H1Pb)
ProofProvider(ProofP, Verif, HP, N2P, Proof)
ProofProviderB(ProofPb, Verif, HPb, N2Pb, ProofB)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Eve
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, PKAgent(Claim),
PKProver(ProofP), PKProver(ProofPb), PKVerifier(Verif), SKAgent(Eve),
SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve)}
A.1.2 Extension Two Casper Script
#Free variables
C : Agent
V : Verifier
P, Pb : Prover
SKAgent : Agent -> SecretKey
PKAgent : Agent -> PublicKey
SKProver : Prover -> ProverSecretKey
PKProver : Prover -> ProverPublicKey
SKVerifier : Verifier -> VerifierSecretKey
PKVerifier : Verifier -> VerifierPublicKey
III
nP, nPb, n2P, n2Pb : Nonce
hP, hPb, h1P, h1Pb : Hashed
xC : Location
tC, tP, tPb, tV : TimeStamp
proof, proofB : Proofs
dV : Verdict
InverseKeys = (PKAgent, SKAgent), (SKProver, PKProver),
(PKVerifier, SKVerifier)
#Processes
Verifier(V, P, Pb, dV) knows PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, SKVerifier(V)
Claimant(C, V, nP, nPb, h1P, h1Pb) knows PKAgent, PKProver,
PKVerifier, SKAgent(C)
ProofProvider(P, V, hP, n2P, proof) knows PKProver, PKAgent,
PKVerifier, SKProver(P)
ProofProviderB(Pb, V, hPb, n2Pb, proofB) knows PKProver, PKAgent,
PKVerifier, SKProver(Pb)
#Protocol description
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVerifier(V)}
2. V -> C: {{P, Pb}{SKVerifier(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. C -> P: {{P, C, nP}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKProver(P)}
4. C -> Pb: {{Pb, C, nPb}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKProver(Pb)}
5. P -> C: hP, n2P
6. Pb -> C: hPb, n2Pb
7. C -> P: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
8. C -> Pb: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)}
9. P -> C: {{P, tP, proof, C}{SKProver(P)} % mP}{PKAgent(C)}
10. Pb -> C: {{Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)} % mPb}{PKAgent(C)}
11. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVerifier(V)}
11a. C -> V: {{mP % {P, tP, proof, C}{SKProver(P)}}{SKAgent(C)}}
{PKVerifier(V)}
11b. C -> V: {{mPb % {Pb, tPb, proofB, C}{SKProver(Pb)}}{SKAgent(C)}}
{PKVerifier(V)}
IV
12. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVerifier(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
#Functions
symbolic PKAgent, SKAgent
symbolic SKProver, PKProver
symbolic SKVerifier, PKVerifier
#Specification
Agreement(P, V, [proof])
Agreement(Pb, V, [proofB])
Agreement(V, C, [dV])
Secret(C, C, [V, P, Pb])
Secret(P, P, [V, C])
Secret(Pb, Pb, [V, C])
Secret(C, xC, [V])
Secret(P, proof, [V, C])
Secret(Pb, proofB, [V, C])
#Actual variables
Claim, Eve : Agent
Verif, Eve : Verifier
ProofP, ProofPb, Eve : Prover
NP, NPb, N2P, N2Pb: Nonce
HP, HPb, H1P, H1Pb : Hashed
XC : Location
DV : Verdict
Proof, ProofB : Proofs
TimeStamp = 0 .. 0
MaxRunTime = 0
#System
Verifier(Verif, ProofP, ProofPb, DV)
Claimant(Claim, Verif, NP, NPb, H1P, H1Pb)
ProofProvider(ProofP, Verif, HP, N2P, Proof)
V
ProofProviderB(ProofPb, Verif, HPb, N2Pb, ProofB)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Eve
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, PKAgent, PKVerifier, PKProver, PKAgent(Claim),
PKVerifier(Verif), PKProver(ProofP), PKProver(ProofPb), SKAgent(Eve),
SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve)}
A.1.3 Extension Three Casper Script
#Free variables
O : OracleType
C : Agent
V : Verifier
P, Pb : Prover
SKAgent : Agent -> SecretKey
PKAgent : Agent -> PublicKey
SKProver : Prover -> ProverSecretKey
PKProver : Prover -> ProverPublicKey
SKVerifier : Verifier -> VerifierSecretKey
PKVerifier : Verifier -> VerifierPublicKey
nP, nPb, n2P, n2Pb : Nonce
hP, hPb, h1P, h1Pb : Hashed
xC : Location
tC, tP, tPb, tV : TimeStamp
proof, proofB : Proofs
dV : Verdict
InverseKeys = (PKAgent, SKAgent), (SKProver, PKProver),
(PKVerifier, SKVerifier)
#Processes
Verifier(V, P, Pb, kCP, kCPb, dV, nP, n1P, nPb, n1Pb) knows PKAgent,
PKProver, PKVerifier, SKVerifier(V)
Claimant(C, V, O, h1P, h1Pb) knows PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, SKAgent(C)
Oracle(O, C, V, P, Pb) knows PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier
ProofProvider(P, V, proof, hP, n2P) knows PKProver, PKAgent,
VI
PKVerifier, SKProver(P)
ProofProviderB(Pb, V, proofB, hPb, n2Pb) knows PKProver, PKAgent,
PKVerifier, SKProver(Pb)
#Protocol description
0. -> C: xC
1. C -> V: {{C, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVerifier(V)}
2. V -> C: {{nP, n1P, kCP, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVerifier(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
3. V -> P: {{{P, nP, n1P, kCP}{SKVerifier(V)}}{PKProver(P)}}{SKVerifier(V)}
4. V -> Pb: {{{Pb, nPb, n1Pb, kCPb}{SKVerifier(V)}}{PKProver(Pb)}}
{SKVerifier(V)}
5. C -> O: {C}{PKVerifier(V)} % mCP
5a. O -> P: {C}{PKVerifier(V)} % mCP
6. C -> O: {C}{PKVerifier(V)} % mCPb
6a. O -> Pb: {C}{PKVerifier(V)} % mCPb
7. P -> O: hP, n2P
7a. O -> C: hP, n2P
8. Pb -> O: hPb, n2Pb
8a. O -> C: hPb, n2Pb
9. C -> O: h1P, {n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN
9a. O -> P: h1P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1)
10. C -> O: h1Pb, {n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN
10a. O -> Pb: h1Pb, mCPbN % ({n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1)
11. P -> O: h(kCP) % mCPh, {nP, {{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1),
tP, proof, mCP % ({C}{PKVerifier(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVerifier(V)} % mPV}{kCP} % mCPk
11a. O -> C: mCPh % h(kCP), mCPk % {nP, mPV % ({{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)}
% mCPN1), tP, proof, mCP % ({C}{PKVerifier(V)} % mCP1)}{SKProver(P)}}
{PKVerifier(V)} % mPV1)}{kCP}
12. Pb -> O: h(kCPb) % mCPbh, {nPb, {{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} %
mCPbN1), tPb, proofB, mCPb % ({C}{PKVerifier(V)} % mCPb1)}{SKProver(Pb)}}
{PKVerifier(V)} % mPbV}{kCPb} % mCPbk
12a. O -> C: mCPbh % h(kCPb), mCPbk % {nPb, mPbV % ({{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2Pb}
{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1), tPb, proofB, mCPb % ({C}{PKVerifier(V)} % mCPb1)}
{SKProver(Pb)}}{PKVerifier(V)} % mPbV1)}{kCPb}
VII
13. C -> V: {{C, tC, xC}{SKAgent(C)}}{PKVerifier(V)}
13a. C -> V: {mPV1 % ({{P, mCPN % ({n2P}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPN1), tP, proof,
mCP1 % {C}{PKVerifier(V)}}{SKProver(P)}}{PKVerifier(V)})}{SKAgent(C)}
13b. C -> V: {mPbV1 % ({{Pb, mCPbN % ({n2Pb}{SKAgent(C)} % mCPbN1), tPb,
proofB, mCPb1 % {C}{PKVerifier(V)}}{SKProver(Pb)}}
{PKVerifier(V)})}{SKAgent(C)}
14. V -> C: {{dV, xC, C, tV}{SKVerifier(V)}}{PKAgent(C)}
#Functions
symbolic PKAgent, SKAgent
symbolic SKProver, PKProver
symbolic SKVerifier, PKVerifier
#Specification
Agreement(P, V, [proof])
Agreement(Pb, V, [proofB])
StrongSecret(C, C, [O, V])
StrongSecret(P, P, [O, V])
StrongSecret(Pb, Pb, [O, V])
StrongSecret(C, xC, [V])
StrongSecret(P, proof, [V])
StrongSecret(Pb, proofB, [V])
#Actual variables
TheOracle : OracleType
Claim, Eve : Agent
Verif, Eve : Verifier
ProofP, ProofPb, Eve : Prover
NP, NPb, N1P, N1Pb, N2P, N2Pb: Nonce
HP, HPb, H1P, H1Pb : Hashed
XC : Location
DV : Verdict
Proof, ProofB : Proofs
TimeStamp = 0 .. 0
VIII
MaxRunTime = 0
#System
Verifier(Verif, ProofP, ProofPb, KCP, KCPb, DV, NP, N1P, NPb, N1Pb)
Claimant(Claim, Verif, TheOracle, H1P, H1Pb)
Oracle(TheOracle, Claim, Verif, ProofP, ProofPb)
ProofProvider(ProofP, Verif, Proof, N2P, HP)
ProofProviderB(ProofPb, Verif, ProofB, N2Pb, HPb)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Eve
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, TheOracle, PKAgent, PKAgent(Claim), PKProver,
PKProver(ProofP), PKProver(ProofPb), PKVerifier, PKVerifier(Verif),
SKAgent(Eve), SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve)}
A.1.4 Alternative Intruder Information
A.1.4.1 Alternative intruder information for extensions one and two
Known C
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, SKAgent(Eve),
SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim), PKProver(ProofP),
PKProver(ProofPb), SKAgent(Claim)}
Known C/P
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, SKAgent(Eve),
SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim), PKProver(ProofP),
PKProver(ProofPb), SKAgent(Claim), SKProver(ProofP)}
Known C/Pb
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, SKAgent(Eve),
SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim), PKProver(ProofP),
PKProver(ProofPb), SKAgent(Claim), SKProver(ProofPb)}
Known C/P/Pb
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, SKAgent(Eve),
IX
SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim), PKProver(ProofP),
PKProver(ProofPb), SKAgent(Claim), SKProver(ProofP), SKProver(ProofPb)}
Known P
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, SKAgent(Eve),
SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim), PKProver(ProofP),
PKProver(ProofPb), SKProver(ProofP)}
Known Pb
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, SKAgent(Eve),
SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim), PKProver(ProofP),
PKProver(ProofPb), SKProver(ProofPb)}
Known P/Pb
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier, SKAgent(Eve),
SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim), PKProver(ProofP),
PKProver(ProofPb), SKProver(ProofP), SKProver(ProofPb)}
A.1.4.2 Alternative intruder information for extension three
Known C
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, TheOracle, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier,
SKAgent(Eve), SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim),
PKProver(ProofP), PKProver(ProofPb), SKAgent(Claim)}
Known C/P
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, TheOracle, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier,
SKAgent(Eve), SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim),
PKProver(ProofP), PKProver(ProofPb), SKAgent(Claim), SKProver(ProofP)}
Known C/Pb
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, TheOracle, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier,
SKAgent(Eve), SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim),
PKProver(ProofP), PKProver(ProofPb), SKAgent(Claim), SKProver(ProofPb)}
Known C/P/Pb
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, TheOracle, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier,
SKAgent(Eve), SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim),
X
PKProver(ProofP), PKProver(ProofPb), SKAgent(Claim), SKProver(ProofP),
SKProver(ProofPb)}
Known P
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, TheOracle, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier,
SKAgent(Eve), SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim), PKProver(ProofP),
PKProver(ProofPb), SKProver(ProofP)}
Known Pb
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, TheOracle, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier,
SKAgent(Eve), SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim), PKProver(ProofP),
PKProver(ProofPb), SKProver(ProofPb)}
Known P/Pb
IntruderKnowledge = {Verif, TheOracle, PKAgent, PKProver, PKVerifier,
SKAgent(Eve), SKProver(Eve), SKVerifier(Eve), PKAgent(Claim), PKProver(ProofP),
PKProver(ProofPb), SKProver(ProofP), SKProver(ProofPb)}
A.2 Broadcasting Casper scripts
A.2.1 Basic Casper Script
#Free variables
S : ServerType
A, B, C : Agent
O : OracleType
SK : Agent -> SecretKey
PK : Agent -> PublicKey
mB : MessageBob
mC : MessageCeline
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
#Processes
ServerProc(S, A, B, C, O) knows PK
Initiator(A, O, S) knows PK, SK(A)
RecipientB(B, O, S) knows PK, SK(B)
RecipientC(C, O, S) knows PK, SK(C)
XI
OracleProc(O, A, B, C, S) knows PK
#Protocol description (i)
0. -> S: mB, mC
1. S -> A: {mB}{PK(B)} % nMb, {mC}{PK(C)} % nMc
2. A -> O: nMb % ({mB}{PK(B)} % nMb1)
#Protocol description (ii)
3. O -> B: nMb1 % {mB}{PK(B)}
4. A -> O: nMc % ({mC}{PK(C)} % nMc1)
5. O -> C: nMc1 % {mC}{PK(C)}
#Functions
symbolic PK, SK
#Specification
Agreement(S, B, [mB])
Agreement(S, C, [mC])
Secret(A, A, [O])
Secret(B, B, [O])
Secret(C, C, [O])
Secret(S, mB, [B])
Secret(S, mC, [C])
#Actual variables
Alice, Bob, Celine, Eve : Agent
Oracle : OracleType
Server : ServerType
MB : MessageBob
MC : MessageCeline
#System
ServerProc(Server, Alice, Bob, Celine, Oracle)
Initiator(Alice, Oracle, Server)
RecipientB(Bob, Oracle, Server)
RecipientC(Celine, Oracle, Server)
XII
OracleProc(Oracle, Alice, Bob, Celine, Server)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Eve
IntruderKnowledge = {Server, Oracle, PK, SK(Eve)}
A.2.2 Additional Intruder Information
Known A
IntruderKnowledge = {Server, Oracle, PK, SK(Eve), PK(Alice), SK(Alice)}
Known B
IntruderKnowledge = {Server, Oracle, PK, SK(Eve), PK(Bob), SK(Bob)}
Known C
IntruderKnowledge = {Server, Oracle, PK, SK(Eve), PK(Celine), SK(Celine)}
Known A/B
IntruderKnowledge = {Server, Oracle, PK, SK(Eve), PK(Bob), SK(Bob), PK(Alice),
SK(Alice)}
Known A/C
IntruderKnowledge = {Server, Oracle, PK, SK(Eve), PK(Celine), SK(Celine),
PK(Alice), SK(Alice)}
XIII
Appendix B
Veriﬁcation Simulations
B.1 Proof Provider Selection Algorithms
The algorithms outlined in this section (algorithms 8 - 11) describe the diﬀerent approaches
taken by the Veriﬁer when selecting Proof Providers based on a speciﬁc criterion. These
approaches are employed within the veriﬁcation simulations discussed in Section 6.7.
Algorithm 8 Selection Method 1 - All Available Volunteers
set current_volunteer to ﬁrst in volunteer_pool
for all volunteers in volunteer_pool
add current_volunteer to selected
set current_volunteer to next in volunteer_pool
Algorithm 9 Selection Method 2 - Most Trustworthy Volunteers
for all volunteers in volunteer_pool
get ProofProvider trustworthiness of current_volunteer
sort volunteers by trustworthiness
if number of volunteers <= maximum allowable Proof Providers then
add all volunteers to selected_volunteers
else
set most trusted in pool as current_volunteer
while number_selected < maximum allowable Proof Providers
add current_volunteer to selected_volunteers
remove current_volunteer from pool
set next most trusted volunteer in pool as current_volunteer
A
Algorithm 10 Selection Method 3 - Most Suitably Located Volunteers
if number of volunteers <= maximum allowable Proof Providers then
add all volunteers to selected_volunteers
else
while number in selected_volunteers < maximum allowable Proof Providers
sort volunteers by location furthest west relative to claimed location
set volunteer furthest west as current_volunteer
if number in selected_volunteers < maximum allowable Proof Providers then
while current_volunteer not added
if current_volunteer not in selected_volunteers then
add current_volunteer to selected_volunteers
else
set next furthest volunteer west as current_volunteer
sort volunteers by location furthest east relative to claimed location
set volunteer furthest east as current_volunteer
if number in selected_volunteers < maximum allowable Proof Providers then
while current_volunteer not added
if current_volunteer not in selected_volunteers then
add current_volunteer to selected_volunteers
else
set next furthest volunteer east as current_volunteer
sort volunteers by location furthest north relative to claimed location
set volunteer furthest north as current_volunteer
if number in selected_volunteers < maximum allowable Proof Providers then
while current_volunteer not added
if current_volunteer not in selected_volunteers then
add current_volunteer to selected_volunteers
else
set next furthest volunteer north as current_volunteer
sort volunteers by location furthest south relative to claimed location
set volunteer furthest south as current_volunteer
if number in selected_volunteers < maximum allowable Proof Providers then
while current_volunteer not added
if current_volunteer not in selected_volunteers then
add current_volunteer to selected_volunteers
else
set next furthest volunteer south as current_volunteer
Algorithm 11 Selection Method 4 - Random Subset of Volunteers
if number in volunteer pool <= maximum allowable Proof Providers then
add all volunteers to selected_volunteers
else
while number in selected_volunteers < maximum allowable Proof Providers then
generate random number X
if volunteer_X not in selected_volunteers then
add volunteer_X to selected_volunteers
B
Algorithm 12 Counter-Algorithm for Selection Methods 1 & 4 - All Available & Randomly
Selected Volunteers
for all locations in range of added_device
increase location_value by 1
if added_device is friend then
increase location_value by 1
else
compute distance between x coordinates
compute distance between y coordinates
decrease location_value by
(
1
x_distance∗0.75 +
1
y_distance∗0.75
)
B.2 Malicious Counter-Algorithms
The algorithms outlined in this section describe the diﬀerent approaches taken by a mali-
cious device to compute the optimum false location to be claimed within its environment.
These approaches are performed by the inﬂuence map of a device at initialisation, or when
another device updates its location. They are designed to counter the approaches employed
by the Veriﬁer when selecting Proof Providers in that manner, and are employed within
the veriﬁcation simulations discussed in Section 6.7.
When a device is initialised, it loads all information it possesses regarding other devices
in the world into its inﬂuence map. The inﬂuence map attempts to compute the optimal
false location to be claimed using this information. For each device added to the world, the
inﬂuence map employs one of the counter-algorithms described here to gauge the impact of
that device on its surrounding area. Each location within the map is assigned a value, and
the values of those locations within range of the device being added are updated using a
speciﬁc counter algorithm. The inﬂuence map can then compare each of the stored values
to provide the optimal location for use in a false claim.
Algorithm 13 Counter-Algorithm for Selection Method 2 - Most Trustworthy Volunteers
for all locations in range of added_device
increase location_value by 1
if added_device is friend then
increase location_value by added_device_trustworthiness
else
decrease location_value by added_device_trustworthiness
C
Algorithm 14 Counter-Algorithm for Selection Method 3 - Most Suitably Located Vol-
unteers
for all locations in range of added_device
increase location_value by 1
if device is farthest known device from location then
if added_device is friend then
increase location_value by farthest_weight
else
decrease location_value by farthest_weight
elseif added_device is friend then
increase location_value by 1
else
compute distance between x coordinates
compute distance between y coordinates
if distance to location_value is not equal to device_range then
decrease location_value by
(
1
(range−x_distance)∗0.5 +
1
(range−y_distance)∗0.5
)
else
decrease location_value by 1
D
